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This thesis is a descriptive, comparative organizational analysis of Navy Recruiting 
District, San Diego during two time periods: Fiscal years 1997-1998 and 1999-2000.  The 
purpose of this study was to determine those factors affecting organizational performance in 
the primary area of Enlisted Recruiting production of the district in both time periods using a 
systems analysis.  Based on model comparisons, document reviews, interviews, and personal 
communications with the leaders, supervisors and recruiters of NRD San Diego, analysis 
indicates that the district of FY97-98 was ill-equipped in strategy, resources and processes to 
perform effectively in a more demanding environment.  The heightened goal requirements 
and increased number of recruiting personnel placed on all recruiting districts between 1997 
and 1998 exposed NRD San Diego’s system weaknesses, resulting in lower indicators of 
successful performance.  The FY99-00 district appeared to handle change better including 
higher indicators of successful performance such as process improvements, energetic 
leadership, flattened communication and work flow structures and a well-defined direction.  
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A. OVERVIEW     
Navy Recruiting Command is organized into 31 Navy Recruiting Districts 
(NRD’s) operating in four Regions.  Each NRD is goaled, manned, budgeted and 
equipped with population, demographic, and historical factors taken into account.  
Districts, then presumably operate under a “level playing field” in their attempt to make 
their assigned goals.  From year to year, districts are assigned and receive a fair and 
proportionate amount of manning, money and goal to match their market and size.   
In fiscal year 1998, NRD San Diego, a historical powerhouse in Navy Recruiting, 
failed to achieve its monthly New Contract Objectives (NCO) ten out of twelve months.1  
Subsequently, the district failed to meet its yearly New Contract goal.2  Table 1 
summarizes San Diego’s New Contract Objective and Accession Goal attainment over 
the time periods covering fiscal years (FYs) 1997-2000. 
Just the year before, the district overwrote its yearly New Contract goal by 150 
contracts.  Part of the demise was a large goal increase.  The goal was 384 more contracts 
than the previous year.  Unfortunately, even with seasoned leadership and an increase in 
manning, the organization could not perform effectively with the new demands placed 
upon it.  San Diego was not alone.  Only one district in the nation made goal that year.  
However, San Diego “bounced back” in 1999, making goal and earning selection as 
Commander, Navy Recruiting Command’s (CNRC’s) National District of the Year.  
Most of the nation’s other districts, however, continued their slow recovery.  In fact, it 
was not until a nationwide goal decrease in 2001 and downturn in the economy that most 
districts achieved consistent NCO attainment   
The purpose of this study is to determine those factors that affected organizational 
performance of Navy Recruiting District, San Diego by comparing two distinct time 
                                                 
1 A fiscal year starts in October and ends in September of the next year to coincide with the federal 
budgeting schedule. 
2 New Contract Goal, NCO, and “goal” are different ways to say the same thing, the number of new 
contract quotas assigned to the district either on a yearly or annual basis.  The term “goal,” will be preceded 
by the type of goal if meant for anything other than new contracts.  For example, if the study discusses 
accession goals, then the word “accessions” will specifically precede the word “goal.”   
1 
periods:  FYs 1997-1998, and FYs 1999-2000.  Using a systems analysis, factors will be 
identified which may have contributed to the successful or unsuccessful performance 
during the four-year period.  
 
FY 1997 1998 1999 2000 
New Contract 
Objective 2010 2394 2540 2610 
New Contract 
Objective Attained 2160 2220 2555 2766 
% New Contract 
Objective Attained 107% 93% 101% 106% 
Accession Goal 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Table 1.0. NCO/Accession Attainment Summary NRD San Diego: 1997-2000. 
 
B. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses a four-step approach to analyzing NRD San Diego.  First, a 
literature review is conducted of systems theory to obtain the tools necessary for analysis.  
Second, to help understand the context of the analysis, a general description of a Navy 
Recruiting District is provided within the literature review.  Third, NRD San Diego is 
analyzed during the four-year period using a Systems Model and Fit “Checklist”, 
comparing the system that existed in 1997-98 with that of 1999-00.  Finally, conclusions 
and recommendations are offered to assist managers in achieving better organizational 
performance. 
C. BENEFIT OF THE STUDY 
Research through interviews and data collection indicates that many districts are 
currently mired in the same situation as NRD SD in FY97-98.  The study describes in 
detail those factors that may have caused the inefficiency of that particular organizational 
system.  Possible avenues for change will be suggested, which may lead to improvements 
and hopefully, mission accomplishment.  In fact, leadership at any recruiting district that 
is failing to make goal, regardless of their specific market, can read this thesis and 
determine if any of the organizational changes that occurred applies to their situation.  
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The data used in the thesis are primarily derived from approximately 72 
interviews and personal conversations.  The lessons learned specifically apply to NRD 
2 
San Diego, although some general applications may be applied to other recruiting 
districts.  As well, more data was retrieved for the 99-00 time period than for the 97-98 
system because many of the recruiters, zone supervisors and leadership from the earlier 
era were not accessible.  There were, however, approximately 30 individuals from the 99-
00 time frame who also served briefly (at least 3 months) in 97-98. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
Chapter II is a literature review.  It discusses systems theory and its use in 
analyzing organizations.  Subsequently, the review describes the basic systems model 
which is used as the basis for analysis.  As well, a specific checklist of fit method is 
discussed.  The chapter also provides the necessary context to understand the Navy 
Recruiting System and the organization of a Navy Recruiting District.  Chapter III 
discusses the model results.  The systems model is used to compare and contrast those 
inputs, design factors, culture(s) and outputs/outcomes prevalent in both time periods.  
The chapter concludes by analyzing the congruence of fit between the various elements 
of the two models and the environmental influences on the two systems.  Finally, Chapter 
IV offers conclusions in the form of similarities and differences, and recommendations 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A. SYSTEMS THEORY   
This study uses an organizational systems model3 to analyze Navy Recruiting 
District, San Diego (NRD SD) in two distinct time periods.  Systems thinking arose from 
the study of systems dynamics, founded in 1956 by MIT professor Jay Forrester.4  The 
systems approach looks at the organization as a whole, how its individual components 
“fit” with each other and its external environment.  This runs contrary to other methods of 
analyses that focus exclusively on individual parts.   
McNamara (2002) provides the following definition of a system: 
A system can be described as a collection of parts or subsystems, 
integrated to accomplish an overall goal.  Systems have an input, 
processes, outputs and outcomes, with ongoing feedback among all the 
parts.  The system also incorporates the environment, and for social 
systems: culture is a factor.  If one part of the system is removed, the 
nature of the system is changed.   
A system can range from very simple to complex.  There are numerous 
types of systems.  For example, a heart is a biological system, while a 
thermostat is a mechanical system.  Human/mechanical systems include 
riding a bike while a predator/prey relationship is an example of an 
ecological system.  Complex systems, such as social systems, are 
comprised of numerous subsystems as well.  Each susbsystem has its own 
boundaries, and includes separate inputs, processes, outputs and outcomes 
geared to accomplish an overall goal for the subsystem. 
A pile of sand is not a system.  If one removes a sand particle, there’s still 
a pile of sand.   However, if you remove the carburetor from a car, there’s 
no longer a functioning system.5 
An organization can be analyzed as a system.  McNamara continues,  
Systems theory has brought a new perspective for managers to interpret 
patterns and events in their organizations.  In the past, managers typically 
took one part and focused on that.  Then they moved all attention to 
another part.  The problem was that an organization could, for example, 
                                                 
3 Roberts, Nancy, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2000. 
4 Arons, Daniel, “Overview of Systems Thinking,” 2002. 
5 McNamara, Carter, “Thinking About Organizations as Systems,” from 
http://www.mapnp.org/library/org?thry?org_sytm.htm, downloaded 10/18/2002. 
5 
have wonderful departments that operate well by themselves but don’t 
integrate well together.  Consequently, the organization suffers as a 
whole.6 
Harrison (1987) adds: 
A model of an organization as an open system can help practitioners 
choose topics for diagnosis, develop criteria for assessing organizational 
effectiveness, and decide what steps, if any, will…help solve problems 
and enhance organizational effectiveness.7 
Systems thinking has identified several principles of “fit” that are common to 
systems.  These principles help one to better understand how organizations work.  They 
include: 
• The system’s overall behavior depends on its entire structure (which is 
more than the sum of its various parts).  The structure determines the 
various behaviors, which affect various outcomes.  The traditional method 
of breaking up an organization into separate parts, analyzing the parts, and 
ignoring their relationships is ineffective.  As McNamara says, “when you 
break apart an elephant, you don’t get little elephants.” 
Organizations are constantly changing as relationships among key 
variables shift.  An organization’s responses to internal and external 
changes depend on members’ interpretations of these changes and their 
decisions about how to deal with them.  Information about internal and 
external developments flows through both official and unofficial channels.  
Small changes in one part of the system may not require more than routine 
adjustments in other elements, but major changes in one element can set 
off a series of changes in others.8 
• Systems tend to seek balance with their environments.  On the contrary, 
those that do not interact with their environment, tend to be ineffective.9 
An organization’s success depends heavily on its ability to adapt to its 
environment-or to find a favorable environment in which to operate-as 
well as on its ability to tie people into their roles in the organization, 
conducts its transformative process, and manage its operations.10   
Environment influences the flow of inputs to organizations, design factors 
and results.  
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
7 Harrison, Michael I., Diagnosing Organizations: Methods, Models and Processes, Sage Publications: 
London: 1987, p. 23. 
8 Harrison, 1987, p. 26. 
9 McNamara, p. 2. 
10 Harrison, 1987, p. 27. 
6 
• There can be an optimum size for a system.  A system can be too large.  
In the same way, a system “bite off more than it can chew.”  As well, there 
are systems that can expand that are not performing up to their potential.11   
• A circular relationship exists between the overall system and its parts.  
Problems seem to cycle through an organization over and over again.  
Unless harmful cycles are recognized and changed, problems continually 
re-surface. 
B. THE BASIC SYSTEMS MODEL 
The systems model is used to gather basic organizational information at the 
beginning of the organizational diagnosis, followed by an analysis of the system 
congruence using the gathered information.12  
There are several versions of the systems model used in organizational analysis.  
The model used in this analysis is adapted from Roberts’13 Organizational Systems 
Framework (see Figure 2.1) and from a description provided by Harrison.14  This study 
gathers basic organizational information on the organizations using the systems model 
described below. 
All parts of the model affect each other.  Although the model suggests that the 
flow of the system is sequential and linear, the parts of the model are actually 
independent and the activity is concurrent.  The main elements basic systems model 
consists of Inputs, which include the Context (environment, resources and history), 
Critical or Key Success Factors, and System Direction.  Environment is actually external 
to the system and includes external organizations, economic states, political policies and 
other external entities or forces that influence the entire system.  The inputs are linked to 
the Design Factors, which include the Tasks, Technology, Structure, People and 
Processes/Subsystems of the organization.  Culture is an emergent or resultant variable 
largely determined by the preceding phases.  Outputs are goods and services produced 
and Outcomes are consequences of outputs.  Feedback Loops mean the system is 
dynamic and interdependent.  
                                                 
11 McNamara, p. 2. 
12 Harrison, 1987, p. 27. 
13 Roberts, Nancy, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2000. 
14 Harrison, 1987, p. 23. 
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ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK 




































(External to System) 
Political? Social? 
Economic? Technological? 
KEY SUCCESS FACTORS: 
What does it take for the system to 
be successful? 
SYSTEM DIRECTION: 
How is direction promulgated? 
Mandate?  Values? Mission 





What are the basic tasks?          How are they formulated? 
What Specification is required?      How varied are they?      What differentiation is required? 
 
TECHNOLOGY: 
What is the level of technology used by the organization? 
Is the organization effectively utilizing the best available means of conducting work, performing processes? 
 
STRUCTURE:  
Describe the structure,  what are the basic groupings of activities and people? 
How are activities and tasks combined? Departmentalized? 
How are the groupings integrated?      What integrating devices are used? 
Hierarchy?      Task Forces?   Integrating roles?  Matrix?  Networks? 
 
PEOPLE: 
Who are the people?  Motives, Expectations, Mindsets? 
What are their knowledge, skills and abilities? 
 
PROCESS/SUBSYSTEMS: 
Financial Management, Measurement and Controls- 
How are people held accountable for resources? 
Describe budgeting, control performance measurement, performance appraisal processes 
Do these methods of accountability produce the desired patterns of behavior? 
Human Resource Management- 
How do we recruit, select, retain, rotate, promote, terminate, retire our people? 
Do we have the kind if people we need? 
How do we train and develop people and are our current efforts adequate? 
Describe OJT, formal training programs, team building and other development activities 
What is formally rewarded (both positive and negative rewards)? 
What is the basic compensation package?     Are rewards tied to performance assessment? 
Communication, Information Planning and Decision Making- 
How do we communicate?     How do we gather, process, distribute and evaluate information? 
How do we plan?           How do we make decisions 
CULTURE 
How things are done.    Leaders role.    Importance of assessing culture. 
The operating system of the organization.   Subcultures? 
Six major cultural characteristics: Leaders, Symbols, Values, Heroes, Rituals, Norms and Assumptions 
OUTPUTS/OUTCOMES 
What does the system offer/produce in terms of goods and/or services?  
How are outputs measured?                              What are indicators of performance? 
What are the implications/consequences of outputs for stakeholders?   
How are outputs viewed in terms of the environment? 
Figure 2.1. Organizational Systems Framework15. 
8 
                                                 
15 Adapted from Nancy Roberts, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2002. 
The following is a detailed description of the organizational systems framework 
model which will be used to obtain basic organizational information for each time-frame. 
1. Inputs 
a. Context 
According to Nadler and Tushman16, context comprises the elements that 
make up the “givens” facing an organization.  One of the most important givens and a 
significant influence on the system as a whole is its environment.  Environment is an 
external factor to the organizational system.  The environment includes individuals, 
groups, or other organizations that affect how the organization performs.  The 
environment also includes the political, economic, social and technological influences.  
When analyzing an organization, one must consider the factors in the environment and 
how they create demands, constraints, or opportunities. 
Other contextual factors not specifically included in the Roberts model are 
resources and history.  Resources are simply the assets an organization, such as 
employees, technology, capital, and information. 
History describes the influence the past has on the organization’s 
performance.  An organization’s past performance and the impact of historical events on 
that performance can be significant factors in the current performance of an organization. 
b. Key Success Factors 
Simply put, what does it take for the system (organization) to be 
successful? “Management must ask sufficient questions to ascertain the requirements 
essential for success.”17  Success factors for each organization may be different.  In fact, 
an organization may define different success factors from year to year.  Governmental 
organizations may have success factors that are less tangible than private, profit-based 
organizations.  However, some public organizations, like recruiting districts and the 
quotas they must attain, have measurable success factors.  There may also be success 
factors that are considered more important than others.  These secondary success factors 
                                                 
16 Nadler, D. and Tushman, M., Strategic Organizational Design, Scott Foresman and Company: 
Glenview, Illinois, 1988. 
17 Bruner, Bradley, An Organizational Analysis of the Military (Navy) Personnel Plans and Policy 
Division (N13), Naval Postgraduate School, Master’s Thesis, Monterey, California, 1998, p. 10. 
9 
may or may not be accomplished, but are not considered essential in order for the 
organization as a whole to be considered successful. 
c. System Direction 
This input in the model asks the question: how does the organization 
disseminate the strategy, mission, goals and direction to the employees and the public?  
Does the organization mandate, suggest, or guide?  Of course, the type of direction varies 
with every organization.  Some may use a vision statement, while others use strategic 
goals.  Still others simply tell the organization through top-down directives through such 
mediums as e-mail, faxes or letters.  Finally, the management may lead by example, 
hoping the rest of the organization follows suit. 
2. Design Factors 
The next stage in the system is throughput, which is made up of design factors.  
These design factors are the individual components of the organization.  Although system 
fit amongst all the elements of the system is important, congruence among these specific 
design factors is often critical for organizational success:18 
a. Tasks/Jobs 
What are the basic tasks that need to be accomplished in the organization?  
Do the lower level employees, middle management and top executives perform clearly 
defined tasks?  Each organization contains within it different types of work, from 
management to manual labor.  The nature of each type of work must be clearly defined in 
order to be efficient.  
b. Technology 
The level of technology employed by the organization in areas such as 
information systems, communication, data storage and collection, internet, local area 
networks and computers, has a significant effect on the effectiveness of the 
organization.19  Obviously, increased technology usually requires increased financial and 
time investments, which some organizations simply cannot afford.  Other organizations 
choose not to upgrade their technology because they feel they are accomplishing the 
mission of their organization with their current technology. 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 Simon, Cary, Personal Communication at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, May 2002. 
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c. Structure 
Structure describes the organizational hierarchy, or lack thereof, of the 
organization.  It also describes the people and their integrating roles, as well as any 
matrices of sub-organizations that occur within the overall system.  Structure also 
answers the question: Are there task forces and/or special networks involved in the 
organization? 
d. People 
The people design factor refers to not only the knowledge, skills and 
abilities (KSA’s) of the people involved in the organization, their demographic 
background, and experience. 
e. Process/Subsystems 
There are several processes and subsystems that each organization 
performs: 
• Human Resource Management  (HRM):  This subsystem answers the 
question: “How does the organization recruit, select, rotate, promote, 
terminate and retire their people?”  HRM is also concerned with obtaining 
the right people for the job.  Additionally, it answers how the organization 
trains, and develops its people.  Does the organization use OJT, formal 
training programs?  Does the organization use Team Building and/or 
organizational developmental activities?  Is the organization concerned 
with career development?  HRM is also concerned with rewards and 
praise and how they are tied to performance.   
• Measurement and Controls, Financial Management:  This subprocess is 
concerned with the mechanisms and processes designed to hold 
individuals accountable for behavior and resources.  The subprocess 
includes performance appraisal and measurement and budgetary controls.  
Recruiting districts have different ways of measuring the performance of 
their recruiters.   
• Planning, Communication and Information Management:  Planning may 
involve extensive meetings, video-teleconferencing, and/or written 
guidance.  As well, how does the organization communicate on a day-to-
day basis?  Some organizations use meetings as the primary information 
exchange venue.  Some organizations use informal calls and/or e-mail to 
talk to each other.  Still others may combine both informal and formal 
aspects of communication.  Information management is an extremely 
critical subprocess for many organizations.  Organizations such as 
recruiting rely on statistics to determine trends and predict performance.  
How information is gathered and used may help to explain the success of 
an organization.  
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3. Culture 
The culture of an organization is an important factor to consider during analysis.  
Culture pertains to the prevalent norms and values found in a system.  It is the way the 
organization conducts business.  Culture “drives the organization and its actions.  It is 
somewhat like an ‘operating system’ of the organization.  It guides how employees think, 
act and feel.  It is dynamic and fluid, and it is never static.  A culture may be effective at 
one time, under a given set of circumstances and ineffective at another time.”20  Analysts 
must study culture “to maximize its ability to attain strategic objectives, the organization 
must understand if the prevailing culture supports and drives the actions necessary to 
achieve those goals.”21   
Another definition of culture is “a pattern of basic assumptions, invented, 
discovered, or developed by a group as it learns to cope with its problems of external 
adaptation and integration; that has worked well enough to be considered valid, and 
therefore has to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel 
in relation to their problems.”22  
Hagberg and Heifetz (2002) say the following about culture:23 
• Culture can become ingrained and unconscious:  Culture can be viewed 
at several levels.  Some aspects of culture are visible and tangible and 
others are intangible and unconscious.  Basic assumptions that guide the 
organization are deeply rooted and often taken for granted.  Recently hired 
employees, the external consultant and the executive coach are frequently 
in the best position to identify those “unconscious” assumptions that the 
insider fails to see.  Espoused or secondary values are at a more conscious 
level; these are the values that people in the organization discuss, promote 
and try to live by.  All employees of Hewlett Packard, for example, are 
required to become familiar with values embodied in the “HP Way.” 
• Artifacts express culture:  Some of the most visible expression of the 
culture are called artifacts.  These include the architecture and décor, the 
clothing people wear, the organizational processes and structure, and their 
                                                 
20 Hagberg, Richard and Heifetz, Julie, “Corporate Culture/Organizational Culture: Telling the CEO 
that his/her Baby is Ugly,” Downloaded from http://www.hcgnet.com/html/articles/understanding-
culture.html, 2002, p. 2. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Schein, E., Organizational Culture and Leadership: A Dynamic View, Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, 
1985. 
23 Hagberg and Heifetz, p. 3. 
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rituals, symbols and celebrations.  Other concrete manifestation of culture 
are found in commonly used language and jargon, logos, brochures, 
company slogans, as well as status symbols such as cars, window offices, 
titles and of course value statements and priorities.  An outsider can often 
spot these artifacts easily upon entering an organization.  For insiders, 
however, these artifacts have often become part of the background.   
• The Leader can drive culture:  One of the critical factors in understanding 
a corporate culture is the degree to which it is leader-centric.  When one 
asks the question:  How central is the leader to the style of this 
organization?  The organization’s culture often reflects the personality of 
the leader, including that leader’s neurosis.  So if a CEO tends to avoid 
conflict and sweeps it under the carpet, the company then tends to avoid 
conflict.  The behavior that is modeled by the leader and the management 
team profoundly shapes the culture and practices of the organization.  
What management emphasizes, rewards and punishes can tell you what is 
really important.  The behavior of members of the senior team, their 
reactions in a crises and what they routinely talk about, all sets the tone of 
the culture.  If the culture is already firmly established when the CEO 
assumed leadership and he/she simply inherited a set of traditions, then 
he/she may play the role of the guardian of the old culture.  On the other 
hand, CEO’s such as Lou Gerstner at IBM, or Lee Iococca at Chrysler 
were brought in to be a change agent charged with dramatically 
transforming the organizational culture. 
• Subcultures may exist: Many organizations may possess one pervasive 
culture, with several less impacting subcultures.  Many others contain a 
mixture of several subcultures.  It may be unrealistic and undesirable to try 
and homogenize the organization across all of its parts.  It may be 
worthwhile, however, to eliminate or weaken any detrimental subcultures 
within the organization. 
In sum, there are six characteristics that characterize and influence culture in an 
organization:24 
• Leadership: Establishes the vision and sets the example for the culture in 
such a way that leads the organization towards mission accomplishment. 
• Symbols: Physical or visual reminders of important safety values. 
• Values: Spoken principles that guide the decisions of workers and 
managers. 
• Heroes: Organizational members that role model the values. 
• Rituals: Regular celebrations, ceremonies or activities that reinforce the 
importance of success. 
                                                 
24 Simon, Steven I. “Measurement as a Transformative Tool:  The Culture Assessment”, downloaded 
from http://www.camcoderinfo.com/ccc/measurepaper.html, October 22, 2002. 
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• Norms and Assumptions: Norms are the group’s expectations for safe 
behavior.  Assumptions are the beliefs about what is accepted and what is 
not.  
Culture derives from the previous phases of the systems model.  Everything that 
occurs prior, inputs, system direction and design factors, all work to develop the culture 
of the organization.  Culture transforms when any of the previous factors are changed. 
4. Outputs and Outcomes 
The end product of the organization and the “final” phase of the model are the 
outputs and outcomes.  What is the organization producing?  What goods and services 
does it provide?  Output can usually be measured.  It is a measure of how well an 
organization meets its objectives and utilizes resources.  The output is often based on the 
method of measurement and is typically the performance indicator in an organization.  
Outcomes deal with the implications and consequences that outputs have on stakeholders 
and how the outputs are interpreted in view of the environment.  In order to be an 
integrated system, the outcomes must feed back to the environment and the design 
factors. 
C. ANALYSIS OF SYSTEM FIT 
The overall goal of systems analysis is to determine the congruence of fit between 
all the factors that make up the system in order to achieve the critical success factors.  
That is, the analysis attempts to answer such questions as “Do the tasks match the 
structure?” or “does the technology fit with the people?” or “Do the design factors result 
in an effective culture?”  All these factors must work and fit together to produce an 
effective system.   
A systems model is useful when analyzing organizations because it shows the 
interrelationship between all the factors that influence an organization.  Systems theory 
assumes that an organization can be thoroughly analyzed only by looking at the sum of 
all parts and at the congruence, if any, between them.  If the different parts of an 
organization fit well together, the organization is likely to perform better.  If the pieces 
are not operating at a high level of congruence, then the organization will likely 
experience problems, dysfunction, and poor performance.  The basic hypothesis of the 
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congruence model is that organizations will be more effective the greater the congruence 
or fit between the major components.25  
This study analyzes congruence using Harrison’s (1987) Checklist of Important 
Fits (Table 2.0).  The table presents those questions that “research and consulting practice 
have shown to be especially important” in analyzing the effectiveness and efficiency of 
organizations.26  Some of the questions were modified for this study.  Harrison 
categorizes these components into “Focal Areas.”  Elements of the system are 
categorized under the Focal Areas and analyzed for fit using Harrison’s questions.  The 
method essentially answers the question: “Does the focal area fit with the system 
element?” 
To quantify the overall level of fit of the system, values were assigned to the 
answers given to each question.  An answer of “YES” equals a score of “2”; an answer of 
YES and NO equals a score of “1”; and an answer of “NO” equals a score of “0.”  The 
higher the total score the better the congruence of fit of the system.  Therefore, positive 
answers to the questions provided by Harrison’s method result in better congruence 
between system elements. 
D. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF A RECRUITING DISTRICT  
A general overview of a recruiting district is required in order to understand the 
systems models presented for NRD San Diego.  The overview gives insight and 
clarification as to the missions, organization, resources and processes of a typical 
recruiting district.  The primary source of information for this chapter were the CNRC 
Standard Organization Manual (CNRCINST 5400.1F), the CNRC Recruiting Manual 
(CNRCINST 1130.8) and the Standard Operations Manual (CNRCINST 5400.2).   
The 31 NRD’s are geographically separated into four regions: North, West, South 
and Central.  NRD San Diego is located in Region West.  Each region is led by a 
Commodore (0-6).  NRDs are divided into the following departments: Logistic Support, 
LEADS, Administration, Public Affairs, ADP (System Administration), Officer 
Programs and Enlisted Programs.  
                                                 
25 Bruner, 1998, p. 13. 
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Were the best people attracted and retained by the rewards and advancement opportunities 
offered? 
R Were the organization’s strategies and programs be supported by available resources? 
E Did the organization’s strategies, tactics and objectives help it gain and maintain a favorable 
position in its environment? 
Did management express its purposes in ways that create a sense of mission and identity among 
members? 
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C Pr Did managerial plans and objectives contribute to work, or were they too inflexible to handle 
unforeseen developments? 
Were those people who must work together closely grouped in units or otherwise linked 
structurally? 
Were the procedures for coordinating work and information flows appropriate for the tasks and 
the technology? S C 







S Are tasks and functions done adequately with minimal overlap?   
Did members regard official rules and procedures as fair and sensible? 
Pe Pr C 
Did reward and control mechanisms encourage behavior and group norms that were compatible 
with managerial objectives? 
T E Were the structures of the organization differentiated enough to allow them to handle their special 
problems created by their particular environments, technologies and tasks? 
T Pr Did the physical and geographic layout of the organization contribute to the flow of work and 
information? 
Were group actions and decisions free from bitter conflicts or power struggles? 







Did people and units have enough power and resources to accomplish their tasks adequately? 
KEY: S- Structure T- Technology Pr-Processes R-Resources E-Environment C-Culture Pe-People 
Table 2.0. Harrison’s Checklist of Important Fits. 
 
A typical NRD is also divided into geographic zones.  Depending on the size of 
the district, there could be as little as four zones to as many as a dozen.  The zones 
contain a specific number of recruiting stations.  Zone supervisors lead the zones, and the 
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stations are led by Recruiters-In-Charge (RINCs).  These RINCs, who supervise the 
recruiters in their stations, report directly to their zone supervisors. 
1. Mission 
The mission of a Navy Recruiting District (NRD) is as follows: 
Manage recruiting activity within the assigned Navy Recruiting District in 
the recruitment of men and women who meet mental, moral, physical and 
other specific standards for enlistment or reenlistment; obtain the best 
qualified men and women applicants from civilian sources for enlistment 
as officer candidates and for direct appointment as officers in the Regular 
Navy and Naval Reserve.27 
The major responsibilities of an NRD are to make goals, manage resources and 
improve Navy awareness. 
2. Organization 
The focus of the description will be on the enlisted production function of the 
organization.    
a. Executive Leadership 
The Commanding officer is usually an 0-5 Unrestricted Line, Fleet 
Support (1100), or Human Resources (1200) Officer, who “fleets up” from an 18 month 
tour as the command’s XO.  The CO serves an 18 month tour.  The Command Master 
Chief (CMC) is a fleet sailor who may or may not have prior recruiting experience.  The 
CMC is the principal enlisted advisor to the Commanding officer.  
b. Support Departments 
(1) Logistics Support.  Each district has a Supply Department 
typically led by a Storekeeper Chief Petty Officer or higher, known as the Logistics 
Support Officer (LSO).  The department is responsible for all vehicles and facilities.  As 
well, the LSO employs a civilian Budget Assistant (BA) who executes and plans the 
command budget.  The LSO also performs all the purchasing for the command. 
(2) LEADS.  The Local Effective Accession Data System 
(LEADS) department is led by the LEAD Tracking Center Supervisor (LTCS).  The 
LTCS can be a fleet or CRF sailor (usually a chief petty officer or above).  The LTCS 
supervises the generation, processing and tracking of leads through newspaper 
                                                 
27 COMNAVCRUITCOMINST 5400.1F, p. 11-1. 
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advertising, direct mail and other local advertising.  The LTCS also  tracks all National 
Leads forwarded to the Officer/Enlisted recruiting force as prospects for 
enlistment/selection into the Navy.  Finally, the LTCS must also be able to perform as a 
recruiter.  . 
Leads are either national or local.  National leads are those 
received through nation-wide advertising campaigns, such as the web-site and television 
commercials.  Local leads are generated through local advertising campaigns conducted 
by each district.   
Typically, a recruit will be asked by the recruiter “what brought 
him into the recruiting office” or “what got him interested in the Navy.”  If the recruit 
mentions a specific advertisement, or if they saw something such as a recruiting poster 
that piqued their interest, the recruiter will note the “lead” and send the information to the 
district’s leads department.  If the recruit joins the Navy, the lead will help to show which 
advertising campaigns are successful. 
(3) Chief Administrator (CA)/Administration (Admin) 
Department.  The Chief Administrator (CA) supervises the command’s administration 
department.  He or she is typically a Personnelman (PN) or Yeoman (YN) Chief or 
above.  The CA implements administrative and personnel policies and is responsible for 
the efficient and effective administrative functioning of the NRD.  The CA usually 
supervises the typing of officer and enlisted fitness reports and evaluations, and maintains 
the command reports tickler files.   
(4) Public Affairs Officer (PAO).  The PAO is the principal 
advisor to the CO on all public affairs activities.  He or she ensures efficient and effective 
planning and execution of these activities.  The job can be a collateral duty for an officer 
or enlisted recruiter; or the command can have a Journalist (JO) or Photographer’s Mate 
(PH) assigned to the command.   
One of the primary duties of the PAO is to maintain active liaison 
with print and electronic media.  The PAO also writes articles and places news and 
feature materials in local media, including DEP news releases.  The PAO visits media 
outlets frequently with the commanding officer and/or recruiters to promote public 
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services advertising.28  The PAO can also act as the command spokesperson on military 
issues.  Finally, the PAO is also the command’s newsletter publisher and liaison for all 
visiting navy performance teams (The i.e. Blue Angels) and traveling exhibit vans.   
(5) Educational Specialist (EDSPEC).  The EDSPEC 
(EDSPEC) is a civilian employee of the command who is the expert on all matters related 
to applicant education.  Since a high school diploma is one of the qualifying criteria that 
applicants have to meet, EDSPECS are an invaluable member of the production chain.  
EDSPECs can distinguish between qualifying and non-qualifying education credentials, 
especially those credentials associated with home-schooling and alternative education 
programs.  Figure 2.2 describes the organization of a typical NRD (with an emphasis on 
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• Monitoring vehicle operation, domicile to duty and safe driving programs  
• Maintaining expeditious publication of current information and changes  
• Maintaining accountability of assigned property 
• Ensuring all property security procedures are followed 
• Ensuring proper military bearing and dress for personnel 
• Recommending rewards or remedial action regarding performance 
• Attending and participating in Zone/NRD Production, Planning, Training 
meetings 
The EPO has an integral role in the resource planning of the district.  
EPOs assist in developing the district’s marketing operations, training, advertising and 
financial plans.  The EPO distributes and monitors the expenditure of assigned funds in 
accordance with the command’s budgetary plans.  The EPO also ensures the efficient use 
of all assigned resources and monitors and distributes RAD (Recruiter Aid Devices) 
items.  The EPO also recommends placement of personnel in the field and support 
assignments. 
The Enlisted Programs Officer provides feedback information to update 
the District’s MOP (Marketing Operations Plan) based on the analysis of its 
accomplishment.  He or she also develops department production plans to ensure 
consistent attainment of enlisted recruiting goals.  The EPO also ensures that a current 
STEAM29 is conducted and used throughout the NRD Enlisted Programs Department. 
The EPO compiles, reviews and submits input to the annual training plan 
and implementing the district/CNRC training plan.  More specifically, the EPO 
schedules, prioritizes, conducts, monitors, enforces, evaluates, adjusts, documents and 
inspects his department’s training program.  A significant responsibility the EPO has 
towards the fleet sailors is to ensure in-rate study time is provided to them for 
advancement exams.  Finally, the EPO ensures the department is in compliance with 
CNRC’s Recruiter Qualification Standards (RQS)30 policy. 
The EPO supervises the Chief Recruiter to ensure the attainment of goals 
is the primary responsibility with regards to recruiting.  The EPO must also identify 
                                                 
29 Standard Territory Evaluation Analysis Market. 
30 Similar to Personnel Qualification Standards, completion required to qualify for certain positions. 
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weaknesses and/or deficiencies in the DEP program and assists the CR in training them, 
especially to reduce or eliminate attrition.  The EPO keeps a watchful eye on the specialty 
recruiting programs such as Nuclear Power.  There should be a close recruiting 
relationship with the Officer Programs Officer to ensure mutual recruiting benefits.  
Some enlisted applicants may be eligible for officer programs and vice versa.  Liaison 
with local educational, labor and governmental employment personnel is maintained by 
the EPO.  The EPO is also the link between the active duty recruiting programs and the 
reserve recruiting activities.  As well, the EPO should maintain a database on Qualified 
Not Enlisted (QNE)31 personnel. 
The EPO is responsible for supervising the Enlisted Processing Division 
Supervisor (EPDS) to ensure proper processing procedures.  The EPO should also 
maintain liaison with the MEPS Processing team (Operations Officer, Testing Officer, 
and MEPS Commanding officer) to ensure expeditious and courteous processing for 
Navy applicants.  EPOs should also establish an applicant control system to meet MEPS 
and Recruit Training Command “level-loading” 32 requirements.  MEPS and RTC only 
have a certain amount of man-hours and equipment for the processing of personnel per 
day.  The EPO must ensure that the applicant flow can be accommodated by both MEPS 
and RTC.  Within the processing procedure itself, the EPO ensures that the classification 
interview system is efficient.  Finally, EPOs ensure that applicants and enlistees are 
accounted for within the district. 
The EPO regularly reviews kits of waiver33 applicants.  He or she ensures 
the kits are properly processed.  In addition, the EPO can also conduct interviews when 
allowed by CNRC.  As well, he reviews pre-enlistment kits and error feedback 
information.  Lastly, he is responsible for waiver and attrition analysis for both the 
Delayed Entry Program and Recruit Training Command.  The following section describes 
                                                 
31 QNE’s (Qualified, Not Enlisted) are those applicants who have passed the ASVAB and are qualified 
medically, and academically but for whatever reason, just do not want to enlist.  The EPO should be aware 
of these potential recruits for they may change their minds and decide to enlist later. 
32 RTC is limited by the number of seats it has available in bootcamp, requiring that recruits enter 
bootcamp in a steady stream as opposed to unbalanced accession patterns.   
33 Applicants can receive waivers for various reasons including minor drug and criminal infractions 
and medical irregularities. 
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the three “divisions” under the EPO’s responsibility: EPO Administration, MEPS 
Liaison, and the recruiters. 
(1) EPO Administration.  One of the key figures in the 
command is the Statistician who maintains and reports all the statistics for the recruiters.  
These statistics usually include goals assigned and attained for the zones and stations.  
Individual NCO accomplishment, program goals (nuke, mental category and minority 
category) and attrition are other statistics that can be maintained and reported.  The 
statistics can be reported on a daily or weekly basis.  A statistics reporting system could 
range from an elaborate electronic set-up with an automatically updated database and 
fancy reports (possibly in Microsoft EXCEL), to archaic pen and ink systems that require 
tedious hand-computations.  The statistician is the driving force behind the maintenance 
of enlisted production/processing accountability.   
Other EPO Administration Team Members include a Yeoman or 
Personnelman (EPO Administrator or EPO YN).  The EPO YN conducts a variety of 
administrative duties, such as evaluation writing and chit routing.   
In addition, the EPO can also have, but not always, the following 
members of his EPO Admin team: an Assistant EPO, and DEP Coordinator.  The 
Assistant EPO can be an Enlisted or Officer who aids in the EPO in his duties.  The DEP 
Coordinator’s duties vary in each district, with the primary focus being the focal point for 
DEP activity and management.   
(2) The Field.  The Chief Recruiter (CR) leads the recruiting 
function of a recruiting district.  The CR serves in the role of a division officer for the 
field under the EPO.  The CR is the primary supervisor of all the field recruiters and is 
held responsible for making all goals.  The CR is usually a CRF Master or Senior Chief 
Petty Officer with extensive recruiting experience as a recruiter all the way up to zone 
supervisor.  Some CR’s are on their second or third CR tours.  The CR is, bottom line, the 
subject matter expert on recruiting.  According to CNRCINST 5400.1F, the CR’s job 
description is as follows: 
Serve as the Department Leading Chief Petty Officer.  Train zone 
supervisors, district trainers, DEP coordinator(s) and special program 
recruiters.  Manage, supervise and coordinate the use of all NRD 
resources, training and systems to attain enlisted goals.  Serve as the 
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primary advisor to the Commanding officer in matters pertaining to 
enlisted production.   
The primary areas of concern as outlined below: 
• Production.  The CR assigns all goals to the zones and ensures monthly 
goaling notices are distributed to the field.  The CR monitors and analyzes 
NRD processing/prospecting activity to ensure objectives are being met.   
• Training.  The CR implements the CNRC/district training plan.  The CR 
also schedules, prioritizes, monitors, conducts, enforces, evaluates, 
adjusts, documents, and inspects the plan.  CRs must allow for in-rate 
study and comply with CNRC’s PQS policy. 
• Managing Resources.  The CR’s duties with regard to resource 
management are the same as the EPO’s except for several points.  The CR 
acts as the primary advisor to the CO on all matters related to the DEP.  
The CR is the focal point for any NRD directives related to DEP.  The CR 
ensures the ZSs, district trainers, 6YO/NF recruiters and DEP Coordinator 
attain applicable milestones specified in the District MOP.  The CR also 
coordinates all gains, ensuring incoming personnel have a sponsor and 
NRD. 
The CR directly leads a team of Zone Supervisors, or “zone 
supes.”  They are usually but not exclusively CRF’s, and are in charge of a specific 
number of recruiting assigned to their zones.  Zone supervisors are extremely significant 
members of the recruiting process.  Many, including CNRC, consider zone supervisors as 
the most “important level of leadership in the recruiting process.”34  The zones they 
supervise are usually set up geographically, but can include stations that cross geographic 
boundaries.  For example, some districts split up their high producing zones, giving 
individual NRS’ from each to other less productive zones.35 
Zone supervisors have a high level of authority over personnel and 
resources.  They control (as many as) dozens of recruiters, the buildings they occupy, and 
the government vehicles they drive.  Their monthly NCO goals can sometimes reach into 
the 30’s and 40’s, and for many large zones, in the 50’s and 60’s.  They also ship out a 
comparable number of DEPpers to bootcamp each month.   
Zone supervisors manage DEP pools which can number in the 
hundreds.  They manage these civilian personnel in addition to their own military cadre.  
                                                 
34 Commander Navy Recruiting Command, at a presentation at Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. 
35 Interview with CR NRD San Diego, May 2001. 
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They qualify as zone supervisors through a rigid qualification process culminating in an 
oral board chaired by the Regional Commodore.  They are allowed a separate office away 
from the headquarters and the recruiting stations.   
Zone Supervisors are vital to the success of the command’s 
training program.  They implement command and CNRC training plan within the zone, 
identify and train to all weaknesses and/or deficiencies in prospecting, sales techniques, 
required system use and processing procedures, ensure compliance with the CNRC PQS 
policy (COMNAVCRUITCOMINST 1136-ENL) and ensure zone personnel are 
progressing towards advancement and in-rate study time is provided 
The zone supervisors directly lead the Recruiters In Charge 
(RINCs).  RINCs supervise recruiting stations and the recruiters assigned to those 
stations.  They can be fleet or CRF sailors of any rank and usually have prior recruiter 
experience.  They should have completed PQS to qualify as a RINC.   
The RINC is an extremely important figure in the production 
process.  He is essentially in charge of an auxiliary navy “command” located in the public 
domain.  He must be sure that his station does not discredit the US Navy in any way, 
knowing that any negativity associated with his station reflects directly on the Navy. 
Additionally, depending on where he is geographically located, he 
may no direct supervision.  The RINC is responsible for the production and 
accountability of his recruiters.  The RINC must definitely be trustworthy.  RINCs train 
recruiters and essentially serve as the work-center supervisor for their NRS. 
The RINC’s areas of responsibilities and specific duties are 
outlined below: 
• Prospecting 
• ensure accuracy and completeness of prospect cards 
• initiate, approve, enforce and analyze the NRS Prospecting Plan 
• review and approve individual travel itineraries and school canvassing 
programs 
• conduct daily production reviews with each assigned recruiter 
• maintain, approve and revise the station planner 
• ensure applicant logs are complete, accurate and up-to-date 
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• ensure assigned recruiters use approved LEADS and Appointment Power 
Phone/PDC scripts 
• Selling and Processing.  The RINC is the sales expert and recruiter’s 
primary trainer.  He personally observes and critiques each recruiter’s 
sales technique.  He manages his station’s DEP and keeps a database of 
QNE’s.  The RINC must conduct most of the administrative processing.  
He writes evals and fitreps, leave and special request chits, and awards.  
He interviews all applicants requiring a waiver and is typically responsible 
for calling LEADs and setting up interviews. 
• Administration.  The RINC has a long list of administrative 
responsibilities.  Among them are: 
• File names, addresses and phone numbers of assigned NRS 
personnel with local police and fire departments 
• Ensure completion of delegated logs and reports by subordinates 
• Dispose of testing materials per current directives 
• Supervise office routine 
• Draft outgoing and review/follow-up on incoming correspondence 
• Handle inquiries (Red Cross, dependent, military on leave, 
Authorized Without Leave/deserters and others as required) 
• Authorize domicile-to-duty vehicle use for assigned recruiters 
• Sign custody cards for accountable inventory and conduct periodic 
inventories 
• Establish NRS working hours 
• Ensure adherence to and monitor the DEP leadership program 
• Recommend fault/no fault transfers, medals and other awards 
The largest single group of personnel in the command are the 
Enlisted Recruiters.  Recruiters are responsible for providing a “sufficient number of 
qualified civilian applicants for Navy enlistment.”  A command’s recruiting complement 
can number from the low 80’s to over 200 for some large districts. 
Recruiters are fleet sailors (E-4 to E-8) who may or may not be 
coming off operational duty on a staff, ship or squadron.  They undergo rigorous sales 
training at the Naval Recruiting Orientation Unit (NORU) in Pensacola, FL.  The training 
lasts five weeks.  After approximately 3 to 6 months in the field, the recruiters are then 
sent back to NORU for refresher training. 
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Recruiting duty is shore duty for these fleet sailors.  It may or may 
not be voluntary duty, depending on the detailer’s needs.  Recruiters can request specific 
NRS’ within a district by contacting the CR prior to reporting to the command.  The 
potential recruiters can call from their departing command or from NORU during 
training.  Many districts require that the recruiter fill out a biography and preference form 
in order to make a better choice of placement. 
Once in the NRS, recruiters are usually assigned a specific 
geographic area within the bounds of the NRS’ territory.  These areas are normally 
separated by zip codes.  Recruiters may not always get the NRS assignment they 
requested.  It is up to the command to determine whether or not to move assigned 
recruiters. 
The specific duties of recruiters are outlined below: 
• Prospecting.  Recruiters must continuously search for prospects using all 
available resources and make appointments by developing contacts via 
telephone, leads, referrals, personally developed contacts, school visits and 
travel itineraries. 
• Processing.  Recruiters prepare pre-enlistment kits.  They also process, 
schedule and drive applicants to the MEPS.  Recruiters brief the applicants 
on processing procedures and handle/counsel applicants who successfully 
and unsuccessfully process for enlistment.  Recruiters also train the 
DEPpers, tracking their PQS and physical training. 
• Marketing.  Recruiters identify target market population (assigned 
territory boundaries, location and quality of educational institutions, 
population centers36, and leisure time activity centers such as youth 
centers and fast-food restaurants.  They also make optimum use of district 
resources and use community personnel resources such as educators, local 
government officials, media representatives, community service 
organizations and Recruiting District Advisor Councils. 
(3) Military Entrance Processing Station Liaison (MEPS 
Liaison).  The person in charge of the MEPS Liaison is the Enlisted Processing Division 
Supervisor (EPDS).  Whereas the CR supervises the enlisted production function of the 
command, the EPDS directs the enlisted processing function of the district.  Like the CR, 
the EPDS works directly for the Enlisted Programs Officer.  The EPDS manages and 
                                                 
36 Population centers include metropolitan areas, cities, towns, unincorporated towns. 
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supervises the processing of qualified applicants for enlistment.  Most of the EPO’s 
enlisted processing procedures are conducted and coordinated by the EPDS. 
The EPDS can be a civilian civil serviceman, usually at the GS-9 
to 11 level, or an active duty First-Class, Chief, Senior Chief or Master Chief Petty 
Officer.  The EPDS’ areas of responsibility, as outlined in CNRCINST 5400.1, are as 
follows: 
• Administration 
• Maintain liaison with CNRC (including RQAT37/Regional 
Command/NRD/MEPS personnel) 
• Coordinate indoctrination of newly assigned support and recruiting 
personnel 
• Supervise and monitor office routine (daily work, process special and 
recruiter inquiries, respond to irregularities, malpractice and 
congressional inquiries) 
• Provide information to the EPO concerning daily processing events 
• Ensure proper retention and maintenance of DEP records and residual 
files at the NRD 
• Ensures the MEPS production evaluation reports are submitted to the 
EPO 
• Attend Zone/NRD Production/planning and training meetings 
• Training.  The EPDS is responsible for the training conducted at the 
MEPS.  He also submits inputs to the command’s annual Training Plan.  
He must also implement the CNRC and district training plan.   
• Resource Management.  The EPDS ensures that quality control policies 
are adhered to y his subordinates at MEPS, as well as the recruiters in the 
field.  He monitors pre-enlistment waiver and non-waiver kits for 
completeness and accuracy.  He monitors program (such as Nuke and 
AECF), shipping, DEP, RTC level loading, mental quality and other 
assigned goals.   
One of the key players on the MEPS team is the MLPO, or MEPS 
Liaison Petty Officer.  He or she coordinates pre-qualification processing and is the final 
“quality control” checkpoint of applicants prior to actual enlistment or reenlist into the 
United States Navy.   
                                                 
37 RQAT is the Recruiter Quality Assurance Team (a group of Career Recruiting Force that works for 
CNRC) located at RTC Great Lakes who interview recruits to determine if any recruiting irregularities. 
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The MLPO is usually an E-5 or above, assigned by the EPDS.  His 
or her primary mission is to maintain liaison between the MEPS Navy liaison office and 
the MEPS itself.  He or she is also the primary liaison between the recruiters and the 
MEPS Navy liaison office.   
The MLPO is also responsible for the following elements of 
processing: 
• Ensures smooth flow of processing (scheduling, transportation, 
meal/lodging arrangements, briefing applicants on MEPS procedures, 
counseling DEPpers on responsibilities, counseling medical 
disqualifications.) 
• Quality control of kits by screening them for proper basic enlistment 
eligibility requirements (BEERS), accuracy and completeness 
• Review physical examination results of applicants 
• Identify enlistment requirements (mental, medical, physical, moral, 
waiver, police/juvenile involvement, alcohol/drug abuse and prior military 
service) 
• Explain enlistment obligations to applicants 
• Provide MEPS with a list of Navy applicants to be processed each day 
Another key figure in the MEPS liaison office is the Senior 
Classifier.  The Senior classifier is responsible for 
Counseling all applicants on Navy options available based on personal 
qualifications.  He matched Navy needs and applicant interests to reserve 
school seats using the Personalized Recruiting for Immediate and Delayed 
Enlistment (PRIDE) System.  He coordinates placement of applicants in 
various enlistment programs to meet District objectives. 
The senior classifier is usually a Personnelman (PN) E-6 or above, 
with classifying experience.  Oftentimes, the Senior Classifier is on his second or third 
tour in a MEPS.  He or she supervises the classifier team and monitors the overall 
placement of recruits in their ratings, trying as much as possible to meet the demands of 
the Navy while satisfying the needs of the recruit.  The Senior Classifier is also key 
person in the effort to make shipping goal.  He or she coordinates the assignment of 
bootcamp shipping dates for all recruits.  The Senior Classifier should have a good idea 
of how many recruits the command needs to send to bootcamp in a particular month. 
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The other key MEPS personnel are: 
• Classifiers.  Supervised by the Senior Classifer, classifiers are usually 
Personnelman (PN).  In general, their primary mission is to assign the 
recruits their ratings and their bootcamp shipping dates.  They generate 
and evaluate pre-approach “blue-print”38 information to discover want, 
needs and “Dominant Buying Motive (DBM).”  They conduct sales 
interviews tailored to these wants, needs and DBM’s.  Classifiers also 
identify and meet program, shipping, DEP RTC level loading, mental 
quality and other assigned goals and their priorities.  They place recruits to 
meet these priorities. 
• Processors.  Like classifiers, processors can be Personnelman (PN’s) 
ordered to the MEPS.  They can also be recruiters who for whatever 
reason, are not in the “field” as active recruiters.  Processors are the 
primary screeners and quality control of enlistment kits and ensure that 
they are accurate and complete. 
• Waiver Coordinator.  The Waiver Coordinator can be a processor, 
classifier or recruiter assigned from the field.  He is responsible for “the 
quality control review, tracking and processing of all applicant waivers.”39  
Applicants can receive waivers for a variety of reasons, including criminal 
history, drug use, medical irregularities, and prior service.  The Waiver 
Coordinates tracks and coordinates these waivers. 
3. Major Processes and Subsystems 
a. Goals and Goaling40 
Goals begin with End Strength requirements as determined by congress.  
End Strength is the available inventory of military personnel.  It represents the number of 
personnel required, by law, to be in the military as of October 1st of the fiscal year.  End 
strength does not take into account those personnel who are in a “hold” status, which 
include such personnel as prisoners and those on medical hold. 
Accession requirements are derived from end strength.  The Chief of 
Naval Personnel derives the Accession Plan from the Strength Plan.  Each year, the 
recruiting districts are required to send a specific number of accessions to bootcamp.  The 
accessions assure that the Navy meets its End Strength goals for the year. 
                                                 
38 Applicants are “blueprinted,” meaning the recruiter obtains basic information such as height, 
weight, job history, job preference, school experience, criminal history (if any), etc… 
39 CNRCINST 5400.1F. 
40 Adapted from NORU EPO course presentation “Introduction to Enlisted Programs”. 
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The accession goals are assigned as yearly goals to CNRC by CNP, then 
broken down into monthly goals.  These yearly and monthly goals are then distributed to 
the four regions, which are then split up into the districts.  Each district then, has one 
yearly and twelve monthly accession, or “shipping” goals.   
In 2001, the Navy’s yearly accession goal was just over 57,000.  That is, 
the Navy had to send 57,000 new recruits to boot camp.  Accession goal is also known as 
“shipping” goal.  “This is the hard goal, the goal that counts.”41  If CNRC does not make 
this goal, then the Navy has failed to “make goal.”  Failure to make goal results in the 
Navy not having enough personnel to fill billets and meeting end strength.  As well, not 
making goal brings a psychological sense of failure and the requisite internal and external 
bad press both internal (within the Navy) and external (the national news).  
The yearly accession goal is distributed among the 31 districts according 
to a variety of factors such as market share, demographics, and historical performance.  
The annual CNRC and district goals are then divided into 12 monthly goals.  Each district 
is responsible to make these monthly goals.  For example, NRD San Diego’s average 
monthly goal might be 220.  That is, San Diego must ship 220 members of its DEP pool 
to boot camp each month.  Otherwise, that district has failed to make shipping goal that 
month.  Each district’s progress is tracked publicly in CNRC’s “One Navy” report, which 
is e-mailed to each member of Navy recruiting every morning.  Shipping goal is not 
considered an optional goal.  Districts are expected to make this goal.   
Each district must therefore send a required number of accessions to 
bootcamp each month.  These accessions are derived from the district’s Delayed Entry 
Program Pool, or DEP Pool.  DEPs are civilians who have signed up for the Navy as 
“New Contracts.”  To build up DEP pools to make shipping goals, each district is thus 
assigned a New Contract Objective (NCO) each month.  In fact, each district is assigned 
an annual NCO “goal”42. 
NCOs are distributed in accordance with market factors of each district.  
These market factors include demographics, historical performance, Department of 
                                                 
41 Commanding Officer NRDSD, August 2001. 
42 Although “NCO goal” is redundant (NC Objective goal), it is an accepted phrase in recruiting. 
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Defense population and target population.  Each district is assigned a “fair” goal as 
determined by thorough analysis conducted by CNRC.  For this reason, sparsely 
populated districts such as Omaha will have a much smaller NCO and shipping goal than 
that of largely populated districts such as New York.  As well, demographically diverse 
districts such as San Diego will have a greater variety of minority-category goals than 
less diverse commands such as NRD Denver. 
New contracts will be assigned a rating and a shipping date.  The 
“DEPper”, as the applicant is now called (since he/she belongs in the DEP pool), now 
counts towards the shipping goal of the month he is assigned to ship.  He or she could 
ship out during the month he/she “DEPs”43 in, or the next month, or eleven months later.  
If he or she ships out in the month he/she DEPs in, then he/she counts for both the NCO 
goal and shipping goal for that month.  DEPpers can stay in the DEP pool for a maximum 
of 365 days. 
b. DEP Management 
The command can change a DEPper’s shipping date to a later one (roll-
out) or earlier one (roll-in).  These changes depend on the command’s needs, the 
DEPper’s needs, or both.  For instance, the command may need a shipper to ship out this 
month in order to make goal, but does not have enough people in the DEP pool to do so.  
The command may find a DEPper who is leaving in a later month to roll-in to this month 
in order to make goal.  Conversely, the DEPper may need to attend to personal business 
or finish up some educational requirements and will not be able to ship out this month.  
Therefore, he or she requests a roll-out of his shipping date in order to take care of his 
business.  If the command, however, cannot make goal without this DEPper, the request 
may not be approved.  However, if the request involves such required criteria as 
education and/or weight loss, the command has no choice but to roll-out the DEPper, or 
attrite him.  An attrite is a DEPper who is no longer qualified or no longer desires to join 
the Navy.  They attrite for reasons such as being overweight (there are different standards 
for weight for DEP-in vs. ship out), criminal or medical information that was kept 
hidden, and pregnancy.   
                                                 
43 Refers to the act of signing up for the Delayed Entry Program. 
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DEP Attrition (Attrites and roll-outs) have detrimental effects on NCO and 
shipping goal.  Attrites and roll-outs that occur within the month (and shifted to outer 
months) have to “made-up” by the district.  For example, if a district has an NCO goal of 
200, and they have 20 attrites and 20 roll-outs, their goal essentially rises to 240.  As 
well, if any of these “losses” are in month, then the shipping goal has to be adjusted 
accordingly.  Roll-outs for DEPpers in the “out-months” do not have to be “made-up” in 
the current month.  Out-month attrites, however, still have to be made up in the current 
month. 
Moreover, DEP attrition is a major source of concern not only for 
recruiting, but for the Chief of Naval Personnel.  Losses from the DEP pool which are not 
replaced in a timely manner result in the loss of precious boot camp seats.  These seats, 
because they exist for only a short period of time, cannot be recovered.   
For this reason, the CO is responsible for conducting DEP audits when 
trends show adverse conditions.  These conditions include high attrition, excessive roll-
outs and high RTO’s.  RTO’s are those DEPpers who “Refuse to Obligate”, meaning that 
they simply do not want to go to bootcamp.  DEPpers RTO for various reasons, such as 
lost interest, found another job, cold feet, or pregnancy.   
c. Training 
The command is responsible for implementing both CNRC’s general 
training policy and plan, and the command’s tailored training plan.  The command may 
have a Training Officer who is has overall responsibility for training.  As well, each 
command has a District Trainer who is responsible for coordinating both plans in enlisted 
programs.  The District Trainer can also conduct the training, although the RINCs and 
Zone Supervisor provide the majority of training to the recruiters.  Included in the 
training plan is required PQS for recruiters, RINCs and Zone Supes.  As well, refresher 
training at NORU is also required.  Finally, time must also be set aside for rating training 
and study.  
d. Administration 
The Chief Administrator is responsible for the district’s administration.  
The enlisted programs department, however, has a significant administrative workload.  
For that reason, there is usually a Personnelman (PN) or Yeoman (YN) assigned to the 
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EPO who helps solely with enlisted program administration.  The CA and his admin 
department serve as the primary liaison with the local Personnel Support Detachment, 
something the EPO YN does not do.  However, the EPO YN and EPO will process the 
majority of the command’s leave and special request chits, evaluations and fitness 
reports, various types of correspondence, logs and reports. 
e. Prospect to Contract to Recruit44 
The recruiting process occurs in five broad steps: prospecting, processing 
and classifying, entering the applicant in the DEP, managing the applicant while in DEP, 
and finally, sending the applicant to bootcamp. 
(1) Prospecting.  The recruiter can prospect his market through 
various methods.  The first method is through leads.  Leads can be local or national.  
Another method is referrals.  Recruiters ask their current applicants to give them names 
of other civilians who might be interested in joining the Navy.  Referrals can also come 
from civilian and military members of the community, members of the command, and 
relatives of DEPpers.  The recruiter can also make telephone calls to prospects.  Some 
school districts distribute phone lists of their students.  Recruiters call this form of 
prospecting “phone-power.”  The recruiters can also visit schools to meet potential 
applicants.  Recruiters can also obtain telephone numbers and referrals from personally 
developed contacts (PDC’s).  These are contacts that the recruiter finds by walking or 
driving around his market.  In fact, “PDC’ing” is what the recruiters call their activity 
whenever they go out and try to meet prospects. 
(2) Processing and Classifying.  Once the recruit finds an 
applicant, he determines, through “blueprinting” and document verification, if the 
prospect meeting basic enlistment eligibility requirements (BEERS).  These requirements 
include age, education, and criminal criteria.  If eligible, the recruiter takes the prospect 
to the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) which administers mental, physical 
and moral testing.  The applicant takes the Armed Services Vocational Battery (ASVAB), 
if he/she has not already done so, receives a full physical, and undergoes a background 
check.   
                                                 
44 Adapted from NORU EPO Course presentation “The Recruiting Process”. 
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If the applicant passes all these tests, he/she goes through the 
classification stage of processing.  DEP-in procedures vary with each command, although 
the basic steps of processing, MEPS testing, classifying and swearing in are standard with 
each MEPS.  How efficient they perform these steps is crucial to how many contracts the 
MEPS can process in a certain period of time45.  Classification involves receiving a 
rating assignment and a shipping date. 
(3) DEP In: Entering the Delayed Entry Program.  Successful 
applicants enlist in the Delayed Entry Program (DEP).  As mentioned, these DEPpers are 
now in the district’s DEP pool, which count towards the command’s shipping goal.  
Although they take an oath, they are not actually members of the military until they ship 
out to bootcamp.46  They are assigned Personnel Qualification Standards, which, upon 
completion and coupled with a successful PRT score, results in immediate advancement 
to E-2.   
(4) Managing the DEP pool.  In addition to providing PQS, the 
DEPpers are also given training to help prepare them for bootcamp.  Monthly and 
sometimes weekly DEP meetings are held by the RINC.  The recruiters are responsible 
for accounting for their DEPpers and ensuring that their interest in the Navy is 
maintained throughout their entire time in the DEP pool.  Recruiters can also arrange for 
tours of military installations, if available. 
At the district level, attrition is watched closely by the CR, EPO 
and CO.  A DEP Coordinator is usually assigned to manage attrites and roll-outs.  The 
DEP Coordinator may also be involved in coordinating district-wide DEP training, or 
command DEP activities.  Some districts hold such events as DEP Olympics, pitting zone 
DEPs against each other in friendly athletic competition. 
(5) Shipping: sending the applicant to bootcamp.  The final 
step in the recruiting process is to ensure the DEPper ships out to bootcamp.  The 
recruiter drives the DEPper to MEPS on the morning of the shipping date, or to a 
                                                 
45 Daily, weekly and monthly numbers of contracts can depend on how efficient and effective the 
MEPS and MEPS Navy Liaison Office are with their processing function. 
46 For this reason, the DEPper can actually drop out of the DEP without any real negative 
consequences.  That is, a civilian employer will never know that the person dropped out of the Delayed 
Entry Program.  However, if the DEPper decides to apply for the Navy or any armed service again, the fact 
that he attrited from the DEP program will probably have a negative effect on his chances for re-entering. 
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designated hotel or motel near the MEPS the night before the shipping date.  If the 
applicant is driven to the hotel the night before, he takes a command bus to the MEPS the 
next morning.  On that day, the DEPper takes the oath of enlistment and is officially a 
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send them, in some way, to the EDSPEC.  The EDSPEC then reviews the documents and, 
if approved, forwards them to the Commanding officer for final approval.  After final 
approval, the documents must then be forwarded to MEPS and placed in the applicants’ 
kit, or record.   
Districts perform this process in different ways.  Because of the 
geographic dispersion of some districts, the actual paperwork is not usually seen by the 
EDSPEC.  Instead, faxes of the documents are sent to the EDSPEC, who signs them, 
sends them to CO for approval and sends them back to the recruiter.  EDVERs are 
required to be in the applicant’s kit one day prior to processing.  Missing or delayed 
education verifications can delay an applicant from entering the Navy.   
g. Waiver Processing 
Applicants may have some mitigating criminal or medical issues which 
would normally disqualify them from service.  However, many of these issues can be 
waived.  Districts process these waivers differently.  In all cases, the Enlisted Programs 
department writes the waivers, which are then reviewed and either approved or endorsed 
by the Commanding officer.  Those waivers that cannot be approved by the CO, such as 
major felonies, large numbers of dependencies, and medical issues, are then forwarded to 
CNRC.  CNRC processes the criminal and dependency waivers directly, while a 
representative from the Navy Bureau of Medicine (BUMED) processes the medical 
waivers.  Of course, CNRC tries its best to review and approve/disapprove the waivers in 
a timely manner.  In some instances waivers can be returned the same day.  However, 
most of the time it takes anywhere from two to five weeks to receive a decision on a 
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III. MODEL RESULTS 
A. DATA REVIEW   
The data used in the model were derived from approximately 72 interviews 
conducted with personnel from fiscal years 97-98 and fiscal years 99-00.  Although a 
specific protocol was employed for most of the interviews, the questions were tailored to 
the individual being interviewed.  The data gathering process began in November 1998 
and ended in November 2002. 
B. SYSTEMS MODELS COMPARISON: NRD SAN DIEGO (1997-1998) AND 
(1999-2000)  
The following models describe the (NRD San Diego) basic organizational 
information for the systems in effect during fiscal years 1997-1998 and 1999-2000. 
1. Inputs   
a. Context and Environment 
Of CNRC’s 31 districts, NRD San Diego has one of the largest 
populations.  The district’s area of responsibility encompasses parts of three states: 
southern California, southern Nevada and western Arizona.  The major counties in the 
district include Clark in Nevada and Orange, San Diego, Riverside, San Bernardino, 
North San Diego and East San Diego in California.  The district’s major cities include 
San Diego, Las Vegas, Yuma, Chula Vista, Riverside, Oceanside, Anaheim, Escondido, 
San Bernardino, and Henderson, Nevada.  Figure 3.1 shows the geographical area 
covered by NRD San Diego. 
NRD SD is greatly influenced by its external and internal environment, 
resources, geography and historical performance.  The social environment of the city also 
affects NRD San Diego.  San Diego is often referred to as a “Navy” or “Fleet” town 
because of the many Navy and USMC bases and installations located in the county.  
According to the recruiters, a fleet town is perceived as having both positive and negative 
effects.  As one recruiter put it, 
The bases are a definite advantage…The district can take kids on tours of 
ships and squadrons at almost anytime.  But you have to remember, 
there’s a lot of military out here, so for every one ex-sailor or active sailor 
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that supports the Navy, there may be one disgruntled sailor who can turn a 
prospect against you.48 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Navy Recruiting District San Diego Area of Responsibility. 
 
Each year, NRD SD sends recruiter representatives to the Marine Corps 
Air Station (MCAS) Miramar Air Show, the Navy Fleet Week Celebration, the Naval Air 
Station El Centro Air Show, Naval Station San Diego Surface Line Week Competition, 
and the Naval Air Station Riverside Air Show.  The 99-00 district went a step further by 
coordinating and hosting what became an annual Job Fair at Naval Station San Diego, 
and recruiting cruises on the USS CONSTELLATION CV-64 (which drew over 3000 
participants) and two cruises on the USS FITZGERALD DDG-62.   
Another aspect of the social environment that has an impact on NRD SD 
is the cultural diversity of the district.  The district has a large representation of Latino, 
Filipino, Indo-Chinese, Japanese, African-American, Middle-Eastern, Indian, and 
Caucasian races.  Because of the cultural diversity, the recruiters are oftentimes assigned 
                                                 
48 Recruiter and Region West Recruiter of the Year, December 2001. 
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to their stations based on their race and language ability.  For example, National City, a 
market filled with Filipinos, Latinos and African-Americans, had an Navy Recruiting 
Station (NRS) manned by four Tagalog-speaking Filipinos, one Spanish-speaking Latino 
and two African-Americans, while NRS Victorville, located in the high desert of San 
Bernardino, was manned by three Caucasians.  The 99-00 NRD recruited in previously 
“un-mined” areas such as Santa Ana and Las Vegas, thought to be so culturally and 
socially diverse that they had no market.  Zones 4 and 6, which were usually non-factors 
in District competition, suddenly became successful and productive.  The 97-98 district 
accepted that these zones simply were not going to make goal.   
Zone 6 was expected to miss every month.  Too many rich kids, too many 
Vietnamese, too many Hispanic kids who couldn’t pass the test.  So the 
district just relied on the other zones to make up for Orange county’s 
inevitable failure.49 
Cultivating these areas for success, however, was not required for the 97-
98 district because the goals were lower in that era.  The district could get away with 
riding their “horses” to make goal.50  
The cultural diversity is also a factor in determining the make-up of sub-
goals assigned to NRD San Diego.  San Diego is responsible to write more Latinos and 
African-Americans than other less culturally diverse districts.  As well, because the 
diversity implies less affluence, San Diego has a large “Lower” market than many other 
districts.  “Lowers” are those prospects or recruits that score below a 50 on the ASVAB. 
On a broader scale, the sheer population advantage of the NRD San Diego 
area simply gives the district a large volume of recruits.  As a result, the district receives 
high goals both in new contract and accessions.  As well, the district has a large number 
of non-high school graduates (HP3’s) to choose from.  The Navy mandated only 10 
percent of its recruits can be HP3’s.  Because it had so many non-high school graduates 
to choose from, San Diego often found itself depleting its quota of HP3’s very early in 
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the fiscal year.  “San Diego, if allowed, could write the entire HP3 quota for the nation in 
three months.”51 
The 99-00 NRD had one of the strongest and most active Recruiting 
District Advisory Council (RDAC).52  Members included retired military officers, 
educators, politicians, and businessmen from the San Diego area.  The Navy League, Sea 
Cadets and Veterans of Foreign Wars were also actively members of the IRC.  The Navy 
Recruiting Council (NRC) offered summer job opportunities, conducted guest lectures to 
the DEP and provided incentives and rewards to the recruiters for their hard work.  The 
NRC met once a month, like clockwork, at the NRD headquarters.  The CO and XO were 
also members of the NRC.  Each year, they elected a president who was responsible for 
running the meetings and the NRC itself.  “They are more than a liaison to the 
community, they’re a vital piece of this organization.  They are the voice, eyes and ears 
of San Diego…they know what’s going on out there.”53  97-98’s version of the NRC was 
not as active and did not include as many public figures.   
The political environment also impacts on NRD SD, especially in the 
public school system.  Individual school districts make their own policies regarding 
recruitment of their students.  Some school districts approve of the military, while others 
do not.  For example, the Sweetwater Union High School District is run by a pro-military 
superintendent who allows recruiters to walk and solicit students on campus, he allows 
schools to send school lists to the recruiters.  School lists have the names, addresses and 
telephone numbers of all the students in the school.  In contrast, the San Diego Unified 
School District prohibits the mailing of school lists, citing that the students’ right to 
privacy was being violated.  The 99-00 Commanding officer and Enlisted Programs 
Officer attended a School Board meeting to try and fight the policy but were 
unsuccessful. The board refused to budge. 
                                                 
51 Senior Classifier, June 2000. 
52 Name changed to Navy Recruiting Council (NRC in 2001). 
53 Commanding Officer, May 2001. 
42 
“Some fights just aren’t worth fighting”54 was the overall sentiment of the 
97-98 NRD. The leadership had also tried to free school lists from the SD Unified School 
District and they too met with failure.  From this experience, the district concluded that 
similar petitioning to other school boards by whatever method would not be successful.  
The 97-98 NRD had experience on their side.  The leadership had some recruiting 
experience and realized that some ideas were not worth pursuing.  To “fight” for policy 
changes such as school lists would just be a “waste of energy.”55 
Another aspect of the political environment is how much support the local 
congressmen, assemblymen and mayors give to the district.  In 99-00, the commanding 
officer aggressively sought the support of such politicians as Rep. Duke Cunningham and 
Mayor Susan Golding.  He managed to win their support where beforehand there was 
little exposure to the political arena.  Members of Cunningham’s and other politicians’ 
staffs even joined the District’s NRC.  The author received no data describing 97-98’s 
efforts at seeking political support. 
The economic environment of NRD SD varies greatly over its area of 
responsibility.  Some areas are very affluent, such as La Jolla, Coronado and some parts 
of Orange County such as Mission Viejo.  Although there were a lower number of 
prospects recruited in these areas, they did have the potential to produce a relatively 
greater number of high quality recruits.   
The district got a lot of Nukes and A-cells out of Coronado and Fallbrook.  
Those kids are usually very bright and won’t join unless they get a job 
with a big bonus (like Nuke) or with guaranteed (technical) training.56   
NRD SD always had great success in recruiting out of less affluent areas 
such as National City and Chula Vista.  However, lower income areas did not guarantee 
inherent success.  The Orange County cities of Santa Ana and Garden Grove have low 
median incomes, but did not share the same early success as comparable cities in San 
Diego County.  Reasons included the language barrier and lack of strong leadership and 
                                                 
54 Senior Leader, February 2000 referring to the sometimes wasted effort of trying to “fight” for such 
things as school lists. 
55 Zone Supervisor, March 2002. 
56 Chief Recruiter, May 2001. 
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recruiting ability.  Santa Ana is primarily Hispanic while primarily people of Indo-
Chinese descent populate Garden Grove.  These areas have high populations of persons 
who cannot pass the ASVAB.57 
As with most government organizations, NRD San Diego is resource 
constrained.  The budget and available personnel are limited.  However, resources 
increased at the national level after 1998.  In an effort to reach a nation-wide total of 5000 
recruiters, CNRC increased the number of recruiters in the field in 1998, with NRD San 
Diego’s field recruiters rising from 170 at the end of 1997 to just over 200 by Oct 1999.  
As well, the overall CNRC budget increased in 1999.  A large portion of the money was 
used to improve and expand advertising; purchase and fund cellular phones; and to secure 
a 1 to 1 government vehicle to recruiter ratio.  The money was also used to increase 
enlistment bonuses and college fund budgeting.  At the local level, NRD San Diego’s 
budget increased incrementally by about 10 percent Each year since 1997.58  
The increase in personnel was accompanied with an increase in goal.  As 
the CR put it, 
San Diego had never seen these goals before, and I didn’t know where to 
put all these people.  To add to the trouble, many of the new personnel 
were disgruntled non-volunteers who were forced to do recruiting.  I had 
my hands full with trying to keep these people happy.59 
NRD San Diego has had a very successful history and outstanding 
reputation as a consistent producer in Navy Recruiting.  The command has not missed a 
monthly accession goal since 1997.  The legacy of the District’s previous 
accomplishments were sustained during this study’s time period by several recruiters and 
CRF’s who had spent a great deal of their careers at NRD San Diego.   
In 1997, the district made all of its monthly and yearly goals. With the 
dramatic goal increase in 1998, however, came problems.  Although the district achieved 
its accession goal all 12 months, the command only made NCO goal two out of the 
                                                 
57 Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, a standardized test given to all recruits to not only 
determine which jobs fit them, but also to determine whether the applicant meets minimum requirements in 
Math and English skills. 
58 Assistant EPO, December 2001. 
59 Chief Recruiter, July 2002. 
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twelve months, and missed the yearly goal by 258 contracts!  Despite being awarded 
CNRC’s bronze award as the third best district in the nation, failing to make NCO was 
viewed as failure by many of the recruiters and CRF’s who had enjoyed historical 
success.  The “living” knowledge of previous success allowed the new recruiters to 
imagine what comprised a “successful” district.  In fact, the definitions of success 
described in this study are derived from the descriptions and perspectives of these long-
term, experienced recruiters.60  
b. Key Success Factors 
The 97-98 district leadership defined three primary success factors: 1) 
attaining accession goal, 2) maintaining a good quality of life and 3) eliminating 
improprieties.  Making accession goal is the primary mission of CNRC, and the 
leadership recognized that.  There were two individuals who were central in making 
shipping goal, the Enlisted Programs Officer (EPO) and the Chief Recruiter (CR).  The 
EPO was very busy conducting quality control on the DEP pool to ensure that the 
shippers were actually going to ship on their assigned date.   
She used to call my DEPpers to find out if they were going to bootcamp.  
She used to call me to ask me why I rolled out a specific depper. She used 
to keep track of DEPpers on a little calendar she had.  It was as if she 
didn’t trust the fact that the district could take care of our DEP pools.61  
The CR had to constantly monitor the DEP pool as well.  Unfortunately, 
this detracted her from concentrating on NCO goal.  As a result of this and other factors, 
NCO goal was not consistently achieved.  “The command felt that close was good 
enough…after all it’s not a goal, it’s an objective.”62  In general, the recruiters knew that 
NCO goal was important, they knew that if they didn’t make it, there would be no real 
negative repercussions.  Of the six zones, three usually made goal (2, 3 and 5) while the 
other three struggled to consistently make goal.  As stated, zones 4 and 6 were not 
expected to make goal: 
Las Vegas (zone 4) was accepted as being a tough zone with too many 
transients and too many other job opportunities.  Some of the guys in the 
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61 Anonymous Recruiter, Zone 4, May 2001. 
62 Zone Supervisor, June 2002. 
45 
zone bought into that so they didn’t try that hard to recruit.  Likewise, 
zone 6 (Orange County) was too ‘rich’ of an area to expect contracts.  
They, too, were never expected to make goal.  The other zones just 
overwrote contracts to try and make up for the underachieving zones.63 
Quality of life was a major concern for the command.  Recruiting is a 
rigorous shore duty.  “It is, bar none, the toughest shore duty in the Navy,” said one zone 
supervisor.  He continued  
you receive five weeks of training on how to sell people into joining the 
Navy.  Even people who have been salespersons all their lives couldn’t 
handle this type of sales pressure.  You have to make goal every single 
month.  The accomplishments you had previously do not matter.  It’s 
‘what have you done for me lately’ that counts. 
As a result, many recruiters work nine to twelve hour days, on average, to 
make their monthly goals.  To be successful at their jobs, many recruiters sacrifice their 
home and social lives.  Compounding the problem is the fact that most recruiters have 
just left arduous sea duty and expect a rest while on their shore tour.   
In many districts, maintaining quality of life is the toughest challenge the 
command faces.  The toll of making goal brings with it the almost unavoidable 
consequence of unhappy sailors and families.  Successful districts can balance the fine 
line of making goal while at the same time maintaining a positive quality of life.  The 
command realized that the field was under tremendous pressure.  Therefore, the CO did 
not aggressively push for making NCO goal as much as accession goal.  Additionally, the 
CO achieved great favor from the field using congratulatory handwritten notes and phone 
calls.   
She treated us very well.  She cared for us.  She would buy Thanksgiving 
turkeys for those top-performers.  She would buy food for us at MEPS 
during Mission Days.  You could tell she genuinely cared about our well-
being.64   
Quality of life in the field appeared outstanding according to many 
recruiters.  However, the Career Recruiting Force (CRFs) did not feel satisfied.  As one 
zone supe stated, “we, who were trained to make all goals, not just accessions, felt like 
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we weren’t performing up to our potential.”  Quality of life in headquarters also suffered.  
There was a perception of “field first, headquarters last”65 with the command.  With all 
the emphasis on recruiting, many in the support staff felt as one staffer put it, like they 
were “on the bottom of the food chain.” 
Recruiting duty has a high potential for impropriety and unethical 
behavior by the recruiters.  The recruiters are independent and are pressured to make 
goals and deal with young people every day.  Improprieties may include such occurrences 
as:  
• telling an applicant to withhold disqualifying information such as a 
criminal infraction or medical condition 
• having sex or a relationship with an applicant or Depper 
• misusing a government credit card 
• forging parental consent 
• generating fake diplomas, birth certificates or social security cards 
• using a government vehicle for other than official business 
• holding an attrite that the recruiters knows is not going (for reasons such 
as pregnancy, jail time, criminal activity) 
• fraternization among recruiters 
The 97-98 command made it very clear that recruiters involved in any 
improprieties would be severely punished.  Recruiters were punished severely at 
Captain’s Mast in cases of impropriety.  As a result, however, anything that even 
remotely resembled being “dirty” was looked at with an intense microscope.  We 
couldn’t take any risks, even if the risks were legal” said one recruiter.  He continued 
“Many of us were afraid to recruit…that’s why the district consistently missed goal.”   
An applicant with a questionable criminal past, who could not show 
immediate proof of innocence was not considered for enlistment.  “The district had kids 
who were qualified on paper, but because they could not come up with ‘proper’ court 
documents, were not allowed to process.  The court documents might be sealed, or the 
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applicant needed some time to get them…when the district turned them down, they 
would just go to Los Angeles and process there.”66 
To add, the recruiters did not feel like making any extra effort to “go the 
extra mile” to bring in another contract.  Since NCO attainment was not a success factor, 
the recruiters accepted that 90 percent was enough.   
It was terrible…for those of us who knew that the district could make 100 
percent every single month, this 90 percent stuff was killing us.  It’s like 
losing became contagious.  The problem was, people didn’t think that 90 
percent was losing.  That killed us.67 
NRD San Diego’s critical success factors underwent a change in 1999.  
The factors were well defined.  The command now delineated four primary success 
factors: 1) attainment of accession goal, 2) attainment of NCO, 3) minimized DEP 
Attrition and 4) minimized RTC Attrition.  Secondary success factors included 
minimized recruiter improprieties, maximized quality of life, and maximized retention. 
As with the previous district, shipping goal was considered a critical 
success factor.  As the 99-00 CO said many times, the primary mission of any recruiting 
district is to “put people in the Navy.”  This means sending recruits to boot camp.   
In fact, San Diego made every possible effort to make shipping goal each 
month.  San Diego began each month with either a surplus or deficit in their shipping 
numbers.  If San Diego had a surplus, oftentimes the Regional Commodore would 
increase San Diego’s goal in order to help the Region make its shipping goal.  When San 
Diego’s goal went up, it usually meant that another Region West district’s, such as 
Phoenix or San Antonio, received a goal reduction to allow them a chance to make goal.  
Because of San Diego’s reputation for making goal consistently, its goal hardly ever 
deficit going into the month.   decreased, even when it had a 
                                                 
66 Recruiter, June 2001, referring to the common occurrence of applicants whom NRD SD would not 
process because they could not come up with court documents to explain a charge in their record.  
Technically, applicants can DEP in with a handwritten statement explaining a charge.  NRD SD in 97-99 
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truth.  For example, an applicant may have a charge of  “battery” show up on their record.  Without proper 
court documents, the battery charge may not clearly describe the situation with which the applicant was 
involved.  There were many situations where a battery charge was actually a pleaded down “attempted 
murder” or “assault with a deadly weapon” charge; but The district would not have known that if The 
district didn’t have the court records to clarify. 
67 Zone Supervisor, July 2002. 
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The controlling element of 99-00 San Diego’s shipping goal was the 
Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) Senior Classifier.  The CR and EPO 
“delegated” the management of shipping goal to the Senior Classifier.  Although the 
recruiters placed new contracts in the DEP pool, it was the responsibility of the Senior 
Classifier, and to a lesser extent, the Enlisted Processing Division Supervisor (EPDS), to 
place these contracts into the months that needed them most.  That is, the Senior 
Classifier must “have a handle” on which months’ DEP pools required bodies, and he 
thus filled those months with the new contracts as they came in.  This reality was a source 
of some friction between the Senior Classifier and the CR.  The CR believed that she and 
her recruiters were as much or more responsible for the shipping goal.  However, it 
became clear that without the continuous monitoring and placement by the Senior 
Classifier, shipping goal would be difficult to manage by the recruiters.  For this reason, 
the Senior Classifier had as much of an “open line” to the commanding officer and EPO 
as did the CR.  In fact, the first person the commanding officer and EPO called each 
morning was usually the MEPS, and in particular the Senior Classifier.  They wanted to 
know three things: 1) how many shippers showed up to MEPS to ship out to bootcamp in 
the morning 2) how many did not show up, and 3) how many new contracts were on 
deck.68 
Another determinant of the 99-00 NRD SD System was how often it made 
New Contract Objective (NCO).  Although shipping goal was `extremely important, the 
primary focus at NRD SD was making NCO goal.  In fact, the generic term “making 
goal” almost always applied to NCO goal.  The district believed that making NCO almost 
guarantees making shipping goal.  In fact, making NCO had other benefits, such as 
increased quality of life and improved attitudes.   
NCO ties closely into shipping goal.  Every NCO is a shipper, and thus 
will count towards a specific month’s shipping goal once he/she ships out.  Every NCO is 
placed into the DEP “pool” for a specific month and counts towards 1) the current 
month’s NCO goal and 2) the shipping goal for the month in which he/she is scheduled to 
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ship.  For example, SN Smith signs up for the Navy in March, but is scheduled to ship 
out in April.  SN Smith counts towards March’s NCO goal and towards April’s ship goal.   
A recruit can also count for the same month’s NCO and Ship goal if 
he/she signs up that month and ships out that month.  The recruit can stay in the DEP 
program for up to a year, which is almost always the case when the recruit is still in high 
school.  A junior in high school who knows he/she wants to join the Navy signs up at the 
beginning of senior year and ships out upon graduation.  He/she has thus spent that year 
in the Delayed Entry Program.  Other reasons why recruits do not ship out immediately 
include 1) unavailability of ratings until a later date, 2) trying to clear something in their 
criminal record, 3) trying to complete their education, and 4) trying to make weight 
standards (you can DEP in at a lower standard then shipping out). 
An NCO can be equated to an investment in the future.  The more NCOs a 
district obtains, the larger their DEP pool and the greater their chances of making 
shipping goal.  San Diego packed its DEP pools so well that it theoretically made future 
shipping goals several months early.     
NCO progress is tracked on the CNRC’s daily “One Navy” document and 
districts that achieve NCO receive a 100 percent beside their name once the month ends.  
Successful districts achieve 100 percent NCO every month.  In sum, San Diego felt that 
making NCO was beneficial in several ways.  For one, making NCO “makes you feel like 
a winner, that is it shows that you achieved an assigned goal…100 percent looks a lot 
better than 97 percent.”69  Secondly, it provides a monthly focus for each of the 
recruiters, RINCs and Zone Supes each month.  As well, achieving NCO helps to make 
shipping goal. 
Minimizing Delayed Entry Program Attrition. Another success 
determinant used by the 99-00 district was how well it maintained the health of its DEP 
pool.  More specifically, San Diego believed a successful district has low DEP attrition.  
That is, San Diego strived to achieve low “in-month” DEP attrition relative to “out-
month” attrition.  In-month attrition is lost shippers that were supposed to ship during the 
current month.  Out-month attrites are DEPpers that are scheduled to ship in later months.  
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For example, in April, SN Smith counts as an in-month attrite, because he was supposed 
to ship in April.  If he had attrited in March, then he would be counted as an out-month 
attrite. 
In month attrites are damaging because in the big picture, the nation loses 
a shipper that it thought it had that month.  That is, since the loss was not identified in 
previous months, the nation assumes (to a certain extent) that every DEPper that is 
scheduled to ship in the current month is going to ship.  The reason for this is that 
districts are required to inspect their DEP pools and determine which DEPpers are 
“going” and which are “not going.”  Theoretically, the districts should know how 
“healthy” their DEP pools are at any given point in time.   
A district is then urged to take more out-month attrites than in month 
attrites.  Although this will help “clean up” the DEP pool and make it more healthy, it 
also forces the recruiter to replace the attrite with another contract to “make up” that out-
month loss.  The reason for this is because any attrite, whether out-month or in-month, 
counts against the current month’s NCO goal.  Districts may be hesitant to take out-
month attrites for fear of missing the current month NCO goal. 
Another harmful effect of in-month DEP attrition is the fact that each of 
the DEPpers is given a specific rating assignment by the Navy.  If the attrite is not 
identified early, that assignment or “seat” could be lost forever.  This is unfortunate 
because some seats are tough to get and an attrite may prevent that seat from ever being 
used. 
Finally, attrites take a toll on quality of life.  Every attrite needs to be 
replaced by another recruit.  Therefore, the recruiter must work harder to make goal.  For 
this reason, recruiters may not openly identify attrites because he/she does not want to 
risk missing goal for his/herself or station. 
The 99-00 NRD San Diego tried, but not always successfully, to minimize 
its in-month DEP attrition.  In fact, “this is one area with which the district could have 
done better,” admits the district CO.  Because they wanted to make NCO so badly, 
recruiters often pushed the limit with their DEP problems.  Any DEP losses would have 
to be made up, giving the recruiters additional goal for that particular month.  One 
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common occurrence was that recruiters “held on” to the attrites far too long.  A possible 
attrite can be “rolled out” to another month instead of  “attrited” that month in the hopes 
that the possible attrite will change his or her mind and ship out later on.  Unfortunately, 
many times the recruit did not change their minds and attrited during the month in which 
they were rolled.  They then counted as an in-month attrite for that month.  Why not roll 
them out even longer?  For one, a depper can only be in the pool for 365 days; many of 
these attrites were rolled to their 365th day.  They could not be rolled-out any longer.  
They had to be attrited.  Secondly, many were truly lost causes and some were just lost, 
literally.  The district could not roll out people that, without doubt, did not want to go to 
bootcamp.  The following describes one RINC’s sentiments about possible attrites and 
their effect on goal: 
I would be lying if I said it didn’t happen, even here in San Diego.  We’re 
here to put people in the Navy and we can’t do that without making 
goal…and if there’s a possible attrite who has a chance to be saved, then 
I’ll take that chance, even if that guy attrites later on.  I would not risk 
mission for a guy that “might” attrite.70 
For all the success NRD SD 99-00 had in writing contracts and making 
shipping goal, it was often reprimanded by Region West for its large number of in month 
attrites.  “We didn’t take our attrites as aggressively as we could have” stated on zone 
supervisor, “but if we took every possible attrite, then we would never make goal.  
Unfortunately some of those attrites came back to bite us.” 
Although the command came under constant scrutiny for the number of 
in-month attrites it suffered, “as long as we continued to make goal, no one bothered us 
and we’ll still be the best.”71  Although this statement warranted some truth (NRD SD 
was recognized as Region West District of the Year in 1999 and 2000), the threat of a 
DEP audit by the Region or CNRC always loomed over the district.  In fact, during those 
months where the Region was in danger of missing accession goal, San Diego was often 
singled out as being one of the causes because of the high numbers of attrites the district 
suffered. 
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Another determinant of success is Recruit Training Command (RTC) 
attrition.  San Diego went beyond the traditional scope of responsibility for recruits, 
extending its influence all the way to bootcamp.  Although districts have less control of 
this determinant, the training and guidance the recruiters give to the recruits prior to 
departure have definite impact on whether or not they decide to stay in boot camp, and 
thus in the Navy.  NRD San Diego gave each shipper a set of motivation cards with their 
recruiters’ telephone numbers enclosed.  The recruits were told that they could always 
call their recruiters if they had a problem or needed someone to talk to at boot camp.  The 
recruiters, in turn, maintained strong relationships with their recruits.  “I’ve made a lot of 
good friends and shipmates as a recruiter.  I try to keep in contact with them as much as 
possible.  I think they appreciate it.”72 
Other reasons for dropping out of boot camp may be a direct reflection of 
the command.  Disqualifying factors such as hidden medical conditions or undisclosed 
criminal involvement could have been identified prior to shipping out, or even prior to 
DEPping in.  San Diego did not tolerate hiding disqualifying information. 
RTC drop-outs are tracked by RTC and CNRC.  A group of Navy 
counselors called RQAT (Recruiter Quality Assurance Team) also conducts interviews 
and a “moment of truth” at RTC.  “Moments of Truth” are conducted at several stages of 
a recruit’s processing, at MEPS during DEP in and ship out, at the recruiting station when 
they first walk in, and by the RQAT at RTC.  During the moment of truth, the recruit is 
asked if they have lied or have anything to disclose prior to shipping.  San Diego takes an 
extra step by conducting its own moment of truth at the district headquarters prior to the 
recruit reporting to MEPs.   
The 99-00 systems secondary critical success factors are outlined next.  
Although these factors were important to the system, they were not considered “must 
haves” in order to have a successful organization: 
Like 97-98, quality of life was considered a critical success factor.  The 
key to maximizing quality of life in 99-00 was to make goal.  As the CR often said, 
“making goal equals quality of life.”  In San Diego, there appeared to be a correlation 
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between quality of life and making goal.  The CR and CO tapped the competitive side of 
the recruiters, using goal as a measure of winning:   
We were chastised because other districts thought we were losers.  As a 
result, we worked our butts off but were never really taught how to be 
successful.  I’m glad we’re making goal now…I can actually enjoy my job 
knowing I’m a winner.  
As well, when the recruiters became efficient at making goal, they figured 
out ways to earn more free time for themselves and their family.  One zone supervisor 
even trained his zone to make goal by working four ”hard days a week, and take Friday 
off”73 to spend however they wanted.  One veteran recruiter summed it up: “life was 
never this good when we weren’t making goal.” 
The 99-00 command wanted to eliminate improprieties as much as the 97-
98 district did.  However, 99-00 felt that previous methods of curbing illegal activity 
were morale busters: 
Some districts just run scared.  They’d rather minimize improprieties and 
not make goal, then let the guys recruit and make goal.  That doesn’t mean 
that the only way to make goal is through improper methods…it simply 
means that a scared recruiter will never make goal.  Commands should not 
make recruiters feel scared.74 
San Diego strived to discourage these types of activities without becoming 
a “martial” state.  The method was simple.  The CO, EPO, CR and Zone Supes often put 
out at all-hands training, through e-mail and in written correspondence that “illegal 
activity simply was not done.”     
The method was not entirely successful.  With less pressure from the 
command, some of the recruiters acted irresponsibly.  A Chief Petty Officer paid the rent 
of his house with his government credit card.  At least two senior petty officers were 
accused of having unethical relationships with women other than their wives.  One 
recruiter was convicted of having a party at his home with both DEPpers and alcohol in 
attendance.  And one other recruiter married his former DEPper.  All of these individuals 
did go to mast, however, and they were all punished.  Their punishments, oral reprimands 
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and suspended sentences, received mixed reviews from the field.  While a good number 
thought the punishments were “light” others suggested that they showed compassion for 
the field.   
The rigors of recruiting make it a prime duty station from which sailors 
leave the Navy.  San Diego’s retention rate during 99-00 was a remarkable 98 percent.  “I 
believe the reason why San Diego recruiters wanted to stay in was because of the high 
quality of life they enjoyed while they were here.”75  Many recruiters worked four-day 
weeks.  Most spent more time with their families than they ever did before.  Many 
recruiters just felt good knowing that they were part of a winning organization.  “I enjoy 
coming to work knowing that I am actually contributing to the big picture.  This job 
makes me want to stay in.”76  Another incentive for re-enlistment established by the 
second CO was a free three day stay in Las Vegas, paid for by the Las Vegas version of 
the RDAC.  The newly re-enlisted sailor enjoyed liberty at the Binion’s Hotel, with free 
meals and entertainment. 
c. System Direction  
In the 97-98 district, the Commanding officer used the standard method of 
faxing a goaling letter to the recruits to communicate the command mission.  The goaling 
letter, written and distributed at the beginning of each month, summarized the last 
month’s accomplishments and outlined the goals required for this month.  She also 
traveled out to the field extensively, not only to “keep her finger on the pulse” of the 
district but also to keep them informed as well.  E-mail was not extensively used since 
the only person with access to the net were the RINCs and ZSs.   
The mission statement during this era was:  
To maintain fleet readiness by recruiting the highest quantity of the best 
quality men and women for naval service.  We will accomplish our 
mission with the utmost honesty, integrity, and the highest standards of 
moral and ethical conduct.      
According to many recruiters, the implied mission was “make shipping 
goal, try your best to make NCO.  90 percent (NCO) seemed to be okay with the 
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command, so the recruiters took advantage of it.  There was no accountability, it seemed.  
If the district missed, most recruiters felt bad…but they didn’t let it ruin their day.”77 
The EPO faxed her own correspondence from time to time in a letter 
called an EPOGRAM.  It was primarily an administrative tool, but also attempted to 
motivate the recruiters.  The CR communicated to the field through his zone supervisors.  
The CR did not send any correspondence directly.   
The 99-00 district delineated the overall mission of the command in 
similar ways.  The message, however, was different:  MISSING GOAL WAS NOT AN 
OPTION.  That is, the command will make goal, no matter what.  The first way the CO 
set direction was through the following vision statement: 
We provide success opportunities for our Navy, our Nation and most of 
all, world peace. 
Everyone was required to memorize the vision and the CO would often 
ask a recruiter to repeat it.  “It hit home and set up our frame-of-mind” said one recruiter.   
The CO wanted to ensure that everyone knew NRD San Diego’s mission. 
As with the previous CO, he wrote a goaling letter each month, which delineated the 
specific focus for the month.  One month, the district might need more shippers than 
usual, while other months the district might require more “A-cells” (upper mental 
groups).  Each month’s letter was different and the CO sent it out to each recruiter via e-
mail.  They were essentially his standing orders for the month.  Each recruiter was 
required to read them.    
The recruiters now realized they were being held accountable for doing 
their jobs.  In the past, if a station or zone missed their goal, they would not feel badly 
about it.  Now, they realized that their goal was part of the larger goal.  It seemed as if the 
recruiters took the CO’s message to heart. 
The EPO followed the CO’s lead and put out an “EPO Passdown Log.”  
The log was an informal way for me to put out information to the field.  In the “PDL’s”, 
the EPO briefly discussed upcoming events, admin items and requirements.  For the most 
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part, however, he tried to motivate the recruiters by praising them in the most public 
format, besides the awards ceremonies, he had at his disposal.  The EPO filled the log 
with stats, quotes and achievements.  The EPO included both humorous and motivational 
stories.  There was no specific time for a PDL.  The EPO wrote them whenever he felt 
like it.  Some were long others were short, but they appeared very popular.  In fact, 
recruiters would e-mail the EPO asking when the next PDL was coming out.   
One method of communication used far more frequently than the previous 
era was electronic mail.  The CO, CR and the EPO e-mailed the RINCS of recruiting 
stations that were making goal, and/or the recruiters that were producing above and 
beyond.  Like the previous CO, the 99-00 CO was famous for calling recruiting stations 
at all times of the day (and evening) to congratulate them, give them encouragement or 
just to say hi.  As with 97-98, these calls were not seen as inspections but rather genuine 
calls to the stations from a leader that cared. 
The 99-00 command also used the conduit metaphor of a ship at sea to 
further emphasize the CO’s vision.  He referred to the district as his “ship,” and equated 
making goal to “getting the ship underway.”  He referred to all the command personnel as 
“shipmates” and called MEPS “the bridge,” especially on mission days.  He even 
preferred to be called “Captain” instead of “CO” or “Skipper.” 
The second Commanding officer of that time period appealed to the 
district personnel’s competitive desire to win.  His most famous saying was: 
Losers quit when they are tired.  Winners quit when they have won. 
The quote apparently inspired many in the command to perform to their 
potential and became a rallying cry for the recruiters, headquarters and MEPS personnel.  
As one recruiter put it, “making goal was like winning a big game to us…missing was 
losing…the CO said it- we’re not going to quit ‘til we’ve won.”  The CO ended every e-
mail, goaling letter and speech with the phrase.  In fact, at awards ceremonies, when he 
concluded, the recruiters often repeated the phrase while the CO spoke it. 
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Not to be outdone, the Chief Recruiter was also famous for her one-liners.  
“The CR’s always got something wise to say,” said one zone supervisor.  “Believe me, 
we listen,” he added.  Her most famous line inspired many of the recruiters to persevere: 
Whatever your mind can believe and conceive, you can achieve. 
2. Design Factors 
a. Tasks 
What is the nature of the work as defined by NRD San Diego?  In both 
eras, the primary task was to place qualified civilian personnel into the United States 
Navy.  Simply put, as recruiters often say, “we put people in the Navy.”  In both eras, 
there was significant specialization involved in the tasks assigned to the districts’ people.  
As described previously, the processes and functions of the MEPS personnel are vastly 
different than those of the recruiters.  The overall level of “goal first” differed between 
the two eras. 
In 97-98, there was no apparent emphasis on “goal first.”  A zone 
supervisor who served in both eras stated: “The district didn’t feel like the bottom line 
was to put people in the Navy.  This was especially frustrating for those of us who 
wanted to do write contracts.  The district wanted to put as many people in as possible, 
but the overall feeling was not to take chances or overstretch our bounds…ask any of the 
CRF’s.  The district felt suffocated sometimes.  Goal definitely didn’t seem like the first 
priority.”  The different pieces of the organization conducted their tasks without any 
pressing desire to work together to achieve the higher tasking.   
The field’s perception did not match the 97-98 leadership position of 
making goal the number one priority.  That goal, however, was not NCO, but accessions.   
The EPO would constantly ride us about our DEPpers.  She wanted to 
make sure we made shipping goal so she questioned us constantly about 
our DEPpers to make sure they were going to bootcamp.  She would come 
down on us if we had a missing shipper, but really didn’t do anything if 
we missed NCO.78   
The 97-98 district expressed concerned about the professional 
development of its personnel.  “Members placed studying of advancement materials 
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above recruiting because headquarters said it was okay.”79  As well, personal 
development and family time were encouraged.  “We were allowed to go to school, and 
the CO and XO understood that we were on shore duty and had families to attend to.”80 
While development of personnel, improving chances of promotion, and 
being a spokesman/role-model for the United States Navy were also mentioned, the 
predominant feeling was that the 99-00 NRD San Diego did one thing: send qualified 
people to bootcamp.  As the CO stated many times, “make no mistake…we are here to 
put people in the Navy; that’s the bottom line.”81  The task of the district was spelled out 
very clearly for everyone: make goal.  Therefore, although each department had 
seemingly different taskings, they all came together to achieve the primary task of the 
command. 
Recruiting was placed above everything else, including professional 
development, family and personal development.  Although ample time was given for 
recruiters to study for exams, they were still expected to sign at least two contracts for the 
month.  Personal development, such as school, was looked at in a positive light, for those 
who could handle the workload and write contracts.  For those that could not, however, 
they were indirectly “forced to choose between school and their careers, because they 
were still responsible for their two (a month).”82  Family time, it was felt, came about as 
a result of making goal.  Unfortunately, many families were negatively affected by the 
intense recruiting effort.  As a result, there were over a dozen divorces or separations 
during the 99-00 timeframe. 
b. Technology 
The 97-98 district operated in an environment where high costs of new 
technology precluded their use.  Cellular phones, scanners, and broadband internet 
service providers were not readily available.  The primary means of communication were 
fax and telephone.  The district was very efficient with faxes, but they were subject to 
breakdowns.  “It seemed that at least one (of the NRS’s) or MEPS’ fax machines was 
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80 Recruiter, October 2000. 
81 Commanding Officer, February 2001. 
82 Chief Recruiter, March 2002. 
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broken.”83  As well, many documents were time-late, preventing contracts from being 
processed.   
We would have to wait hours for documents like transcripts or court 
papers to come through.  If the district didn’t get them before (MEPS) 
cutoff time, those guys didn’t get in.  It’s a shame because sometimes 
those contracts were on Mission Day and they wouldn’t count until the 
next month.84 
Landline phones were the only telephone lines available.  Some recruiters 
had their own personal cellular-phones but rarely used them for work because of personal 
cost.  Many recruiters had pagers, and could therefore be contacted.  If recruiters were 
“on the road” while they were paged, they would of course have to pull over to return the 
call.  
When some opportunities for technological innovation became available, 
the 97-98 district took advantage.  For example, Zone 5, the Riverside County zone, was 
selected as a test case for a Naval Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC) 
study regarding cellular phone use and production.  NPRDC was testing whether cell 
phones increased production.  The zone was an outstanding producer, making goal nearly 
every month.  The recruiters could be contacted at all times of the day and could make 
calls anytime they needed.  Although the conclusions of the study were not made 
available to the researcher, they may have prompted CNRC to fund cell phone use for all 
recruiters in 2000. 
In the area of administration, all documents were written and routed on 
paper.  DARS, Leave Chits, Special request chits, waiver requests, educational 
verifications, etc. were filed as paper copy.  The EPO complained to her relief that “80 
percent of her time” was spent doing administration.  She also said that “all I ever seem 
to do is write evals.”  Evaluations were written (sometimes handwritten) by the recruiters 
and zone supervisors and sent to district via duty driver or fax.  The EPO had to hand-
route every chit sent to her to the XO and the CO, and then send the chits back to the 
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recruiter.  “Leave chits took too long to process.  A lot of us were going on leave without 
a chit because they would get lost in somebody’s box.”85    
Evaluations were also processed on paper, and were sometimes late.  Not 
only did the EPO have to re-write the evaluations, she had to convert each of the 
evaluations into computer format, and route them to the chain of command.  She then had 
to re-write them with CO and XO chops and send them back to the field for signature.  
Once the evals got back, she then had to mail them.  “The district never got our evals out 
in time.  We were lucky if the district got them out a month late.  The system was so 
slow.”86 
Another possible area for technological improvement was statistics.  The 
statistician would have to, one by one, type in the statistical results of each day.  This was 
time-consuming after large volume processing days, such as working Saturdays87 and 
mission days.  As a result, the statistician often stayed late, and sometimes had problems 
getting the stats out to the recruiters in a timely manner.  When inputs were finished, the 
stats were faxed out to the zone supervisors and recruiting stations.   
DEP changes were recorded on documents known as DARS, or Delayed 
Entry Program Activity Reports.  The district wrote and routed DARS on paper.  As well, 
DARS were filed away in large stacks for reference purposes.  Like other paper 
documents, the DARS were sometimes lost or delayed.  Unlike other documents, 
however, DARS have an immediate impact on production.  DARS are the means by 
which the command maintains an accurate picture of their DEP pool.  If a DAR is 
missing, the accountability of the DEPper is compromised.  This could results in missing 
Shipping and/or NCO goal. 
The 99-00 district made a concerted attempt to use available technology to 
help improve their efficiency and increase the probability of success.  The following are 
ways in which the district upgraded its technology: 
                                                 
85 Headquarters Support Personnel/Recruiter, May 2002. 
86 Assistant EPO, May 2002. 
87 CNRC, MEPS, the four Regions and the 31 districts often work on Saturdays to accommodate for 
those applicants who cannot process for enlistment during the work-week.   
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(1) Video Teleconferencing.  Technology helped to overcome 
some geographical challenges.  Some of the district’s recruiting stations are hundreds of 
miles away from headquarters and MEPS.  This distance presents a problem with face-to-
face interviews.  By rule, the CO must conduct face-to-face interviews with those 
possible recruits that have criminal records, prior drug usage or other possibly 
disqualifying circumstances.  The recruiters had to drive the applicants all the way down 
to the district office for each interview.  The round-trip, in some cases, took eight hours 
to accomplish.  This took a lot of time away from the recruiters and discouraged them 
from trying to recruit qualified, but slightly questionable recruits.  The XO suggested the 
district use Video teleconferencing machines instead.  After all, the CO can still see their 
face.  The CO immediately bought six new VTC camera screens and placed them in 
strategic areas around the district.  The recruiters now drove far less distances and spent 
more of their time either recruiting or with their families. 
(2) LANS and Broadband.  Technology made NRD SD’s 
administration faster and more efficient.  The command invested in Local LANS for each 
recruiting office, and fast modems instead of slow dial-up.  Even though it was time-
consuming, the district conducted extensive training on computer basics to the crew.     
(3) Electronic Administration.  The EPO delegated the 
responsibility of evaluation and fitness report processing to his EPO administrator, a 
YN1.  An expert in organization, she, with help from the Assistant EPO, developed an 
effective timeline for writing, revising and mailing evaluations and fitness reports.  She 
set the due dates, conducted eval writing training with all the recruiters, and delineated a 
list of acceptable bullets for each level of proficiency (5.0, 4.0 etc…).  This way, all they 
had to do was cut and paste bullets and fill in names.  The results were incredible.  The 
first cycle of evals after instituting the evals was the First Class Petty Officers.  The 
district was two weeks early.  Late evals were the norm for NRD SD before our new 
system was in place.   
Leave and special request chits were another area in which the 99-
00 district improved using electronic media.  Fortunately, the Statistician, a 
Quartermaster by rate but EXCEL wizard in his spare time, developed all the electronic 
forms for the district.  He also sent many recruiters their electronic signature, which they 
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could easily affix to the chits through cut and paste methods.  As well, he devised an 
efficient routing procedure through the e-mail, which included a built-in tracking system.  
The tracking system allowed everybody in the chain to know exactly who had the chit 
last.  Chits were never lost as they were automatically saved when transmitted to an 
electronic inbox. 
There is certain paperwork exclusive to a recruiting command.  
Two such documents, Depper Activity Reports (DARS) and Waiver Requests, have a 
tremendous impact on making goal.  If these documents are held up in any manner, they 
could mean losing dozens of contracts each month.  The reasons these reports get lost are 
typical of “normal” paperwork: they get lost in somebody’s inbox, they get lost in the fax 
machine, or they just simply “get lost.”  These documents were also made electronic and 
all but eliminated these documents being lost.     
Other administrative processes that turned electronic included 
vehicle usage logs and Training reports.  Two items that directly improved morale and 
quality of life was the electronic processing of Out of Pocket Expenses (OPE) and Supply 
Requisitions.  Recruiters receive reimbursement of up to $75.00 on any expenses incurred 
while doing their jobs, such as buying a recruit lunch or paying for parking.  OPE used to 
take up to three months to be processed.  With electronic processing, the recruiters found 
the money in their bank accounts within two weeks.  Supplies were never short as 
electronic processing drastically reduced the turnaround in orders. 
(4) Statistics.  The district also improved its statistics reporting 
process.  Recruiter stats are a vital part of any competitive district.  In San Diego, 
competition was one of the foundations of its success.  Everyone wanted to see how he or 
she was doing in relation to everybody else.  Stations and recruiters competed against 
each for monthly and year-end awards.  They needed accurate, timely stats in order to see 
how they were faring against the “competition.”  The Statistician programmed an 
interface between the MEPS computer system (PRIDE)88 and his desktop computer at 
headquarters.  With one keystroke, the names of the DEPpers (with demographic 
information such as gender, ASVAB score, educational level, marriage status, etc.), 
shippers, and their recruiters downloaded into a statistics storage and reporting program 
                                                 
88 Personalized Recruiting for Immediate and Delayed Enlistment 
63 
on the headquarters desktop computer.  The information was then sent out to the field 
from his home computer or through the headquarters PC before 0700 the next morning.  
That way, each recruiter knew exactly where he or she stood in relation to the other 
recruiters.   
(5) Kiosks.  The district was given extra funding to conduct 
recruiting via “kiosks.”  These kiosks were videogame-like machines that were placed in 
strategic locations such as high schools, shopping malls and public affairs events.  
Prospects typed their names, age, telephone numbers in the machines, which were linked 
via telephone line to a database kept at the command.  The kiosks precluded the need for 
a recruiter to be at the site.  They were mobile.  They were less threatening.  Through the 
kiosks, the district developed a large database of leads.   
The actual effectiveness of the kiosks was debated.  Although they 
were an exciting innovation, they were not the revolutionary breakthrough that the 
district and CNRC had hoped they would become.  Increased man-hour requirements for 
recording data, delivering the kiosks and downloading information made the kiosks 
somewhat of a nuisance.  “I would rather recruit the regular way than deal with the 
kiosks…they took up too much time and effort.”89   
The most effective use of the kiosks was at Navy-related events, 
such as Fleet Week and the Miramar Air Show.  The crowd was pro-Navy and was eager 
to find out more information.  Placing them in high schools and malls proved less 
effective.  Although they were placed in high traffic areas, students were simply not 
interested in spending time on the machines.  In all, the district attained less than 20 
contracts while using the kiosks over a one-year time period. 
c. Structure 
The recruiting structure of both districts was similar.  Geographically, the 
district was divided into six zones, with 44 stations spread out among them.  The basic 
structure with major counties and stations are shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
                                                 
89 Recruiter/RINC, responsible for a kiosk placed in Barstow, CA, two hours away from his recruiting 
station in Victorville. 
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Name  Major County/Area Major Stations (NRS’) 
Zone 1 San Bernardino San Bernardino   Victorville   Upland   Fontana 
Zone 2 North County Oceanside   Poway   Mira Mesa    
Zone 3 San Diego County National City   Chula Vista   El Cajon   College Grove 
Zone 4 Las Vegas Las Vegas (East) Las Vegas (West) Henderson Lake Havasu 
Zone 5 Riverside County Riverside    Corona   Temecula   
Zone 6 Orange County Anaheim   Garden Grove   Mission Viejo    
 
Figure 3.1. NRD SD Zones. 
 
Looking at the chain of command, the CO during the 97-98 time period 
was an O-5.  She was promoted to Captain towards the end of her tour.  The CO was a 
Fleet Support Officer (1700 designator) with extensive prior recruiting experience.  Her 
Executive Officers were also Fleet Support Officers, both O-4’s.  Each served 18 month 
tours with her.  They operated under the previous process, where the XO was ordered in 
for a tour and did not “fleet up” as they do now.  The Enlisted Programs Officers were 
both 0-3 1700’s who served as Assistant EPO’s for a year before taking the helm as the 
department head.  The Chief Recruiter, for a time was a Senior Chief CRF who was 
standing in for the incoming CR.  The incoming CR, who served for most of the time 
period of this study, was a female CRF Master Chief who was serving her first CR tour.  
She was, in fact, the only female CRF Master Chief in the Navy.  She had extensive 
experience in recruiting in the region, having served as a Regional Trainer prior to her 
CR tour, and earned national recognition as a Zone Supervisor of the Year during her tour 
at NRD New York.   
The district was essentially without a qualified Chief Recruiter in 1997.  
The assigned CR, a Master Chief with vast experience, left to attend the Senior Enlisted 
Academy.  When he returned, he allowed the interim CR to continue on the job for at 
least five more months.  “Although he claimed openly that there was no real reason to 
reclaim the job, most felt that there was some friction between him and the CO.  That’s 
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the real reason he didn’t take the (CR) job back.”90  The interim CR was a Senior Chief 
Petty Officer CRF with little leadership experience.  He was able to make NCO goal, 
however, “because the goals were so low.”91   
The CR then left, leaving the interim CR in place to turnover with the 
incoming Chief Recruiter.  The incoming Chief Recruiter received a poor turnover from 
the Senior Chief prior to the beginning of 1998.  To compound her problems, the district 
received the aforementioned goal and personnel increase.  She also had to deal with the 
fact that almost half the recruiters were leaving within three months of her assuming the 
watch.   
The overall structure of the district was the same for both eras.  The 
district was divided into the same departments: public affairs, supply, LEADS, 
administration, officer programs and ADP.  During the 97-98 time period, however, the 
district made a major physical move.  Because the district was previously located at the 
now defunct Naval Training Center (NTC), the district moved “across the street” to a 
new home at the Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare Training Center. Did the move have any 
impact on recruiting?  According to most of the interviewed, the move had little effect on 
production.  Here are some opinions: 
We did it in a weekend…there was no impact.92 
We had some problems with phone lines, and faxes, and things like 
that…but we overcame them very quickly.  No one ever came to district 
anyway, so it was no big deal.93 
We had to move all our desks, computers, files…you name it, we did it.  
The whole move took a couple weeks, altogether, and we still had to make 
goal…But it really didn’t affect goal that much.  We still made 
accessions.94 
The 97-98 command was very rigid and hierarchal.  There were distinct 
lines of responsibility and management.  At the top of every process was the 
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93 Headquarters personnel, September 2002. 
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Commanding officer.  “From shipping, to public affairs, to training, to Out of Pocket 
Expenses (OPE)95, the CO monitored everything.  She had to make sure she knew 
everything.  She held so many meetings…the poor EPO was down here almost every 
minute.”96     
The XO was very interested in all aspects of administration.  “Every single 
piece of correspondence had to go through her.”97  The XO also maintained the personnel 
“picture” of the district, taking care of recruiter improprieties and manning issues.  The 
support department heads all reported to the XO directly.  All their actions were screened 
by XO prior to being known by the CO.   
The EPO seemingly followed the lead of her supervisors by managing 
nearly all aspects of the recruiting effort.  “She stayed in her office until 2000 almost 
every night trying to catch up on her work.  She had a pile of paperwork almost four feet 
high sometimes.”98  She managed shipping goal, scheduled recruiter training, wrote 
evaluations and tracked leave requests.   
The EPO had an Assistant EPO, a Chief Personnelman (PNC) who had 16 
years of administrative, recruiting and MEPS experience, all of which at NRD San Diego.  
She also had a civilian secretary, who was primarily responsible for routing and filing 
leave and special request chits.  The secretary also helped with writing evaluations and 
fitness reports. 
The EPO relied on the CA and district Administration department to 
perform the bulk of her administrative processes.  Her EPDS was a Chief Personnelman.  
As mentioned, the interim CR was a Senior Chief CRF with no CR experience.   
The CR supervised a District Trainer.  However, he was more responsible 
for scheduling refresher training and updating demographic information in STEAM, than 
for training.  Recruiter training was conducted primarily by the CR and the zone supes. 
                                                 
95 OPE was capped at $75.00 per month. Recruiters were allowed to treat applicants to meals in the 
process of trying to recruit them.  Recouping the money involved turning in claim forms on a monthly 
basis. 
96 Headquarters Personnel, September 2002. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Assistant EPO, September 2002. 
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The CR also managed a DEP Coordinator, who in 97-98 was a Petty 
Officer Second Class.  His duties were limited, as well.  He did not take an active part in 
managing the district’s DEP pool.  Instead, he was responsible for ensuring that the 
DEPpers received all their awards prior to departing for boot camp.  For example, a 
DEPper can earn a blue and gold Navy sweat suit for a certain amount of personal 
referrals.  As well, if the DEPpers perform and pass a PRT and complete their DEP RQS, 
they are automatically advanced to E-2.  It was the DEPCO’s responsibility to ensure the 
DEPpers earned their just rewards. 
The LEADS department consisted of the LTCS between two and four 
prior recruiters who were either on their way out of recruiting because they were at the 
end of their tour, disciplinary problems or less than adequate production, and one or two 
assigned personnel.   
The Public Affairs Officer was the collateral duty of an O-4 Fleet Support 
Officer who was retiring in the next year. 
The Administrative department was led by an E-8 CA and included a 
Yeoman First Class Petty Officer and one or two PN2’s and PN3’s.  The Admin 
Department handled and processed all of the district’s correspondence. 
The Automated Data Processing (ADP) department consisted of a civilian 
civil service member, a designated R-TOOLS trainer, and a former recruiter who was 
responsible for paperwork.  The department was primarily responsible for repairing 
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The organizational structure of the 99-00 district was markedly different 
than that of the previous era.  There were two CO’s during this period.  They were both 
unrestricted line officers, one a surface warfare officer, the next a P-3 pilot.  The P-3 pilot 
was the former XO.  With current policy, the XO fleets up to CO after an 18-month tour 
as the second-in-command. 
The CA did not exist in 99-00 as the XO and CO wrote most of their own 
correspondence.  A Chief Yeoman led the administration department.  The PAO was a 
Journalist First Class Petty Officer (JO1) who was very active in writing articles.  He 
even performed as the command’s disk jockey at quarterly awards ceremonies.  
Furthermore, the PAO department required three full-time personnel who coordinated the 
myriad of events that took place all over the district and maintained the local web site.  
The ADP (renamed SYSAD for System Administration) department employed three 
personnel for installation, troubleshooting and repair.  Because of a new telemarketing 
initiative, the number of personnel in the LEADS department tripled to 12.   
The Enlisted Programs Department’s headquarters team included two DEP 
coordinators (who also served as the public affairs “strike team”).  The strike team set up 
public affairs events such as job fairs and airshows, taking that responsibility away from 
the recruiters.  The EPO team also added a civilian Assistant Statistician, another trainer 
to go along with the Assistant EPO, statistician, and two trainers.  
One major change was that the EPO had a separate administrative team.  
The reason for a separate administrative function from the district’s admin department 
was simply because the wanted to be intimately involved with the recruiters’ 
administration.  In other words, the EPO had to be in charge of the person responsible for 
the recruiters’ administration.  The EPO could not tell the administration department 
what to do; but he could tell his Yeoman what to do.100  With a separate admin function, 
the EPO had better control over his personnel.  Another major change with the structure 
of EPO administration was that the XO handled most issues with the AEPO, leaving the 
EPO free to handle production issues.  Although the EPO still held overall responsibility 
                                                 
100 Enlisted Programs Officer, November 2002. 
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for his department’s administration, the AEPO was an experienced PNC who expertly 
conducted those duties. 
As well, and most significantly, the EPO had the luxury of having an 
“Enlisted Processing Officer” at MEPS.  Officially designated an Assistant EPO, he was 
an interim EPO who served in the department head position for four months prior to the 
permanent EPO’s arrival.  The AEPO was also a surface warfare officer (1100 
designator) who had extensive leadership experience in the fleet.  He and the EPDS 
worked as a team to ensure the efficient processing of applicants at MEPS. 
There were also four extra processors at the MEPS who also came from 
the field, and a new EPDS who was a retired Personnelman Master Chief Petty Officer.  
The EPDS’ previous civil service job was in the MEPS command, so he had the added 
advantage of knowing many of the personnel that worked at the MEPS.  
There were additional personnel initiatives in the field.  The zone 
supervisors each had an assistant who helped with production and administration.  As 
well, they also had the opportunity to hire a civilian administrative assistant who also 
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of rank.  In fact, there were several stations that had petty officer second classes as the 
RINCs because they were simply better recruiters and in some cases, better leaders.  In 
fact, it was not unusual to have a Petty Officer First Class Navy Career Counselor (NC1) 
as a zone supervisor, since precedence for these jobs was given to the career recruiter 
force (CRF).  
The field was divided into career recruiting force (CRF’s) and Fleet sailors 
on their shore duty tour.  There was often some friction between the CRF personnel and 
the fleet sailors.  The CRF’s were former fleet sailors who changed their ratings to 
become full-time recruiters.  As one CRF put it, the fleet sailors would “look down upon 
the CRF’s because the district were not sea-going.  I think they resented us because the 
district were always on shore duty and also because The district had a negative reputation 
for being crooks.”101   
For the most part, however, the field operated with mutual respect.  The 
CR attempted to fill leadership positions with those individuals who were proven leaders, 
regardless of whether or not they were CRF.  In fact, several non-CRF recruiters went on 
to become successful RINCs and two fleet Chief Petty Officers went on to become 
successful zone supervisors.   
As with most recruiting districts, NRD SD also contained a mix of sailors 
from various communities.  There were recruiters from the aviation, surface, submarine, 
cryptological, intelligence, supply, and personnel ratings.  
As mentioned, the district (in both eras) was very racially diverse.  Given 
the cultural diversity of the San Diego area, the racial mix was expected.  Typically, at 
any one time period, half the field was minority with several dozen each of Filipinos, 
other Asians, African-Americans, and Hispanics, leaving about one hundred Caucasians. 
e. Processes/Subsystems 
(1) Human Resource Management.  The following processes 
describe the recruitment and selection processes conducted by both districts: 
Personnel Recruitment.  As with all commands, the district has no 
real say in which fleet personnel CNP and CNRC assign to recruiting duty.  The 97-98 
                                                 
101 Zone Supervisor, June 2002. 
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district did not enjoy a “steady stream” of recruiters but instead received a large number 
of recruiters at one time at the beginning of fiscal year 98.  After the initial “jolt” of 
recruiters, the 99-00 district received between 5-10 recruiters per month. 
With regards to the career recruiters, it seems that the CRF system 
allows the CRF’s to pick their preferential duty station.  The CRF’s detail themselves 
through their own detailer, a CRF Master Chief, and negotiate their orders with greater 
flexibility than the fleet sailors.  For example, the CR, upon leaving, had her choice of 
becoming a CR of another district (of her choice), CR of the nation, or an officer recruiter 
in another district. 
The 97-98 command employed many recruiters who were non-
volunteers.  They were sent to recruiting because they had no other shore duty choice.  As 
a result, many were not ready for nor wanted to face the rigors and requirements of 
recruiting duty.  The leadership understood this and the CR, in particular, made it known 
that each and every person in the district was a sailor assigned to a particular duty.  And 
as is the case in all naval commands, the sailors were accountable to do their duty, even if 
it was recruiting.  “The message took a while to sink in with some recruiters, but once 
they did, they realized that they weren’t here for a vacation.  They were actually here to 
work.”102 
As a result, the recruiters in 99-00 were experienced non-
volunteers who were joined by new recruiters who, for the most part, wanted to come to 
recruiting.  “As a whole, the recruiters in that time period were far easier to work with 
than the previous batch of recruiters.”103 
Personnel Assignment.  This section refers to the assignment of 
personnel at headquarters and MEPS.  Each department was always in need of extra 
personnel.  The PAO, Supply, LEADS and ADP departments were all augmented with 
field recruiters.  How did the district assign these personnel?  In 97-98, the bulk of these 
augmenting personnel were either “failed”104 recruiters or recruiters nearing their PRD’s.  
                                                 
102 District Trainer, December 2001. 
103 Chief Recruiter, November 2002 
104 “failed” refers to those recruiters, who for whatever reason (personal, social, lack of salesmanship, 
and/or medical) simply could not recruit, and had no potential for becoming a good recruiter.  These 
personnel were better off away from the field. 
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Known begrudgingly as “District Dwellers”, these outcast recruiters were looked down 
upon by the field recruiters.  As one recruiter put it, “it was kind of shameful to be 
assigned to district; it meant you couldn’t hack it out in the field.”  (See Figure 3.4) 
The CR, however, wanted to fill the “holes” with effective 
performers so as not to take away from the mission of the specific departments.  She 
wanted to do this in ’98, but was not allowed to until ’99.  She felt that “recruiters earned 
the right to work at district.”105  This way, the district personnel would be looked upon 
with an air of respect.  As well, the recruiters could look forward to a reward-being “off 
production” was something many recruiters strived for. There was some friction, 
however, between the CR/EPO and the XO whenever a need arose at the headquarters.  
The XO would want a certain person, without taking into account the individual’s turn in 
the CR’s “pecking order” of eligibility.  There was usually debate (sometimes heated) 
between the XO and EPO/CR.  Whatever the case, however, the spot was usually filled 
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Figure 3.5. Personnel Assignment Process 99-00. 
 
Recruiter Assignment.  Assigning recruiters to their NRS’ did not 
differ greatly between the two time periods.  The first step in assigning recruiters to their 
particular station was a phone call by the recruiter, while at NORU, to the District 
Trainer.  The trainer took the recruiters’ preferences, but more than likely had a station 
already picked out.  Based on inputs provided via message on the recruiters’ individual 
background (languages spoken, nationality, familial requirements [EFM, wife’s job]), the 
CR already had a good idea where she was going to put a prospective gain.  For example, 
a Spanish speaker would most likely be placed in NRS Tustin, Garden Grove, El Centro 
or Chula Vista.  However, if that recruiter had family in Arizona, the CR would consider 
placing the recruiter in Yuma.  The CO did not have that much to do with recruiter 
placement.  However, if a recruiter complained about his/her placement, the CO was sure 
to get a call. 
Once a recruiter was in his/her initial station, there was still a 
possibility that he/she could move from that station.  Once again, the CR controlled these 
moves with help from the zone supes.  Although the XO and CO were supposed to be 
notified of any moves, many moves were made without the command’s immediate 
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Figure 3.6. Recruiter Assignment Process 97-00. 
 
Training.  The training process was not markedly different 
between the two districts.  Each zone supervisor was responsible for training the 
personnel in his/her zone.  The zone supes followed a standard schedule put out by 
CNRC, as well as their own tailored training.  The CR gave them this freedom.  The zone 
supes took pride in providing training and were very good at it.  To track training activity, 
the zone supes e-mailed weekly training reports to the district trainer.106  On paper, the 
Command Training Officer, a junior officer from the Officer Programs Office, was 
supposed to conduct and track training.  However, because she did not have any 
experience with enlisted recruiting, the optimum method of providing training was 
through the zone supes.  Any other way would have caused unneeded friction between 
the officer programs department and the field. 
Another aspect of human resource management process is the 
reward system.  The awards and incentives system employed by the command sought to 
persuade the recruiters to make goal.   
Awards and Recognition.  One of the most effective rewards for 
the recruiters was a strong evaluation or fitness report.  In both time periods, recruiters 
who were successful at NCO attainment were usually rewarded with outstanding 
evaluations.  Unfortunately, this practice caused some criticism in the field.  Some sailors 
who had sparkling records simply could not recruit, and were “punished” in their evals 
77 
                                                 
106 The title “district trainer” was a misnomer.  The district trainer’s main responsibility with regards 
to training was tracking and scheduling; he did not provide any whatsoever.  The district trainer performed 
other functions which were essential to the command, including: scheduling recruiter refresher and 
leadership training, conducting ethics and indoctrination, coordinating EPO, CR and CRF travel, STEAM 
management, and acting as liaison with the command Training Officer. 
with low marks.  On the other hand, some sailors who had average performance marks in 
previous commands, shined in recruiting earning them the “Early” and “Must Promotes.”   
Another significant award used effectively by both time periods 
was the Recruiter Incentive Program, or REIP.  This program was equivalent to the 
Command Advancement Program (CAP) used by operational commands.  Sailors could 
be meritoriously promoted by their commanding officers if they were outstanding 
performers.  While the 99-00 command focused its seven to nine annual REIP 
promotions to Petty Officer Second Class’, the 97-98 command did not restrict itself to a 
specific rank on who it would REIP.     
The two districts handled awards in different ways.  One thing in 
common with regards to awards was the extensive awards instruction and program used 
by each command.  Awards were given to the “best” in several categories including 
individual recruiters, stations: large, medium and small categories, LEADS production, 
early “lock-out”107, making gates108, and shipping goal attainment.  Production was the 
bottom line.  If the individual, station, or zone was the top producer in New Contracts, 
then they earned an award.  The actual awards ranged from trophies, to plaques, to pen 
and pencil sets.  The “hardware” received was purposely large and displayable, so that 
the recruiters could flaunt the fruits of their efforts.   
The 97-98 district CO, XO or EPO distributed awards by giving 
them out at the station, or at the zone level during training.  The CO instituted a quarterly 
awards show that was modeled after the Oscars or Emmy’s.  The recruits were flown or 
driven from their zones in order to take part.  The mandatory awards show was an instant 
success with the field, but not so popular with the headquarters personnel.  They resented 
having to watch “the recruiters get all those awards while we just sat there, with no 
acknowledgement.”109  On the contrary, support personnel did earn a specific 
headquarters award, called the “Support Person of the Month.” 
                                                 
107 “lock-out” means making NCO goal for the month.  Locking out early means making goal a week 
prior to Mission Day (the last day of the month). 
108 The month is separated into goaling “gates”, 25%, 50%, 75% and 100%.  25% gate means trying to 
achieve 25% of your goal at approximately the first ¼ part of the month (might be the 7th or 8th of the 
month). 
109 Headquarters Personnel, August 2002. 
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Realizing the value of competition and the drive and motivation it 
provided to the recruiters, the 99-00 leadership continued the mandatory all-hands awards 
ceremonies, conducting them on a quarterly basis.  The Assistant Statistician, a civilian 
hire who was a prior recruiter and MEPS MLPO, coordinated the program.  The 
command held the awards ceremony in one of the six zones.  The ceremony could take 
place near the Point Loma headquarters one quarter, Corona, CA the next quarter, and 
Riverside the next.  For most of the field, the ceremony was not only an opportunity to 
receive hard-earned awards; it was also a chance to see their peers, to socialize afterwards 
(they were sometimes overnight events) and simply to brag about their accomplishments.  
The awards ceremonies ended with well-deserved recognition and increased morale and 
focus. 
We wanted to be on that stage to get an award.  It really meant something 
to us.  Most of us felt badly if we didn’t win at least one award.110 
The command made national and regional awards something to 
value, but not exactly an incentive.  Although the district and individuals in the district 
won several regional and national awards, including the top award (District of the Year) 
two years in a row, making goal seemed to be the only incentive the district needed to 
perform effectively.  One zone supe summed up the impact that national recognition 
placed on the field: 
I don’t think the field, as a whole, sought to become district of the year.  
Although I do believe that they did not want to be the reason the district 
didn’t win the award.  What I mean is…everybody wanted to make 
goal…nobody wanted to miss…if they made goal, then there was no 
reason why the district shouldn’t win…except maybe for politics.111 
Fitness Report and Evaluation System.  The 97-98 command 
spent a great deal of time on processing fitreps and evaluations. As discussed, the 
command worked with paper and faxes with most of their paperwork.  As a result, the 
EPO, CA and XO had to be very active in the writing, distribution, and tracking of the 
documents.  The recruiter gave to the RINC inputs in the form of bullets, last evaluation 
and copies of awards and other recognition (such as certificates of appreciation from 
                                                 
110 Recruiter, December 2001. 
111 Zone Supervisor, December 2001. 
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schools or local businesses).  Depending on the RINC, the evals were either fully written 
or summarily written and turned into the zone supervisor.  Most of the zone supervisors 
wrote a complete evaluation for their recruiters based on the inputs received.  The 
process, up to this point, could take weeks or even months to accomplish.  The Chief 
Recruiter then received the evaluations, made her “chops” and forwarded them, by hand 
to the EPO.  The EPO then rewrote each and every evaluation by hand, typed them up (or 
had her secretary type them up) and forwarded the completed evaluations to the XO.  The 
XO edited them in hardcopy, and sent them to the Chief Administrator to make changes.  
The CA then sent them back to the XO, who reviewed them and returned them to the 
EPO.  The EPO walked the evaluations to the Chief Recruiter, who sent them out to the 
zone supervisors.  The zone supervisors then called in the recruiters and debriefed them 
on their marks and/or rankings.  The recruiters signed the evaluations and sent them back 
to the zone supervisor, who forwarded them back to the EPO.  The entire process 
sometimes took six months to accomplish.  Figure 3.7 maps out the 97-98 process: 
As mentioned, fitreps and evals were conducted entirely 
electronically in 99-00.  The only time the evals were printed out was when they were 
ready to sign.  The process begins with the EPO YN.  She sent out a packet to the zone 
supes containing standardized bullets, each recruiter’s most recent eval and last year’s 
rankings.  She also sent out, via e-mail, a “canned” eval, which contained the 
standardized bullets each zone supe was allowed to use.  All this was done two months 
prior to the due date.  For example, if evals were supposed to be postmarked by 30July to 
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Figure 3.7. Evaluation/Fitness Report Process 97-98. 
 
Once the zone supervisors wrote the evals, the EPO and CR 
discussed rankings in a closed-door session.  Once they developed their rankings, the 
proposed list and the finished evals were forwarded via e-mail to the XO.  The XO made 
his chops and forwarded both the revised list and chopped evals to the CO.  The CO 
made his final chops and returned them to the EPO.  If the EPO or CR disagreed with any 
marks or rankings, they had the levity to meet with the CO or XO.  After further 
discussion, the final rankings and evals were decided upon and the evals were printed out, 
signed by the CO, and distributed via guard mail, overnight express, or duty-driver to the 
field. 
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The zone supe was then responsible for reviewing them and 
distributing them.  If he had any disagreements with the marks, he too had the freedom to 
discuss any issues with the CR and the EPO.  A huge effort was made to resolve any 
disagreements in a timely manner in order to get the evals back before the 15th of the 
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Figure 3.8. Evaluation/Fitness Report Process 99-00. 
 
(2) Measurement and Controls, Financial Management.  The 
following process answers the question: how are people held accountable for 
resources?   
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Resource Accountability. The process of resource accountability 
differed only slightly between the two districts.  The primary difference was that the 99-
00 recruiters had more resources with which to work.  Recruiters had several resources 
for which they were accountable.  These include government vehicles, cellular phones 
(and their usage), government credit cards, laptop computers and their recruiting stations.  
Although there were government vehicle logs, cellular phone bills and credit card bills, 
the recruiters, for the most part, were trusted to be responsible for their resources.  Car 
accidents and repairs were rare, but did happen.  Credit card improprieties rarely 
occurred.  Cell phone use in 99-00, however, was abused because of the freedom given to 
recruiters for their use.  That is, the word put out by the cell phone contractor to the 
command was that the cell phones would cut off after a certain amount of time was used.  
Unfortunately, that function never worked.  Therefore, the recruiters, thinking their cell 
phones would cut off after a certain amount of time, used their cell phones well beyond 
the time stipulated in the terms of the contract.  As a result, the district was almost 
$30,000 over its assigned cell phone budget for several months in a row. 
(3) Planning, Communication and Information Management.  
The following processes describe the planning, communication and information 
management processes conducted by both districts. 
Planning.  The primary planning tool used by all recruiting 
districts is the Production meeting.  Usually, all key players in the recruiting process 
attend the meeting.  These players include the CO, XO, EPO, CR, EPDS, Senior 
Classifier, LTCS, LSO and CA.  The 97-98 era saw two different methods of conducting 
Production meetings.  In 1997, when the district was consistently making goal, the 
command held a production meeting every Monday, Wednesday and Friday morning.  In 
1998, however, the command held a production meeting every day.  The meetings became 
very tedious and actually hurt production more than helped.  “It got to be too much…I had 
to delegate someone to go to the meetings for me because I had to go out to the field.”112 
Generally, the meetings began with the EPO quickly summarizing 
current NCO goal attainment for the month, and then discussing predictions and forecasts 
                                                 
112 Chief Recruiter, October 2002. 
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for the coming week.  The EPO then discussed shipping goal, and the progress or lack 
thereof, of obtaining that goal.  The EPO was followed by the OPO, who talked about 
Officer Recruiting.  The LEADS Supervisor discussed past and current LEADS 
conversion rates.  That is, he reported how well the recruiters were “turning-over” 
available LEADS.113  The department heads in attendance then talked about relevant 
production activity in their departments.  The XO gave a report on current administrative 
and personnel actions, and the CO ended with words of support, motivation and/or 
reprimand. 
The XO also held Department Head meetings on Tuesdays and 
Thursdays.  Everyone from the production meeting attended these meetings except for 
the CR, EPDS, and Senior Classifier.  They were joined by the AEPO and the command 
secretary.  The XO discussed such events as administration, public affairs events, 
personnel issues and budget issues.     
In 99-00, there were two major meetings held each week, a single 
production meeting and a single department head meeting.  The production meeting, 
chaired by the CO, took place on Wednesday mornings.  All the department heads 
attended, as well as the AEPO, Senior Classifier and/or EPDS, and sometimes the CR.  
The CR was not required to attend the production meeting, but often did because of two 
reasons 1) she wanted to be there and/or 2) the CO requested that she attend.  The bulk of 
the information put out was by the Enlisted Programs Officer, the Senior Classifier, the 
Officer Programs Officer and the LEADS Supervisor.  One of the interesting aspects of 
the production meetings was the CO’s willingness to allow proxy Department Heads to 
attend instead of the actual DH, just as long the actual DH had a viable reason for missing 
the meeting.  For example, the EPO attended the vast majority of the production 
meetings.  However, in that rare occasion where the EPO had to be at MEPS or in the 
field for whatever reason (station-visit, re-enlistment, etc.), the AEPO or CR would take 
his place without any complaint from the CO. 
The department head meeting took place directly after the 
production meeting.  These meetings evolved from one meeting a week to two meetings, 
 Thursdays instead of Wednesdays after the production taking place on Mondays and                                                 
113 Recruiters were given leads by the LEADS department, and were expected to call them to see if 
they are actually interested.   
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meeting.  This decision, unfortunately, took too much time away from the EPO’s ability 
to run production so the attendance was delegated to the AEPO.  Although the XO did 
not appreciate this on some occasions, the over-riding need to make goal was more than 
enough justification for missing the meetings.   
Communication.  In general, the primary method of 
communication between the members of the district in 97-98 was by fax and telephone.  
E-mail was not widely used.  The CO was very active in calling her recruiters on a daily 
basis to encourage, motivate and “sometimes to just say hi.”114  She also sent handwritten 
notes of congratulations.  The CO was also “on the road” constantly, visiting stations.  
She knew her recruiters very well and spoke to them about personal as well as 
professional issues.   
Formal communications operated in a traditional, military, top-
down hierarchy with restricted lines of communication.  The Commanding officer was at 
the top of all communications lines.  The Executive Officer expected all communications 
to the Commanding officer to go through her first.  There were two distinct lines of 
communication: the administrative communications flow and the production 
communications flow.  While the XO was the focal point of all administrative concerns, 
the CO still wanted to see every piece of documentation that left the command.  No one 
was allowed to bypass the XO when it came to administration.  The EPO, during this 
time period, was the major contributor to admin issues.  The CR did not have an active 
role in administration.  The AEPO also helped the EPO with administrative concerns.  







                                                 





















Figure 3.9. Administrative Communication Flow 97-98. 
 
The CO was the focal point and final authority of all production 
concerns.  The CR, EPDS and EPO had direct lines of communication with the CO 
regarding all matters of production.  Zone Supervisors spoke only to the CR.  RINCs 
spoke only to their Zone Supervisors.  The Senior Classifier communicated via the EPDS 
and/or EPO regarding shipping matters. 
The XO and most of the other department heads did not figure into 
the production communication flow.  Figure 3.10 depicts the flow of communications 





























Figure 3.10. Production Communications Flow 97-98. 
 
There were definite communication barriers in the 97-98 district.  
The XO did not want to hear information second-hand when it came to most significant 
issues.  The XO also required most communications, whether written or oral, to the CO to 
go through her first.   
The 99-00 district communicated primarily through phone and e-
mail.  The district had the advantage of cell phones and high speed internet service, so 
communication was more efficient and faster in this time period.  The CO, EPO and CR 
still drove out to the field, however, citing the success “windshield time” had on crew 
morale.  Fax machines were almost never used, except when the e-mail went down.  All 
documents which could not be reproduced in a Microsoft Word or Excel format were 
scanned (each station was required to have a scanner) and then sent over the email in a 
.pdf file. 
In addition to the administration and production communication 
flow, the 99-00 also had a distinct accessions communication flow.  The administrative 
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flow differed slightly from the previous time period.  The XO was still the focal point, 
but had more authority to sign out and release documents.  That is, the CO did not have 
to, nor did he want to, see everything that left the command.  Anything that could be 
delegated, such as 1306 requests, were delegated to the XO.  The CA did not exist and 
most of the communication with personnel issues took place between the AEPO and the 
XO.  Like the previous command, the AEPO had a direct line with the XO on all matters 
of administration.  In 99-00, however, the EPO did not have an active role in routine 
matters of administration.  Most of the day-to-day correspondence was handled by the 
AEPO, even leave and special request chits.  The EPO and CR received a courtesy copy 
on all correspondence, since most of the documentation was electronic.  Figure 3.11 



















Figure 3.11. Administrative Communication Flow 99-00. 
 
The 99-00 production communication flow also differed from 97-
98.  The CO was still the authority, but there were more direct lines to him than before.  
The CO had a direct line to the Chief Recruiter, and sometimes by-passed the EPO 
altogether to find out information about NCO production.  As well, the Chief Recruiter 
had a direct line to the CO any time she pleased to talk about NCO’s.  The Zone 
Supervisor were also free to speak with the CO at anytime.  As well, the CR allowed the 
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zone supes to run their zones almost autonomously.  That is, she did not micro-manage 
their training or production activity.  Additionally, with regards to waivers, the EPDS and 
even the waiver clerk spoke directly to the CO regarding applicants.  The EPDS or 
Waiver PO conducted interviews and passed on the information to the CO, courtesy 
copying the EPO on e-mail, and the CO conducted his interview from there.  The XO had 

















Figure 3.12. Production Communication Flows 99-00. 
 
Another distinct and highly defined communication line was the 
Accession goal chain.  The CO and EPO spoke directly to the EPDS and/or Senior 
Classifier regarding shipping issues.  The CR was not called for routine matters.  She was 
called when the district were in danger of missing shipping goal.  Since the CR controlled 
the DEP pool, she could direct the zone supervisors to “roll-up” DEPpers to take “closer” 
shipping dates.  As mentioned, this was a point of contention with the CR, who believed 
that she should have been intimately involved in every aspect of production.  However, 
the CO believed in getting the information efficiently and quickly; and sometimes the CR 
simply did not have the type of answers the CO needed.  For example, the CO may have 
wanted to know how many non-high school graduates the district had left to write in a 
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particular month.  The Senior Classifier knew the answer.  The CR would have had to ask 
the Senior Classifier in most cases.  In fact, the Senior Classifier was the primary source 
of accession goal information for all the key players, except for recruiting issues such as 
possible attrites.  Those issues were handled by the CR.115  For the most part, however, 
the pertinent information regarding shipping numbers were provided by the Senior 















Figure 3.13. Accession Communication Flows 99-00. 
 
In sum, the 99-00 district tore down communication barriers and 
flattened out hierarchical patterns. The EPO wrote e-mails directly to the CO.  He walked 
into the CO’s office whenever he had an issue and called him at his home or his cell 
phone whenever he felt the need.  As a result, however, the EPO was seemingly “on call” 
24 hours a day.  In recruiting, problems occur at all hours of the day and night.  
Recruiters can get in car accidents, shippers do not report to leave for boot camp, flights 
from Las Vegas or Orange County get delayed.  As one zone supervisor out it, “there’s 
no 9 to 5 and there’s no answering machines when it comes to recruiting.”  The 
recruiters, zone supes, and CR had their cell phones on all day and night.  They knew 
                                                 
115 An important aspect of shipping goal are possible attrites that will show up later in the month, that 
must be accounted for in order to determine how close the district will be to making accession goal.  The 
CR, based on information she receives from her zone supervisors, has the most accurate prediction of 
unaccounted attrites.  The Senior Classifier would not know this information since he is not in any way part 
of the zone supervisor’s chain of command.  The district tried to alleviate the problem of unforeseen attrites 
by forcing the recruiters to identify and “take” their attrites by the 15th of each month. 
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they could call the EPO and CR anytime.  The EPO also called them no matter what the 
hour.  The district realized this and made communication flow as fluid as possible. 
Unfortunately, the freedom of communication resulted in several 
problems.  The use of e-mail to contact the CO directly led some in the district to 
undermine the EPO and CR’s authority.  Several times, recruiters e-mailed the CO with 
complaints about such issues as quality of life, awards recommendations and evaluation 
marks.  For example, one recruiter e-mailed the CO voicing his discontent over working 
on a Saturday.  The CO replied, with a blind courtesy copy to the EPO and CR, 
explaining that the zone supervisor was well within his bounds to have his recruiters 
work on Saturday if it prevented missing goal.  The EPO and CR then received a separate 
e-mail from the CO with a reprimand for not training the field to use maturity and 
professionalism when given the privilege of flat communications.  Fortunately, most 
members of the district understood the limits of the district’s barrier free communication 
policy.  
The open chain to the CO regarding production and accession 
matters was also a point of contention with the CR and EPO.  Although they were both 
courtesy copied and/or back-briefed on most communications between the zone 
supervisors/EPDS/Senior Classifier and the CO, sometimes they had to hear news second 
hand from the CO himself.  For example, the CO called the EPO and CR in one morning 
and asked “why five shippers were missing on the day they were supposed to ship out? 
(this was information he received earlier in the morning from the Senior Classifier).”  
The EPO and CR had received the report that all shippers were accounted for.  The 
Senior Classifier, as it turns out, did not have an updated list of shippers for that day, and 
gave the CO inaccurate information.   
For the most part, however, “bypassing” the chain was not an issue 
with most of the leadership given the nature of the work.  In fact, all the EPO required for 
most e-mails was a courtesy copy on his cell phone if the Senior Classifier, EPDS, or the 
CR needed to speak with the CO about urgent issues.  The EPO did not want, in any way, 
to impede communications with the boss.    
Information gathering and distribution (statistics management).  
As the CR would often say, “the field wouldn’t really care if the district didn’t have a 
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PAO; but they would get really mad if the district didn’t have a good statistician.”  NRD 
SD recruiters were interested to see how they were doing.  Most of the recruiters were 
very competitive and wanted to compare themselves to others.  The RINCs were proud to 
see their stations doing well.  The daily Production Report provided the recruiters vital 
information. 
How did the 97-98 district disseminate the statistics?  The 
production report, which showed new contract attainment, status of shipping goal 
attainment, station and zone status and individual recruiter status, was distributed to the 
field via fax machine.  At the end of the production day, the Statistician had to manually 
input the numbers each night, printed the document, and sent them to the field via mass 
fax.  He had to fax either late at night or very early in the morning.  Otherwise, the fax 
machine in the EPO office would be closed to incoming and outgoing traffic for one to 
three hours. 
The 99-00 Statisticians was a Microsoft EXCEL genius who 
revised the entire input and reporting program.  As mentioned, instead of manually 
inputting the stats, he wrote a program which automatically downloaded the information 
from the MEPS to his office PC.  He distributed the new production report via e-mail in 
the afternoon.   
(4) Other Procedures Related to Enlisted Production.  The 
following procedures are all sub-processes vital to making goal. 
DEP-IN Procedures.  There were methods of DEP-in used at 
MEPS in 97-00.  The 97-98 district depped the recruits in the standard way, even on large 
volume days.  The 99-00 district used the standard method on “light” days, but employed 
a revised version on heavy days.  The standard flow is described as follows with the 
revise, more efficient deviations of “front-loading” and “night processing shown in 
parentheses.   
• Transport.  Applicants spend night in hotel near MEPS (in NIGHT 
PROCESSING, applicant is brought to MEPS for processing before going to 
the hotel).  The applicant brought to MEPS at 0500 by bus, or by government 
vehicle is applicant is local bullets should be .5 
• Check In.  The MLPO checks the applicants in and gives them name tags.  
They are then sent to a two-three hour comprehensive Medical examination. 
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• Processing.  After the medical exam, the applicant is sent to waiting room 
outside of MEPS liaison to await processing.  On heavy days, with more than 
20 applicants on deck, the applicant may wait for up to three to four hours.  
(when FRONT LOADING is used, applicant sent to get fingerprints taken and 
security questionnaire completed, a step usually completed after processing) 
Paperwork is processed while applicants in medical. (In FRONT LOADING, 
the paperwork is processed the night before) Processors review applicants’ 
paperwork and produce an enlistment “kit.”  The processors then interview the 
applicant, asking information about any possible criminal activity or medical 
condition not divulged to the recruiter.  If an issue arises, then the processor 
sends the applicant the Waiver PO for further processing.  Afterwards, the 
applicant must wait, as long as two to three hours) for the next step.  (In 
FRONT LOADING, those applicants who did not get fingerprinted now do so 
instead of waiting.  Applicants can also be NIGHT PROCESSED, meaning 
they process with a night-shift processor the night before DEPping, saving 
valuable time during the day.) 
• Classification.  The MLPO then directs the applicant is sent to one of three to 
five classifiers to choose a rating and corresponding shipping date.  If the 
District or the nation has a particular need, the classifier tries to “sell” the 
applicant on a particular job and/or shipping date.  For example, the Navy may 
need to ship more people out this month than next month, so the classifier will 
try to sell the applicant on shipping out this month.  The bottom line, however, 
is to try and give the applicant what he or she wants 
• Security Interview and Fingerprinting.  The MLPO then sends the applicant 
to get fingerprints taken and security interview conducted by the MEPS staff.  
The applicant then returns to the waiting room for his/her swearing in 
ceremony, which are conducted each hour on the hour. 
• Swear-In.  An officer administers the oath to the applicants in a ceremony 
room at the MEPs.   
• DEP Brief.  The new DEPper signs his/her enlistment contract.  He or she is 
given a t-shirt, hat and backpack and leaves MEPS a member of not only the 
NRD DEP pool, but a member of the US Navy. 
 
All along the way, the Military Liaison Petty Officer (MLPO), a 
PN1, updated his schedule, which listed all the DEPpers and where they are currently in 
the process.  The 97-98 district employed a paper tracker, differentiating the different 
stages with colored markers.  The 99-00 implemented a Microsoft Excel–based DEP 
tracker on his desktop.  The tracker was automatically e-mailed to the field and 
headquarters every 30 minutes, which precluded the need for the recruiters to call and ask 
where their applicant is in the process.  Figure 3.14 contrasts the standard method of 
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Figure 3.14. Standard DEP-in and Frontloading DEP-in. 
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Education Verification.  All required paperwork (transcripts, will-
grad letters, etc) and an Educational Verfication form was faxed to one of 97-98’s two 
EDSPECs for review and signature.  The EDSPEC then faxed the forms either back to the 
recruiter or to the EPO’s office, and the EPO walked the paperwork to the CO for 
signature.  The EPO then faxed the paperwork to the MEPS and the recruiter.  The 
EDSPECs, unfortunately, were often on the road and difficult to reach.  Applicants would 
therefore not be able to DEP in because they had incomplete BEERS documents.  Faxing 
the documents also presented a problem when the documents were lost, or the fax 
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Figure 3.15. Education Verification Process 97-98. 
 
NRD SD 99-00 faced even more difficulty when the funding for 
EDSPECs was reduced and San Diego had to operate with only one EDSPEC.  Once 
again, the district utilized electronic methods in an attempt to improve the efficiency of 
the process.  The documents were e-mailed (after fax-scanning) or faxed directly to the 
EDSPEC’s assistant (a civilian contracted office automation expert).  She then scanned 
them into her computer (if faxed) and filled out an electronic EDVER form (if the 
recruiters haven’t already done so).  She e-mailed the form and the attachments to the 
EDSPEC, wherever she was, for review and signature.  If she was at a school, the 
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EDSPEC Assistant e-mailed the forms to the nearest recruiting station.  After review and 
signature (electronically), the EDSPEC sent them back to the Assistant who then e-
mailed them to MEPS and the CO.  This told MEPS that they needed to expect an 
EDVER.  The CO then reviewed and signed and sent back to MEPS, the Assistant and 
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Figure 3.16. Education Verification Process 99-00. 
DEP Activity Reports (DARs).  As discussed, DARS are used to 
ges in a DEPpers status.  DARs were routed via fax in 97-98.  The 
 fill out a DAR in the station, route it to the RINC who signed it.  The 
ed the DAR to the zone supervisor, who recommended approval or 
 faxed it directly to the CR or to the EPO’s office, where one of the EPO 
el would walk the DAR to the CR’s office, and more specifically, to her 
she eventually got to the DAR, she would sign and walk it over to the 
 The EPO would then call the CR, ZS or RINC to find out more 
ut the DAR, especially if the DAR was an in-month attrite or roll-out.  
 walked each DAR to the CO and the two discussed the situation 
h DAR.  The CO would then sign the DAR.  The EPO faxed the DAR to 
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Figure 3.17. DAR Routing Process 97-98
 
The 99-00 era routed DARS electronicall
them on electronic format to the zone supervisor.  The supes
electronic DARs to MEPS, the EPO Yeoman, the CR and the EP
to give them a “heads up”.  The EPO Yeoman took the DARs an
would not be lost.  The CR and EPO were then supposed to 
forward them to the CO for signature.   
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Figure 3.18. DAR Ro
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many contracts they actually had to write during the month and 2) the attrites held job 
and bootcamp reservations which had to be cleared so that other recruits could use them.  
If they were attrited late in the month, those bootcamp and job reservations would be lost 
forever.  Although most attrites were identified and taken before the 15th, a good number 
would appear towards the end of the month.  The reason was simple “there were possible 
attrites that the zone supervisors and RINCs did not give up on, and took a chance that 
they would go.”116  “The recruiters wanted to make goal so badly that they took chances 
even though they knew the ramifications would not be pretty.  Sometimes they went, 
sometimes they didn’t…the risk was worth it.”117 
LEADS.  The 97-98 LEADS department was typical of most 
districts.  It was manned by recruiters who were soon departing or could not “hack it” in 
the field.  The LEADS cards were sent out to the recruiters by the department and the 
LEADS telephone operators answered calls from persons who called the national 
telephone number or answered advertisements in the local paper.  The LEADS 
department provided an adequate, but a spectacular amount of local and national leads to 
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Figure 3.19. LEADS Marketing Process 97-98. 
 
The 99-00 command pioneered the LEADS tele-marketing 
process.  Whereas most LEADS are distributed to the field, and the recruiter or RINC is 
then responsible for calling them, San Diego established a pro-active LEADS process in 
99 
                                                 
116 Chief Recruiter, October 2002. 
117 Zone Supervisor, July 2002. 
which the LEADS personnel call the LEADS prior to the recruiter.  Calling them 
beforehand accomplishes two objectives: 1) it provides an extra level of screening so the 
recruiters don’t have to waste their time with false leads and 2) it allows the recruiters 
more time out in the field instead of “chained to their desk.”  Once contact is made with 
the LEAD, the tele-marketer (who is a former recruiter) blueprints and tries to conduct an 
initial “sale” on the applicant.  The tele-marketer will then perform a three-way call on 
his phone with the applicant’s area-assigned recruiter.  Once three-way contact is 
established, the recruiter sets up an appointment to see the applicant.  If the recruiter is 
not available, the tele-marketer will set up the appointment anyway, and inform the 





































Figure 3.20. LEADS Tele-Marketing Process 99-00. 
 
3. Culture 
What are the prevalent norms and values in the system as they are expressed in 
behavior?  What role did leadership play in the system?  What are the rituals, ceremonies, 
symbols that occur within the organization? 
a. Norms and Assumptions 
One of the most significant norms of the 97-98 district was the overriding 
need to make shipping goal.  In this era, the nation as a whole was operating in an 
immediate shipping posture.  CNRC needed to fill bootcamp seats in a hurry, and did not 
have a large DEP inventory from which to choose.  Subsequently, San Diego included, 
concentrated on recruiting “workforce” contracts who could leave for bootcamp in a 
hurry.  As well, DEPpers who were shipping out later in the year were constantly “rolled 
up” to ship early.  Unfortunate consequences of this action include sending a DEPper 
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who is not yet ready (mentally, physically, financially, socially) to go to bootcamp and 
DEPpers losing jobs they were promised because the accelerated shipping date forced 
them to change their rating selection.118 
Another norm in 97-98 was that business must always be conducted 
ethically.  To eliminate improprieties, the command constantly preached “doing the right 
thing” when recruiting.  For example, if a recruit did not have the exact type of court 
documents needed to clear a possible criminal offense, then that applicant would not be 
considered for enlistment.  Applicants with juvenile records would often have sealed 
records which would explain incidents in their record.  If this was the case, and the 
documents were sealed, the recruiter would more than likely not even bother trying to 
enlist the applicant, no matter how forcefully or passionately the individually professes 
his or her innocence.   
The command dealt with other issues such as sexism, fraternization and 
improper relationships with pronounced punishment.  Anyone suspected of such activity 
was immediately called “to the carpet,”119 questioned and subsequently monitored 
closely.   
Because the district was not effectively able to make NCO goal on a 
consistent basis, the expectation for NCO was “almost is good enough.”120  The reasons 
for not making goal piled up: the larger goals, high turnover rate, large number of non-
volunteer recruiters, good economy, and low unemployment.  Recruiting was difficult 
and instead of pushing to make NCO, the district was content to make shipping goal, 
since “shipping goal is the goal that counts.”121 
Because of all the changes that took place in the district’s system, the 
culture also changed dramatically in 99-00.  The first norm was that missing goal was not 
                                                 
118 Recruits are given jobs based on the availability of those jobs after bootcamp.  Sometimes, the jobs 
are lost because the recruit rolls up to ship early, but the job he originally wanted is not available during the 
early time frame. 
119 Refers to the act of being called in to headquarters to personally see the XO or CO. 
120 Zone Supervisor, July 2002. 
121 Enlisted Processing Division Supervisor, November 2002. 
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an option.  NCO and accession goal, were “must-makes.”  Missing NCO constituted 
failure.  
The entire field saw the value of making goal.  Making goal not only 
improved quality of life, it also increased the recruiters’ utility.  It got to a point where 
making goal was not the question.  The question became: “How much are the district 
overwriting goal by this month?”  The following are various quotes from NRD personnel 
provided as evidence of their glowing pride: 
We felt good about ourselves.  We saw ourselves as winners” when the 
district made goal.   
The district wanted to be winners, not losers.  Goal was the way to prove 
ourselves winners.  In fact, the district didn’t really understand why other 
districts were not making goal.  In all honesty, we view them as losers. 
The mindset of the district was that we were good at what we did.  And 
what we did was put people in the Navy. 
No one from the outside was allowed to criticize Team San Diego.  We 
don’t think anyone deserves or has earned that right.122 
We expect to make goal.  There’s no ifs, ands or buts about it.  Each 
station, zone and district is expected to make goal.  If they don’t, then they 
feel ashamed.  If they don’t, they feel like they’ve let the rest of the team 
down. 
With the new commanding officer, enlisted programs officer and re-
vitalized and experienced Chief Recruiter came a new attitude regarding NCO goal.  
“Whereas NCO was considered an option in the previous year, it became a “must-make” 
in Fiscal Year 1999.”123  The Chief Recruiter, who felt a bit “stifled” and was admittedly 
inexperienced in the previous era, was not only allowed more levity to perform her duty, 
but also had a year of experience under her belt.124  The district, as a whole, made a 
concerted effort to make NCO.  “The district had a new attitude.  The district now had to 
make NCO.  If we didn’t make goal, then we failed.  As professionals, we surely did not 
                                                 
122 This was a standard reaction when an outside entity such as the Region West Process Action Team 
(PAT) Team or CNRC Navy Training Team came to “inspect” the district’s processes. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Chief Recruiter, November 2002. 
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want to fail…that would mean losing…and we were definitely not losers!”125  Consider 
the following stories: 
On the morning of mission day, November 1999, a high-ranking officer 
walked to the CO’s office and proclaimed: “we have 48 people on 
deck…isn’t that great!  That’s more than the we’ve ever had.”  The CO 
looked at her with a sharp gleam in his eye and simply said…”  That’s not 
enough…get some more.”  As it turned out, the district needed 51 recruits 
to make NCO.  With only 48 “on deck”126, the district would surely fall 
short of goal.  The CO was looking for at least 70 persons on deck to have 
a chance of making the NCO goal.  The CO had an emergency meeting 
with the CR and EPO.  He demanded that the recruiters find more people 
to put on deck.  The CR called out to her zone supervisors and throughout 
the day, more prospects showed up on deck.  Reasons why these persons 
were not previously on deck were because: 1) the recruiters, having 
already made their personal or station goal, were “saving” them for next 
month 2) the recruiters did not really care about the district goal, and 3) 
the recruiters were not willing to take a chance on a prospect with possible 
criminal or other problems; i.e. the recruiters were not willing to put any 
extra effort in to putting in a recruit that may need a little “extra work.”127  
The district not only made NCO goal that month; there was a new feeling 
of accomplishment that pervaded the entire district.  “We felt like the 
district won a hard fought game or battle.  It was truly refreshing.”128 
The next month, December, was also a very tough month for recruiting.  
With most of the recruiters thinking about the upcoming holidays, the 
motivation to recruit was floundering.  “November was great, but 
December is traditionally a hard month” said the recruiters.  To which the 
CO replied “Who said it’s hard?…nothing’s hard if you set your mind to 
it.”129  On mission night, which lasts until 2100 Pacific Standard Time, 
the district needed one more contract to make goal.  At 1800, everyone but 
the CO and CR had all but given up.  Then the CR called her zone 
supervisors in for a closed-door meeting.  They went through their 
prospect lists and found a possible recruit in Victorville, CA, which is 
about 2 hours away from the MEPS, the place where recruits are 
ed.  The call was made to Victorville.  The reason processed and contract
                                                 
125 Recruiter, May 2001. 
126 “on deck” means that the recruits are civilian prospects who have passed the ASVAB (although 
some may be taking the test on that day; in that case, they are Same Day Processors) but still have to go 
through physical (medical) and criminal screening.  Because of these filters, 48 prospects do not guarantee 
48 contracts.  In fact, the average “conversion ratio” for San Diego was about 70%.  Therefore, with 48 on 
deck, San Diego expected, at the most, between 35 to 40 of them to become contracts, which would leave 
them short of their goal. 
127 Zone Supervisor, October 2001. 
128 Chief Recruiter, August 2001. 
129 Ibid. 
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why the prospect was not on deck was because he could not get out of 
work.  The recruiter talked to his boss, got him off work, and drove him 
down to the MEPS.  The prospect, who was already physically qualified, 
signed up and swore in.  San Diego made NCO with 3 minutes to spare.  
Considering the complex coordination with CNRC’s PRIDE130 shop, this 
was truly a remarkable feat.  Once again, the district made goal and 
everyone went on to enjoy the holidays knowing that San Diego was a 
winner.131 
During the final quarter of fiscal year 1999, Region West was assigned a 
substantial NCO goal increase by CNRC.  CNRC wanted to bolster its 
overall DEP pool and also try to make national shipping goal.  San 
Diego’s goal increased by nearly 80 contracts over the months of July, 
August and September.  The CR and EPO decided that the best strategy 
was to place most of the increased goal in the month of September.  She 
believed that 1) the recruiters would push harder at the end of the year, 
and 2) it gave the district a chance to at least make the July and August 
goals.  September’s goal ended up being 299.  The EPO and CR (although 
she would not admit it) entered the month with a little bit of apprehension 
at the daunting 299 staring them in the face.  The CO, in a closed-door 
session with the CR and EPO, openly expressed his concern about such a 
high goal.  At the end of the meeting though, everyone agreed that the CO, 
XO, EPO, CR and Zone Supervisors must go into the month with a 
positive and unrelenting attitude about making the goal.  “We are making 
299” were the CO’s final words.  With energy and proactive leadership 
(the CR, CO and EPO called stations and recruiters at random to “pump 
them up”), the recruiters came out with a flourish.  By the time mission 
day rolled around, the district needed 65 more contracts to make the 299.  
They had already written 234 contracts.  On the morning of mission day, 
FY1999, NRD San Diego had well over 100 persons on deck, with 20 to 
30 more to arrive during the day.  San Diego wrote 308 that day, the most 
every written by the district, and the most ever written by any district in a 
month.  San Diego finished the year well above their fiscal year goal (105 
percent) and was named District of the Year by CNRC. 
In general, the recruiters, RINCs, zone supervisors, CR, EPO and CO were 
unrelenting in making goal.  The CO made personal calls to the BUMED doctor on 
several occasions in order to determine the status of a waiver.  Additionally, he wrote 
                                                 
130 PRIDE is the Navy’s classification and job reservation information system.  It stands for 
Personalized Recruiting for Immediate and Delayed Enlistment.  The PRIDE Operators are located in 
CNRC headquarters in Millington, TN and are responsible for classifying personnel into specific jobs and 
bootcamp seats.  A contract does not count as a contract until placed in the PRIDE system. 
131 Chief Recruiter, December 2001. 
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personal notes to the doctors at Navy Medical Center (MEDCEN), San Diego explaining 
the importance of the applicants with consults to the recruiting effort.132  
Unfortunately, the zeal with which the EPO and CO performed their duties 
was often a source of friction between the district and the MEPS.  MEPS personnel are 
responsible for scheduling consults at the Navy Medical Center.  Oftentimes, the consults 
were scheduled at a distant date.  The problem was that the applicant was now not going 
to “count” as a contract for the current month.  In these cases, the EPO would call the 
MEDCEN himself and if he could, schedule appointments within the month.  Sometimes, 
the MEPS received word of the EPO’s actions and responded with very harsh criticism.  
On one occasion after hearing that the EPO scheduled an asthma consult133 without the 
MEPS knowing, the Lead MEPS Physician, a Captain in the Navy Medical Corps, forbid 
the EPO from entering the MEPS command.134   
Additionally, the MEPS was often of accused of not being concerned with 
goal attainment.  As a Joint shore duty command, the members included military 
personnel from all services as well as civilians.  They performed a complicated job filled 
with schedules and deadlines that often impeded the mission of the recruiters.  For 
example, the doctors who performed the physicals did not see any applicants after a 
certain cut-off time in the afternoon, so late arrivals were not allowed to process.  The 
shipping clerk had to have all shippers in the MEPS before 0500 on shipping days.  The 
last applicant could not “cross the line” to get processed after a certain cut-off time, 
forcing that applicant to come back the next day.  This presented a problem if the 
applicant had school or work the next day.  The recruiters, operating in conditions which 
sometimes called for 16 to 20 hour days, could not accept the fact that a vital link in their 
recruiting process had so many hindering effects.  Said one veteran recruiter, 
It was definitely a source of frustration…I don’t know how many times I 
had an applicant waiting five or six hours and then told that he or she 
                                                 
132 Applicants with possible medical conditions were often sent to Navy Medical Center, San Diego 
for consults by specialists.  For example, an applicant with bad acne would be sent to the NAVMEDCEN 
dermatologist to determine if he or she had a disqualifying condition.  Even if the consult came back as 
disqualifying the applicant could be considered for a waiver by BUMED. 
133 PFT or Pulmonary Function Test. 
134 Personal experience, June 2000. 
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could not finish processing because of cut-off.  It’s not the kids’ fault that 
the MEPS can’t handle the volume. 
The incessant need to make goal was obvious at all levels of the recruiting 
chain.  The recruiters were driven by their RINCs, Zone Supes and the CR to make their 
station goal.  As one RINC put it, “if our station didn’t make goal, we weren’t doing our 
job.  That’s the bottom line.”135  Zone supervisors felt the same way about their zones.  
In fact, according to one of the zone supervisors, “my RINCs are ashamed to miss 
goal…especially if everybody else makes goal.  Missing really makes us feel badly.  We 
hate missing; hate it more than anything.”136  The CO, CR and EPO felt the same way 
about district’s goal.  The CR even went a little further.  Her tack was to have “all 
stations and all zones” make goal.  Although some stations did not make it, all her zones 
made NCO goal.  
To emphasize her point, she sometime held what were termed “come to 
god” meetings137, as they were affectionately known, for those recruiters, RINCS and 
zone supervisors who were not performing up to their potential.  For example, in one 
particular month at the 50 percent gate, she called a short notice meeting with all those 
recruiters and their RINCS who had not written one contract.  The purpose of the 
meetings was not to reprimand, “but to train.”138  Some of the recruiters had to drive 
three to five hours to make the 0900 meeting.  Although she attempted this sort of 
training in the previous era, the tactic was not completely supported by the senior 
leadership.139 
Another norm established by the new district was the development of 
teamwork and sense of family.  There was a definite sense of family among the recruiters.  
Quarterly awards ceremonies were as much social as they were official.  The recruiters 
truly respected one another and “got along” very well.  There were no real conflicts, 
except for minor disagreements between CRF personnel and the fleet sailors.  Those 
                                                 
135 Recruiter In Charge, May 2001. 
136 Zone Supervisor/District Trainer, December 2001. 
137 Assistant EPO, November 2001. 
138 Zone Supervisor, May 2001. 
139 Chief Recruiter, November 2002. 
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conflicts, however, were expertly mediated by the zone supervisors and if needed, the 
CR.  There was no need for the EPO, XO or CO to be deeply involved in any conflict 
management. 
The second commanding officer of the 99-00 time period made teamwork 
central to the district’s way of thinking.  He even revised the district logo to read “TEAM 
SAN DIEGO.”  He related the district to a sports team and announced our quest for 
another championship. 
The Chief Recruiter pointed out time and time again the importance of 
sticking together.  She meant that in two contexts.  First, the CR, EPO and CO must 
always be on the same page.  She said, “the recruiters can easily sense when there is a rift 
between the CO, CR and EPO, and would be forced to choose sides.  A district can’t 
produce that way.”  She continued, “if ever the CO and I had a disagreement, we 
discussed it in private, and delivered a united message.  Much the same way, the CR and 
EPO must always appear to agree.  Any differences between the EPO and CR could be 
devastating to the morale of the field, she contended.  The EPO could put out a message 
without the CR’s blessing that might run counter to something the CR just put out.  
Difficult issues such as DEP attrition and management must be handled together and the 
policies put out must be completely supported by both parties. 
The second area in which teamwork was extremely important occurs 
between the CR and zone supervisors.  She often referred to her six zone supervisors as 
her “knights of the round table.”  She respected each of them for their ability and 
knowledge.  The feeling was mutual. 
The CR was almost like our mama.  She could really bother us sometimes, 
but in the end, all the scoldings were for our own good.  She knew how to 
motivate, how to inspire and how to get us focused.  I can speak for all the 
zone supes and say that we wanted to be on her team, and that we felt we 
were the best team in the nation.140 
 
 
                                                 
140 Zone Supervisor, July 2002. 
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The CR reciprocated: 
Those six guys were the best set of zone supervisors in the nation.  They 
were the best I’ve ever seen.  Most of the time, there’s bickering, jealousy 
and sometimes even hatred between zone supes because of the 
competitiveness of the business.  This group was not that way.  They 
genuinely loved each other, and helped each other out.    
The CR and EPO were also an outstanding team.  Although there were no 
major conflicts with the CR and the EPO in the previous time-period, there was also no 
real effort to develop an in-depth relationship.  The 99-00 CR and EPO disagreed about 
many things, but did so in private.  “They argued a lot, but when they came out of the 
office, it was all smiles.  They started out on different chapters, but ended up on the same 
page.”141  The two spoke every day on the phone or in person for at least one to two 
hours regarding personnel, production and accession issues.  The CR said, “I must have 
received ten calls a day from the EPO.  But I’m not complaining, that’s the way it should 
be.”142  The two became so familiar with each other’s leadership styles, preferences and 
tendencies, that even such tedious tasks as writing evaluations and ranking recruiters 
became easy.  The CR stated, “if he and I were asked to rank the recruiters 1 to 10, we 
would probably be off by maybe one or two recruiters.  We felt the same way about a lot 
of things.”143 
One area where teamwork improved from the previous time-period was 
the between the MEPS and the Field.  However, there were still problems.  The CR and 
Senior Classifier were often at odds with shipping issues; and the CR and Zones were 
often at odds with the EPDS about production issues.  The direct lines between the EPDS 
and Senior Classifier to the CO “bothered” the CR, as she felt she was being undermined 
to some extent.144  The recruiters even joined in the MEPS “bashing.”  One anonymous 
recruiter stated: 
Sometimes we felt our MEPS office was out to get us.  They sometimes 
acted like we were intentionally putting in bad contracts just for the bone 
                                                 
141 DEP Coordinator, November 2002. 
142 Chief Recruiter, October 2002. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Chief Recruiter, June 2002. 
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(contract).  I’ve even overheard them saying that we were dirty.  That’s 
not being a team player. 
The author often spoke to the classifiers and processors in MEPS 
regarding their perception about recruiters.  Some of the MEPS personnel would often 
question some of the recruiters’ integrity.    
The district also believed that the command wanted the field and 
headquarters to enjoy recruiting and enjoy a good quality of life.  Although the recruiters 
were extremely professional, there was still a sense that the district operated less as a 
strict military command but more as a production-driven organization.  That is, the 
realization that production was the primary goal led to the belief that the command was 
not necessarily bound by the traditional restrictions of a naval unit.  Musters were taken 
at the station level.  PRT’s were held at the zone level so that the “outlying” recruiters did 
not have to make the long trip to the district headquarters.  Recruiters wore civilian 
clothes or Navy warm up suits a great deal of the time.145  Petty Officers (2nd and 1st 
Class) were in charge of Chief Petty Officers.146  For the most part, the recruiters did not 
abuse any of these “privileges.”  They maintained their professionalism and were trusted 
by the command leadership. 
The EPO had an open door, open phone, open cellular and open e-mail 
policy with the recruiters, as did the CR, as did the zone supes.  There was no reason a 
recruiter could not speak to me for whatever reason.  The interaction among all personnel 
was professional, but at the same time relaxed.   
Another norm was that recruiting was placed above everything else.  The 
intensity placed on recruiting did not bode well with every recruiter, especially those that 
could not sell the Navy.  Some recruiters found the pressure too difficult to handle.  Some 
even requested to be transferred back to sea duty.  Those that could not recruit were, 
unfortunately, noticed by the command.  As long as they tried, however, they would 
never suffer any negative repercussions.  Those that stopped trying, however, were 
                                                 
145 Friday uniform was officially khaki pants and navy blue or white polo shirts with the district’s logo 
on them.  The recruiters were also allowed to wear their official P.T. gear, a Navy blue and gold workout 
outfit provided by CNRC.   
146 A PO1 could be the RINC of a station manned by Chief Petty Officers; the CPO had to report to 
the PO1. 
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“black-balled” by the command and tracked closely.147  If they became a bad apple, they 
were removed from the field and processed for a “No-Fault Transfer.”148  Also, because 
of the “goal first” mentality, there were many divorces and separations in the district 
during the 99-00 era.  As one recruiter said, “no one was surprised if they heard about 
one of the guys getting a divorce or being separated” 
b. Leadership 
The leadership of the organization establishes the vision and sets the 
example for the culture in such a way that leads the organization towards mission 
accomplishment.  There were four distinct leaders in the 97-98 district.  The 
Commanding officer, Executive Officer, Enlisted Programs Officer, Chief Recruiter each 
played a role in developing the culture of the organization. 
The 97-98 Commanding officer was well-respected in the Region and 
CNRC for her professionalism and leadership ability.  “The CO had a stellar reputation in 
recruiting.  She had experience and knew what it took to inspire the recruiters.”149  She 
was well-liked by most of the recruiters.  She often called individual stations, as one 
recruiter put it, “just to see how they were doing.”  One of the headquarters personnel 
believed that “the recruiters appreciated her.  She spent a lot of time in the field.  She 
cared about the recruiters’ well-being and quality of life.” 
The CO was deeply concerned each month the district missed NCO.  “No 
one felt worse than the CO whenever we missed.  I felt terribly, but she was just 
devastated.”150  There was almost nothing she could do to try to improve the system.  
The goal and personnel increase came too fast too soon.  The demand for shippers was 
also exhausting.  Improvements in the system took a back seat to the demands of 
accessions.  “The district was caught in a bad situation; we were trying to get better at 
making NCO but couldn’t because accessions were always occupying our time.”151  The 
CO realized this and had to make a choice.  “Her worst nightmare was that if the district 
                                                 
147 Anonymous member. 
148 A No fault transfer is a request made by the recruiter for transfer out of recruiting.  The recruiter, 
through no fault of his own, simply could not effectively recruit for the Navy. 
149 Assistant. EPO, November 2002. 
150 Chief Recruiter, July 2002. 
151 Ibid. 
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were ever turned around, the new leadership would be looked at as a savior.  What people 
won’t realize was that the recruiters would all be seasoned, as will the CR and zone 
supervisors.  That goes a long way in making goal.”152  Because of the greater demands, 
the district became reactive as opposed to proactive.  Thus, standards such as 90 percent 
NCO evolved.  Although they were not making goal, the standard was not necessarily a 
negative reflection of the district since the nation was also settling for 90 percent NCO.  
“As long as the nation wasn’t bugging us about NCO, then we continued to settle for 90 
percent.”153 
The Commanding Officer also set the standard for ethical conduct.  She 
constantly preached that the recruiters “do the right thing.”  She emphasized ethics in her 
mission statement and in her speeches at awards ceremonies.  The recruiters reciprocated, 
avoiding risky contracts and as one zone supe said, “trying to keep their noses out of 
trouble at all times.” 
The Executive Officer did not play an active role in production.  She did, 
however, have an impact in the attitudes of the district’s personnel, especially about 
headquarters.  It was no secret that the CO and the XO did not agree on several issues.  
“They often argued, out in the open.  The headquarters personnel saw and heard it 
firsthand.  The recruiters also saw them argue.”154  It seemed that the XO and CO’s 
discussions disrupted the harmony of headquarters.  “It got so bad that no one wanted to 
come to district.”155   
One contributing factor to that assertion was a well-publicized sexual 
harassment incident involving the XO and a recruiter.  “The recruiter made a sexist and 
derogatory remark about the XO, who found out and wrote him up.”156  Although the 
allegations were true, the “recruiters, in my opinion, felt like they were under a 
microscope” said one zone supervisor.  He continued “We felt like we had to watch 
                                                 
152 Senior Leader, July 2002. 
153 Zone Supervisor, July 2002. 
154 Headquarters Personnel, July 2002. 
155 Recruiter, July 2002. 
156 Assistant EPO, August 2002. 
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everything we said or did.”  The goal of ethical conduct now took a negative spin.  “Do 
the right thing” became “don’t do the wrong thing.” 
Many at headquarters also felt that “the XO needed to monitor all aspects 
of our jobs, especially administration.”157  “She had a reputation for micro-management.  
I knew that if I didn’t tell her something, and the CO knew about it, that I would catch 
hell for it.”158   
The Enlisted Programs Officer was technically efficient and knew the 
recruiting business very well.  Before taking the helm as the EPO, she spent a year as the 
Assistant EPO under the tutelage of the EPDS (she worked at MEPS) and the incumbent 
EPO.  She was an outstanding writer but, as one of the EPO shop members put it, “spent 
too much time writing evals.”  As mentioned in her turnover with the incoming ‘99 EPO, 
she “spent 80 percent of her time on paperwork.”  The demands on her time was one 
possible reason that she was not, as one recruiter put it, “a recognized leader…she just 
seemed to be at district all the time and never visited us.”  She did not, she admits, travel 
to the field “as much as I should have.  I was too busy writing evals and going to 
meetings at the district.  By the time I got home, it was 2000.”   
4. Outputs and Outcomes  
The 97-98 performed as well, or better than most recruiting districts during that 
time frame.  The district achieved national recognition as the Bronze Medalist (for third 
place overall standing) in 1998.  The success factors as defined by the district were all 
met.  The command made accession goal, the recruiters enjoyed good quality of life and 
improprieties were minimized.  Although NCO goal was not achieved, it was not 
considered a key success factor for the district in that era. 
In the end, this system provides recruits to fill billets at sea.  More specifically, 
the recruiters fill bootcamp with qualified personnel in the form of shippers.  As far as 
Region West was concerned, the primary measure of output and indicator of district 
performance was not how close the district get to monthly shipping goal, but how much 
over shipping goal the district can provide.  San Diego’s goal was increased almost every 
                                                 
157 Headquarters Personnel, August 2002. 
158 Ibid. 
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month in order to “cover” for those districts that were going to come up short on their 
goals.  
The implications of not making goal were felt both within and external to the 
command.  If the district did not make shipping goal (which never happened), the 
recruiters would probably have felt very disappointed.  “The district didn’t want to miss 
any goals, especially shipping and NCO.  With shipping, that’s where the rubber meets 
the road.”159  When the possibility arose that the district might miss shipping goal, then 
the district went into high gear to find DEPpers that would ship early. 
External to the command, Region West would not have made many of their 
monthly goals if not for NRD SD.  In fact, CNRC counted on NRD San Diego to make 
NCO and shipping goal on at least two occasions.  One particular month, the district 
received a personal call from the nation’s EPO asking for one more contract so that the 
nation could make NCO goal for the first time in two years.  The district obliged of 
course and found one more NCO. 
The focus on NCO goal must be re-iterated.  The most effective way to make 
shipping goal was to make NCO goal.  As mentioned, the phrase “making goal” 
specifically meant making NCO goal.  The recruiters concentrated on making NCO goal 
and shipping goal took care of itself.  The recruiters actively, but indirectly, insured The 
district made shipping goal by:  1) actively finding those DEPpers who wanted to leave 
early and 2) ensuring those DEPpers that were supposed to leave in the current month did 
leave. 
C. ANALYSIS OF FIT 
The systems model for the 97-98 district is depicted in Figure 3.21.  1999-2000’s 
system model is shown in Figure 3.22.  Using Harrison’s Questions of Fit framework, 
and values of fit assigned by the author, the study now analyzes the congruence of the 
system elements.  To recap, “YES” and “YES and NO” answers offer positive evidence 
of a “better” congruence between system elements. 
                                                 








































“Navy Town”  School Support 
Culturally Diverse 
No Active Political Support 
Strong History
KEY SUCCESS FACTORS: 











Find and Send accessions to bootcamp.      Professional Development.   
 
TECHNOLOGY: 
Fax Machines.  Telephones.   Pagers.  Did not use latest technology because of time and costs. 
 
STRUCTURE:  
Enlisted Recruiting Structure: 6 zones, with 44 stations, grew from 170 to 200 recruiters in six months.   
EPO in charge of MEPS, EPO Administration and Field. 
CR in charge of Recruiters, EPDS in charge of MEPS.   
First CR was interim and inexperienced, replaced by a new CR. 
Activities between “divisions” of EPO separated with little integration or teamwork. 
 
PEOPLE: 
Recruiters made up of fleet sailors: Chiefs and PO1’s and PO2’s.  10% of the Field CRF’s, filled leadership roles. 
Most of the CRF’s were experienced.  Most of the recruiters were inexperienced. 
Trained for 5  weeks at NORU, who was flooded with new recruiters.  Motivated by QOL, not getting into trouble. 
 
PROCESS/SUBSYSTEMS: 
Human Resource Management- 
NRD has no real choice in who BUPERS sends to the command.  Influx of non-volunteers. 
Recruiters assigned in the Field and District by the CR.  XO/CO also assigned District personnel. 
Poor performers assigned to district-“District Dwellers.” 
Zone Supervisors Responsible for training in zone.  Command Training Officer not a factor in training recruiters. 
Evaluation/Fitness Report was most valued award.  REIP also effective with PO2’s.   
Eval/Fitrep system was slow and timelate. 
Awards given out by EPO, CR or CO on the road.  Began Quarterly awards ceremony. 
Accession and NCO goal attainment rewarded.  Ethical problems punished.  Missing NCO was not punished. 
 
Resources and Controls, Financial Management- 
Not that many resources for which to account 
 
Communication, Information Planning and Decision Making- 
Production Meeting held MWF in 97, every day in 98.  Dept Head meetings held TTh. 
Primary methods of communication: in person, by fax or telephone.  CO sent personal notes to recruiters. 
Admin Comms flow went through XO.  Production Comms flow: CR/EPO/EPDS/LEADS DL to CO.    
 
Other Recruiting Processes- 
DEP-IN , EDVER, DAR and LEADS procedures slow and detracted from production. 
 
CULTURE 
Overriding need to make shipping goal.  Conduct business ethically.  Don’t kill yourself trying to make NCO. 
Lack of teamwork.  Leadership not always on the same page. 
Recruiters did not want to travel to district.  Believed the CO had their best interests in mind. 
OUTPUTS/OUTCOMES 
Made Accession goal every single month.  CNRC’s Bronze Award for third best district.  Improprieties were 
minimized.  NCO goal achieved in 1997, but missed in 1998.  10 of 12 months missed NCO goal.  Considered 
successful by CNRC but not by many Recruiters and CRF’s. 
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Figure 3.21. Systems Model NRD San Diego FY1997-1998.
 OUTPUTS/OUTCOMES 
Made NCO and accession goal for 24 straight months.  Earned CNRC’s District of the Year Award two years in a row. 
Outstanding Quality of Life.  Considered the Premier District in the Nation, a model for others to emulate. 
CULTURE 
Overriding need to make both  shipping and NCO goal.  Make every effort (legally) to make NCO and Shipping goal.
Teamwork and  Leadership very strong.  Ship metaphor and  Winning Team metaphor strongly influenced personnel.
Recruiters enjoyed a good quality of life when making goal.  CRF’s were close-like family.  Individual stations and 




Find and Send accessions to bootcamp.   Build DEP pool by writing Contracts.      Professional Development.   
 
TECHNOLOGY: 
Maximize Technology: Cell phones, VTC, Kiosks,  E-mail, Internet.  Minimize paper and fax machine use 
 
STRUCTURE:  
Enlisted Recruiting Structure: 6 zones, with 44 stations, grew from steadied at 200 recruiters.   
EPO in charge of MEPS, EPO Administration and Field. 
CR in charge of Recruiters, EPDS in charge of MEPS.   
CR and Zone Supes were now experienced. 
Teamwork emphasized between all divisions.  Streamlined structure, dropped CA other unnecessary Admin functions.
 
PEOPLE: 
Recruiters made up of fleet sailors: Chiefs and PO1’s and PO2’s.  10% of the Field CRF’s, filled leadership roles. 
Most of the CRF’s were experienced.  Most of the recruiters were experienced. 
Trained for 5  weeks at NORU..  Motivated by making goal. 
 
PROCESS/SUBSYSTEMS: 
Human Resource Management- 
NRD has no real choice in who BUPERS sends to the command.   
Recruiters assigned in the Field and District by the CR.  XO/CO also assigned District personnel. 
CR rewarded outstanding performers with a district assignment.  District dweller stigma reduced. 
Zone Supervisors Responsible for training in zone.  Command Training Officer not a factor in training recruiters. 
Evaluation/Fitness Report was most valued award.  REIP also effective with PO2’s.   
Eval/Fitrep system was slow and timelate. 
Awards given out almost exclusively by Quarterly Awards ceremony. 
Accession and NCO goal attainment rewarded.  Ethical problems punished, but not as severely.   
 
Resources and Controls, Financial Management- 
Cell phone usage accountability difficult.   
 
Communication, Information Planning and Decision Making- 
Production Mtg held once a week (Wednesday).   Dept Head meetings held MTh, attended by AEPO instead of EPO.
Primary methods of communication: e-mail or cellphone.  CO sent personal notes to recruiters. 
Admin Comms flow went from AEPO to XO.  Production Comms flow: Everyone had direct line to CO. 
Accession Comms flow: Senior Classifier had direct line to CO.. 
 
Other Recruiting Processes- 
DEP-IN , EDVER, DAR and LEADS procedures re-designed and made faster. 
SYSTEM DIRECTION: 
Mission and Vision Statement 
Telephone Calls Road Trips 
Goaling Letter EPO PDL 
Ship Metaphor, Team Metaphor
KEY SUCCESS FACTORS: 
Accession and NCO goal.    
   Good QOL 
Minimize Improprieties. 
Number 1 District in the Nation! 
ENVIRONMENT/CONTEXT: 
“Navy Town”  School Support 
Culturally Diverse 






































Figure 3.22. Systems Model NRD San Diego FY1999-2000. 
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 The following is the analysis of fit using an adapted version of Harrison’s 
Checklist of Fit Method. 
HUMAN RESOURCES 
Structure, Technology, Processes 
 
Did the employees’ skills and training fit their job requirements? 
97-98: NO.  The recruiters were trained by NORU for five and a half weeks prior 
to recruiting.  However, most of these new recruiters were non-volunteers who did not 
want to recruit in the first place.   
Some of the guys didn’t pay attention at NORU because they knew that 
NORU was going to pass them anyway.  They needed them out there.160 
When they arrived at district, the zone supervisors found it difficult to train so 
many recruiters at one time, and so many that had bad attitudes.161  
99-00: YES.  The recruiters received the same training as the 97-98 crew, but 
were more apt to try and succeed and learn.  The zone supervisors were also more 
experienced in this time period and trained the recruiters more effectively when they 
reached the district.  The non-volunteers who were still at the district also received 
additional training.  More importantly, these non-vols now became accountable for goal 
and had to actually start recruiting!   
Were the best people attracted and retained by the rewards and advancement 
opportunities offered?   
97-98: NO.  The best people were attracted to recruiting only because they were 
part of the large group of recruiters that had to recruit.  In other words, there was no real 
selection criteria for most of the recruiters that reported during the 97-98 time period.  
The rewards for recruiting are significant.  Navy Achievement and Navy Commendation 
Medals can be earned, as well as a chance for command advancement (REIP).  The best 
sailor, based on previous experience, is not always the best recruiter.  Because the criteria 
                                                 
160 Recruiter, July 2002 
161 Zone Supervisor, June 2002. 
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for recruiting success revolves around production, the best sales person and not 
necessarily the most squared away sailor, often came away with the rewards.] 
YES and NO.  The best people were attracted to recruiting only because they 
were part of the large group of recruiters that had to recruit.  In other words, there was no 
real selection criteria for most of the recruiters that reported during the 97-98 time period.  
The rewards for recruiting are significant.  Navy Achievement and Navy Commendation 
Medals can be earned, as well as a chance for command advancement (REIP).  The best 
sailor, based on previous experience, is not always the best recruiter.  Because the criteria 
for recruiting success revolves around production, the best sales person and not 
necessarily the most squared away sailor, often came away with the rewards. 
SYSTEM DIRECTION 
Resources 
Were the organization’s strategies and programs supported by available resources? 
97-98: YES. The district was primarily interested in making accession goal.  The 
resources to make that goal were available in the district at that time.  The district 
required a large workforce population to recruit and send to bootcamp.  
99-00: YES. The command had the luxury of increased resources brought on by 
CNRC.  Not only did each recruiter receive a cell-phone, but the government vehicle 
ratio was very close to 1 to 1.  CNRC gave the district a fighting chance to achieve not 
only accession goal, but NCO as well.   
Environment 
Did the organization’s strategies, tactics and objectives help it gain and maintain 
favorable position in its environment? 
97-98: YES.  With the backlash of media negativity dominating the environment, 
CNRC demanded accessions.  NRD San Diego provided them each month.  The strategy 
of the district was to concentrate on making those accession goals and get as close to 
NCO goal as possible.  The external environment (CNRC) during that time period did not 
require NCO goal.  However, there was an internal environment of recruiters and CRF 
personnel who did not find the district’s position favorable.  The constant “kiss and ship” 
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mode in which the district operated wore down at the morale and motivation of the 
recruiters.  The recruiters spent most of their time looking for individuals who could ship 
now, and couldn’t cultivate those potential applicants in high school who would serve to 
make accession goal later. 
99-00: YES.  NRD San Diego gained respect in the communities of Metro San 
Diego, North San Diego County, Riverside County, Anaheim and Las Vegas as a group 
that was concerned about the future of the young people in that area.  As well, San Diego 
was considered the premier district in the nation in all aspects of recruiting.  Admiral 
McGann stated on many occasions how she “wished she could clone” Team San Diego.   
Behavior, Processes, Culture 
Does management express its purposes in ways that create a sense of mission and 
identity among members? 
97-98: YES and NO.  The field and headquarters knew the mission very well, 
make accessions.  Write contracts, but don’t kill yourself on NCO.  “The mission seemed 
hollow” said one CRF.  He continued, “sure, we made shipping goal.  But we constantly 
had stations and zones that missed NCO.  To me, that’s not mission accomplishment.”    
99-00: YES and NO.  The field and headquarters knew the mission very well, 
make goal.  Missing goal was not an option.  As a result, goal was placed above 
everything.  Unfortunately, the headquarters and sometimes even the MEPS personnel 
felt like they were not on equal standing with the recruiters.   
Were efforts to change the organization compatible with current norms, behavior 
and assumptions? 
97-98: YES, but…the only reason they were compatible was because there was 
no real effort to accomplish radical change within the district.  The district was reactive 
as opposed to proactive. 






Did managerial plans and objectives contribute to work, or were they too inflexible 
to handle unforeseen developments? 
97-98: NO.  This is the area where the 97-98 command was weakest.  When NCO 
and accession goal was low, the district “could make goal with its eyes closed,” said one 
zone supervisor.  “Life was good, we could rely on the big zones to make goal for the 
entire district.  The rest of us just kept our heads above water,” added another.  However, 
when the goals increased, the district maintained the way it conducted business, lowering 
its “bar” to just accession goal.  As the 99-00 CO put it, “we were trying to make goal the 
same way we used to…it just wasn’t possible…there was no way to excel by conducting 
business as usual.”   
99-00: YES.  This is where the 99-00 district truly shined.  The entire focus of the 
leadership was to change processes in order to more effectively achieve goal.  Everyone 
in leadership was required to be extremely flexible 
PROCESSES 
Structure, Culture 
Were those people who must work together closely grouped in units or otherwise 
linked structurally? 
97-98: NO.  NRD San Diego is dispersed with many of the recruiters significantly 
geographically separated from both the MEPS and the district headquarters.  Despite the 
geographic isolation, the recruiters must work intimately with the MEPS personnel and 
the district’s Enlisted Programs personnel.  Some of the key players in production, such 
as the EDSPEC are also physically separated from the recruiters and the MEPS, as they 
were required to be on official travel a great deal of the time.  The systems in place to 
help reduce the physical distance, fax machines, landline phones and pagers, worked in 
1997 when the goals were low.  However, these systems became quickly outdated when 
the goal increased significantly in 1998.  
99-00: YES, the Enlisted Programs Department was housed in it’s own area on 
the second floor of the headquarters.  The Commanding officer was located only a few 
steps away, but downstairs.  This allowed enough physical distance but at the same time 
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made the CO accessible.  The MEPS was located 15 minutes from the headquarters, 
while the recruiters were connected via broadband internet, email and cellphones.  Great 
strides were made ease the communication between all the members of the enlisted 
recruiting team. 
Are the procedures for coordinating work and information flows appropriate to the 
tasks and the technology? 
97-98: NO.  The district conducted far too many meetings and the leadership took 
a more active role in areas that could have been delegated.  Production meetings occurred 
every day in 1998, a reactive response to the pressures of the increased goal.  The 
Enlisted Programs Officer, an important hub in the recruiting process, attended upwards 
of seven meetings in a five day workweek, all of which required significant preparation 
time.  Additionally, the EPO performed an inordinate amount of administrative 
paperwork for a department, not having the resources to be able to delegate these 
responsibilities.  The CR and EPO also spent more time on accession goal than they 
could on production.  With the focus on shipping, production suffered.  Training on sales 
and DEP management also fell by the wayside as the recruiters were more concerned 
with finding “immediate-ships” than they were in building up their DEPs.    
99-00: YES. The process improvement effort developed more effective 
procedures.  The district clearly used the latest technology available to achieve that end. 
Are tasks that are poorly understood or require creativity and innovation handled 
by organic structures? 
97-98: YES.  These tasks included methods of achieving the success factors: 
accession goal management, improved quality of life, and reduced improprieties were 
developed by the command leadership.  No outside consultation was requested or 
required.   
99-00: YES, but…not effectively.  It was true that creative ideas came from the 
recruiters and the leadership.  However, it came to a point where the new ideas were not 
allowed to prove their worth before one of the leaders would come up with another idea.  




Are tasks and functions done adequately with minimal overlap?  
97-98: NO.  The recruiters, zone supervisors and CR were not producing contracts 
as effectively as they potentially could have.  The district and nation was concerned with 
accession goal, and settled for “good enough” when it came to NCO.  When the nation 
achieved anything above 90 percent in NCO attainment, the belief was that the districts 
had earned an “A.”  The districts followed suit.  Unfortunately, the result was depleted 
DEPs and exhausted recruiters.   
The EPDS was inefficient.  He was a Chief Petty Officer who lacked leadership 
ability and imagination.  MEPS was looked at as “the enemy” by the recruiters, and not 
as an ally.  The MEPS developed a reputation for not only being inefficient, but for not 
being a team player. 
The current ADMIN structure and methods were ineffective.  Too much time was 
wasted on paperwork and the morale suffered.  Having a CA was redundant.  The XO 
and EPO could re-write their own correspondence.  Having the district ADMIN 
department handling recruiting admin was not effective.  The EPO needed its own 
ADMIN staff. 
The SYSAD was used exclusively for repair and training, not innovation.  The 
two members of this department trained the recruiters on how to use the R-TOOLs 
recruiting software and fixed broken laptops.   
The PAO was retired on active duty.  No one was available to write articles on the 
recruiters or to coordinate much needed positive-advertising campaigns. 
The Zone Supervisors were not all trained and did not have extensive recruiting 
experience.  Those that did have experience were not necessarily good leaders.  
Additionally, some of the zones were not expected to make goal, so they didn’t. 
The EPO was an administrator and tracker, not a leader.  The EPO spent most of 
her time doing double work with evaluations. Overall, no delegation occurred.  There was 
a lot of micromanagement, especially by the XO and EPO. 
Unfortunately, there was too little time to innovate on the CO’s watch. 
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99-00: YES.  Most of the redundancy problems were solved or improved by the 
1999-2000 leadership.  Administration, LEADS conversion, control of the shipping 
process were all recognized and improved by the leadership.  DEP management was not 
clearly defined, however.  As a result, there were several layers of DEP leadership with 
no one fully in charge. 
STRUCTURE 
People, Processes, Culture 
Do members regard official rules and procedures as fair and sensible? 
97-98: YES and NO.  The recruiters felt that they were being stretched to the 
limits with accession goal and reaching 90 percent, to try to always 100 percent for the 
district would be even more.  On the contrary, those recruiters who strived to make NCO 
did not like the fact that others who were not making goal were not being held 
accountable for what they perceived as “failure.” 
99-00: YES, most recruiters felt they were fair.  Those in “difficult” stations were 
sometimes discouraged, however.  Their attitude quickly changed when they were 
viewed by the rest of the recruiters and the leadership as using their difficult markets as 
excuses for not making goal.  The culture of the district did not tolerate complainers. 
Do reward and control mechanisms encourage behavior and group norms that are 
compatible with managerial objectives? 
97-98: YES.  The primary mission was to make accession goal.  If the district did 
this, then there was no punishment.  The district did not stretch to achieve NCO, which 
precluded any “risk-taking” to go the extra mile.  Finally, the recruiters were rewarded if 
they did not do anything ethically wrong. 
99-00: YES.  The recruiters, for the most part, valued awards for performance.  
More importantly, most appreciated being awarded in front of their peers.  The quarterly 
awards ceremonies were very popular with the recruiters, especially those who knew they 
were going to win an award.  On the contrary, many recruiters felt inspired or motivated 
by not winning an award.  That is, not winning made them try harder to win.  Every 
recruiter also competed on an equal footing.  Even though their station was not 
historically a powerhouse, the awards system was organized and written so that all 
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stations and all recruiters had an equitable chance to win awards.  As well, the individual 
recruiter, especially if he or she was a Petty Officer second class, was motivated by the 
possibility of REIP.  The district made it clear that REIPS were given out to those who 
not only wrote contracts, but displayed a whole sailor concept of excellence.  Therefore, 
even those recruiters who were assigned to lower production stations could compete with 
the big number writers in the “power” stations. 
Technology, Environment 
Are the structures of the organization differentiated enough to allow them to handle 
their special problems created by their particular environments, technologies, and 
tasks?  
97-98: NO. The zone supervisors could not autonomously handle problems as 
much as they wanted.  The CR wanted them to, but realized that many of them could not 
be trusted or could not handle the responsibility. 
The EPO did not run her department with autonomy.  The XO constantly inquired 
about admin and personnel issues while the CO “rode her back”162 on production issues. 
The CR had to deal with dissension amongst her zone supervisors which 
prevented effective problem-handling. Some of the zone supervisors did not respect the 
CR and her ability, so they did not cooperate. 
99-00:  YES, almost every sub-organization was autonomous.  The Enlisted 
Programs Department operated with the complete confidence of the Commanding officer.  
Many process re-structuring decisions were made and implemented within the 
department in the areas without the CO’s prior approval.  The Chief Recruiter was 
allowed to run the enlisted recruiting effort without any micro-management from the 
EPO or CO.  The MEPS, in turn, was managed by the EPDS with expert efficiency.  The 
EPO and CO trusted the EPDS to use his 35 years of experience to change many outdated 




                                                 




Does the physical and geographic layout of the organization contribute to the flow of 
work and information? 
97-98: NO.  As with all districts, the geographic layout of the organization 
detracts from the flow of work and information.  With stations as much as five hours 
away by car and no airport access, the geographic layout hinders the flow of information 
and of work.  Said one recruiter,  
It’s disheartening to drive all the way to MEPS to put in an applicant you 
thought was fully qualified and then have the Doctor or one of the 
processors tell you that he or she is not.  Then we have to take that long 
drive back, trying to explain to the applicant how messed up our system is. 
Recruiters from the northern areas faced constant traffic on the I-805, I-15, I-8 
and I-5.  Recruits and recruiters from Las Vegas had to deal with delays and crowded 
flights.  There was also 2-5 hour one-way roadtrips from non air-accessible areas such as 
Victorville and Barstow and Lake Havasu.  
99-00: NO.  As with all recruiting districts, the geographic dispersion of the 
recruiting stations detracts from the work and information of the organization.  However, 
the 99-00 leadership recognized this and made every effort to improve connectivity.   
People, Processes 
Were group actions and decisions free from bitter conflicts or power struggles? 
97-98: NO.  There was dissension between some members of the upper 
leadership.  Although not visible to the field, headquarters personnel were well aware of 
the personal conflicts occurring with the leaders. Many were indirectly forced to side-
track their business with the leaders if an argument was occurring. 
99-00: YES and NO.  There were minor power struggles regarding accessions 
issues between the Senior Classifier and the CR.  As well, there were some production 
conflicts between the MEPS and the Recruiters; and more specifically, between the 
EPDS and  Zone Supes/Recruiters Rivalry.  However, these conflicts did not get in the 




Did rewards and controls encourage desirable competition? 
97-98: NO.  The recruiters that were assigned in the non-producing zones did not 
believe they had a chance to win awards.  As well, the headquarters and MEPS personnel 
felt segregated from the recruiters when it came to awards.  The focus of the awards 
instruction was on the recruiters.   
99-00:  YES.  The headquarters staff still believed that the recruiters hoarded all 
the awards, but to a lesser extent.  The command established new awards including 
“Support Person of the Month” and the “Heavy Hitter” award, which was open to all 
personnel to recognize everyone in the district.  However, some of the MEPS personnel 
still felt that they “were short-changed”163 with awards because 80 percent of the awards 
budget was spent for recruiters.  To alleviate this, MEPS personnel were eligible for the 
Support Person of the Month Award. 
Do people and units have enough power and resources to accomplish their tasks 
adequately? 
97-98: NO. The recruiters were behind the times in technology and 
communication.  Communication and transportation was slow.  The recruiters often had 
to wait for a vehicle to come back to their station to transport an applicant because there 
were so few cars to go around.  In order to make a phone call, the frustrated recruiter had 
to either go to a recruiting station or a pay phone.    
99-00: YES.  The command and CNRC made a concerted effort to ensure that the 
recruiters had the resources available to successfully accomplish their tasks.  CNRC 
increased the number of government vehicles, approved a budget for cell phones, 
increased the number of REIPS, re-structured it’s reward process to incentivize making 
NCO goal and improved morale by introducing such programs as Remote Delayed Entry 
Program, DEP Enrichment and reformed waiver policies.164   
Figure 3.23 provides a comparison of the Harrison Summary of Fit Analyses for 
the district in 1997-1998 and 1999-2000. 
 
                                                 
163 MEPS Personnel, November 2002. 
164 CNRC reduced the level of waiver approval on some waivers from the CNRC level to the 
Commanding Officer level. 
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Analysis Query Answer / Score Answer/ Score 
Did employees’ skills and training fit their job requirements? 
 











S T Pr 
Were the best people attracted and retained by the rewards 
and advancement opportunities offered? 
YES & NO 1 YES & NO 1 
R Were the organization’s strategies and programs be supported 
by available resources? 
YES 2 YES 2 
E Did the organization’s strategies, tactics and objectives help it 
gain and maintain a favorable position in its environment? 
YES & NO 1 YES 1 
Did management express its purposes in ways that create a 
sense of mission and identity among members? 
YES 2 YES 2 
Pr C 
Were efforts to change the organization compatible with 
current norms, behavior and assumptions? 








C Pr Did managerial plans and objectives contribute to work, or 
were they too inflexible to handle unforeseen developments? 
NO 0 YES 2 
Were those people who must work together closely grouped in 
units or otherwise linked structurally? 
NO 0 YES 2 
Were the procedures for coordinating work and information 
flows appropriate for the tasks and the technology? 
NO 
 
0 YES 2 
S C 
Were task that are poorly understood or require creativity 
and innovation handled by organic structures? 





S Are tasks and functions done adequately with minimal 
overlap?   
NO 0 YES 2 
Did members regard official rules and procedures as fair and 
sensible? 
NO 0 YES & NO 1 
Pe Pr 
C Did reward and control mechanisms encourage behavior and 
group norms that were compatible with managerial 
objectives? 
YES 2 YES 2 
T E Were the structures of the organization differentiated enough 
to allow them to handle their special problems created by their 
particular environments, technologies and tasks? 
NO 0 YES 2 
T Pr Did the physical and geographic layout of the organization 
contribute to the flow of work and information? 
NO 0 NO 1 
Were group actions and decisions free from bitter conflicts or 
power struggles? 
NO 0 YES & NO 1 







Did people and units have enough power and resources to 
accomplish their tasks adequately? 
YES 2 YES 2 
TOTAL POINTS 13  30 
Key:S-Structure T-Technology Pr-Processes R-Resources E-Environment C-Culture Pe-People 
 
Figure 3.23. Comparison of Checklist of Fit Analyses: NRD San Diego, 1997-1998 and 
1999-2000. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
According to the Checklist of Fit Analysis and the assigned scores, the 99-00 
district performed more effectively and efficiently as a system than the 97-98 district.  
There were notable similarities and differences in the two systems.   
1.  Similarities 
Both districts considered themselves successful.  The System direction established 
by the leadership of both districts appeared very effective.  As well, success factors were 
clearly defined and obtainable.  System direction fit with the available resources, the 
environment, the processes, and culture of each district.   
The environment in 97-98 did not demand the attainment of New Contract 
Objective (NCO).  With most districts struggling to make accession goal, NCO goal was 
considered “nice to have” but not necessary.  NRD San Diego thus focused its effort on 
making monthly accession goal, which it did the entire two years.  San Diego was 
CNRC’s bronze award winner as the third best district in the nation in 1998, and silver 
award winner as the second best district in 1997.      
There was a renewed interest in making NCO goal in 1999.  Diminished DEP 
pools forced CNRC to impose new requirements for NCO attainment as well as shipping 
goal attainment.  CNRC realized that without a large DEP, accessions and thus the 
bootcamp population would decrease.  Although (as a whole) CNRC did not make NCO 
for most of 1999 and 2000, individual districts like San Diego, Los Angeles and New 
York consistently achieved monthly NCO goal.  NRD San Diego missed NCO in October 
of 1998 (1st month of FY1999).  The district has made every monthly NCO since to date.  
With the increase in NCO came a larger DEP pool.  The larger DEP pool resulted in 
increased accessions.  Therefore, San Diego has also made every monthly shipping goal 
since then.  The transformed 1999 district earned CNRC’s gold award as the number one 
NRD in the nation.  The district then followed that up with a repeat gold award in 
FY2000. 
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Both districts had little to no control over assignment/selection of incoming 
recruiters.  Fleet personnel, either voluntary or non-voluntary, made up the bulk of the 
recruiting force.  Volunteers were attracted by the rewards and advancement 
opportunities of recruiting.  Non-volunteers simply had no choice.  The only difference 
between the two systems is that the 97-98 district received a larger percentage of 
recruiters after FY97 than usual as a result of CNRC’s effort to increase the total 
population of recruiters to 5000.   
There was identifiable tension between the recruiters and support personnel in 
both time periods.  The structure did not fit with the people, processes and culture.  
Members did not generally regard official rules and procedures as fair and sensible.  
Headquarters personnel felt as if they were, as one member put it, the “red-headed step 
child” of the district.  With the emphasis on contracts; all rewards, goals and success 
factors were geared towards the recruiters. 
The recruiters in both districts performed up to the established expectations.  The 
structure fit with the processes, people and culture.  The reward and control mechanism 
encouraged behavior and group norms were compatible with managerial objectives.  
Although NCO was important to the 97-98 district, accessions were the overriding 
concern.  Many recruiters were not overly concerned about missing NCO.  The 99-00 
district was expected to make all goals, and the processes developed appeared to 
positively impact the culture of the district.  NCO was now expected and making NCO 
was rewarded. 
Each district operated with relatively the same amount of resources.  The people 
of each system appeared to have enough power and resources to accomplish their tasks 
adequately.  The 97-98 district had relatively less goal than the 99-00 district.  The 99-00 
district had more people and more resources to achieve the higher goal. 
2.  Differences 
The people in the 97-98 system appeared less capable to perform their duties than 
those in 99-00.  The recruiters’ skills and training did not appear to fit their job 
requirements in 97-98.  These recruiters appeared ill-prepared for the large goal increase.  
They were predominantly non-volunteers assigned into recruiting by the Navy.  The 99-
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00 personnel appeared more seasoned and experienced.  There were a greater number of 
voluntary recruiters as well.  The recruiters who enjoyed smaller goals that could not 
cope with the increased requirements had departed the command.  The leadership had the 
time to re-engineer processes to encourage development of a new culture as well.  CNRC 
also gave the 99-00 district more resources to perform their duties. 
The 99-00 district leadership’s increased flexibility appeared to positively affect 
management of unforeseen change.  In other words, the system direction fit better with 
the culture and processes in 99-00, than in 97-98.  The 97-98 district was filled with 
individuals, both in leadership and in the ranks, who adamantly stuck by traditional 
methods and processes.  They appeared to believe that doing things the old way would 
still be effective in the new environment.  The 99-00 leadership realized the shortcomings 
of the “old ways” and feverishly developed new processes.   
The method of system direction were vastly different in each district.  The 97-98 
district used less imaginative ways of providing direction, while the 99-00 district 
employed metaphors, incentives and visions. 
Accountability was also more pronounced in 99-00.  Missing NCO was not an 
option, and those individuals, stations and zones that did miss goal had to personally 
explain why to the Chief Recruiter, Enlisted Programs Officer and Commanding officer.  
In the previous command, zones and stations that tended to always miss goal were 
indirectly allowed to miss.  That is, those recruiters, RINCS and zone supervisors in the 
historically difficult areas were given latitude when it came to NCO. 
Communication and structure improved in 99-00.  Technological advances, flatter 
lines of communication, and less rigid organizational structures contributed to better 
performance in the 99-00 organization.  The 97-98 district operated with older 
technology, hierarchical communication flows and a rigid command structure.     
The 97-98 NRD processes appeared more redundant and inefficient.  The 
structure of the 97-98 district did not fit well with the processes. The administration, 
DAR and FITREP/EVAL process improved in the 99-00 district.  New positions such as 
the Public Affairs Strike Team and Enlisted Processing Officer further improved 
command performance.  Eliminating such positions as the Chief Administrator prevented 
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overlap in several processes.  The re-structuring of the LEADS and MEPS department in 
99-00 were also instrumental in improving the command’s performance. 
99-00’s organizational structures were more autonomous.  Everyone was under 
the microscope in 97-98.  Organizations within the district, such as specific zones, MEPS 
and each department, were not allowed to handle special problems on their own.  The 99-
00 command encouraged taking care of problems at the lowest level possible.  Of course, 
serious problems such as ethical misconduct were handled at the highest level.  However, 
possible improprieties and minor investigations were handled at the lower levels. 
The 99-00 awards system appeared to spark increased competition in 99-00.  The 
culture of 99-00 placed an emphasis on “winning.”  Winning equated to NCO 
achievement.  The awards system rewarded NCO achievement.  As a result, competition 
increased among all the individual recruiters, stations and zones.  In 97-98, competition 
was heavy only among those zones and stations that were located in historically 
productive markets.  The other zones and stations simply appeared more apathetic and 
did not appear to try as hard. 
The emergent cultures were different.  One of the most notable differences 
between the 97-98 NRDSD and the 99-00 versions were the cultures.  The norms and 
values evolved from a district that seemingly was “afraid to recruit” and afraid of reprisal 
to one that wanted to recruit and savored success.  As one recruiter put it, the district 
went from “being ‘hit and miss’ to never missing.”   
“The way they did things” was different causing attitudes and expectations to be 
different.  The expectation was different.  Motivational factors were different.  The 
culture appeared to facilitate integrated effort.  The relaxed conditions, coupled with the 
seemingly innate drive and energy of the recruiters and the command, led to the 
remarkable results already discussed. 
There was also a greater sense of teamwork amongst the recruiters.  Although 
competition was fierce, the recruiters viewed each other more as “family, than 
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competition.”165  The zone supervisors “were always on the same page” and to a person, 
completely respected the CR’s leadership and recruiting ability.166   
There was more delegation of duties in 99-00.  The EPO delegated several 
significant jobs to his Chief Recruiter, Assistant EPO, the EPO Administrator, the EPDS 
and Statistician.  The Commanding officer and Executive allowed the EPO to handle 
many procedures they previously performed such as waiver interviews, accession 
management, FITREP processing and DEP leadership. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
NRD San Diego should continue to evaluate and improve methods of system 
direction, critical success factors, processes/subsystems, structure/organization and use 
and procurement of technology to ensure that a productive and positive culture emerges, 
thereby improving the chances for overall success. 
The command should allow its sub-organizations to operate with as much 
autonomy as possible.  This promotes trust and confidence within the organization and 
reduces the negative stigma of micro-management. 
The command should continue to encourage delegation and training of its more 
junior members in order to develop a technical knowledge-base and instill leadership in 
each of its members. 
NRD SD should continue to improve its relations with external political, 
academic and social organizations to better fit with its environment. 
The district should extensively invest in leadership training to promote a continual 
line of effective leaders and managers. 
The command should continue to emphasize New Contract Objective as the 
primary goal.  Making NCO appears to lead to better quality of life and healthy 
competition, and appears to help ensure the district makes accession as well. 
As of January 2003, NRD San Diego has continued its streak of months making 
NCO and Shipping goal.  The “streak” is up to 51 straight months.  The command was 
                                                 
165 Recruiter, October 2001. 
166 Zone Supervisor, November 2002. 
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also awarded a third straight District of the Year Award in 2001.  With continuous 
process improvement, an emphasis on goal attainment and energetic and innovative 
leadership, Navy Recruiting District San Diego should maintain its stature as the premier 























APPENDIX A.  LIST OF INTERVIEWEES, PERSONAL 
COMMUNICATIONS AND CONVERSATIONS 
              NRD San Diego 
 
Commanding Officers, 99-00 
Executive Officer, 99-00 
Chief Recruiters, 97-00 
Enlisted Programs Officers, 97-00 
Assistant Enlisted Programs Officer, 99-00 
LEADS Supervisors, 97-00 
Executive Secretary 
Zone 1 Supervisor 
Zone 2 Supervisor 
Zone 3 Supervisor 
Zone 4 Supervisor 
Zone 5 Supervisor 




Chief Petty Officer Urbiztondo, NRS Imperial Beach 
Petty Officer King, Recruiter, NRS Chula Vista 
Petty Officer Briones, Recuiter, NRS Clairemont 
Petty Officer Jordan, NRS Chula Vista 
Petty Officer Hanson, NRS Victorville 
Petty Officer Erceg, NRS Victorville 
Petty Officer Gunn, NRS Riverside 
Ensign Mercado, NRS National City 
Chief Petty Officer Roth, NRS National City 
Chief Petty Officer Beck, Headquarters 
Chief Petty Officer Chambers, NRS Oceanside 
Chief Petty Officer Luciano, NRS Hemet 
Petty Officer Heurtelou, NRS National City  
Chief Petty Officer Adams, NRS Chula Vista 
Petty Officer Caballero, NRS Garden Grove 
Petty Officer Manansala, NRS Mira Mesa 
Petty Officer Su, NRS Garden Grove 
Chief Petty Officer Reed, Region West 
Petty Officer Long, NRS Las Vegas West 
Petty Officer Medders, NRS Henderson 
Petty Officer Gresens, NRS Victorville 
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APPENDIX B.  INTERVIEW PROTOCOL∗ 
This interview is being conducted as part of the research for my masters’ thesis.  I 
am conducting an organizational analysis of NRD San Diego.  The primary purpose of 
my research is to analyze the structure, processes, information systems, and both internal 
and external relationships of both organizations over the years 1997-2000.  More 
specifically, I am interested in the organizational differences in the district between the 
periods 1997-98 and 1999-2000. 
The results of this interview will be used to compare the similarities and 
differences of the two districts.  Anything said will be cited unless you request it remain 
confidential and/or anonymous.  I would like to record this interview. 
Background 
1. What is your career background?   
2. How long have you been in this position?  
3. Are you a non-volunteer or volunteer recruiter?   
4. Have you had any previous recruiting experience? 
5. If you were here in 1997, generally compare and contrast the district back 
then to how it is now? 
Mission and Structure 
6. What, in your opinion, is the overall purpose of NRD San Diego? 
7. What are your responsibilities? 
8. What would you say are the “inputs” of the organization in terms of 
history, information and resources? 
9. What would you say are the “outputs and outcomes” of this organization? 
10. Who depends on these outputs? 
11. How does this organization compare to other naval commands; how is it 
different? The same? 
12. What individuals or organizations have an impact on getting your job 
done? 
13. How are decisio
                                                
ns made? 
 
∗ Interview protocol was a basic framework.  Actual interviews were tailored towards the interviewee. 
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14. Would you describe your organization as being autonomous or is it an 
organization with a lot of interdependence on other agencies? 
15. How do you spend the majority of your time during a typical day? 
Technology 
16. How do you communicate with each other? 
17. What are the information systems used by this organization? 
18. Are you able to get the information you need in order to make decisions? 
19. What information would you like to see that you aren’t able to now? 
People and Rewards 
20. Besides NORU, what other training have you received? 
21. How long would you say it takes someone to learn how to become an 
effective recruiter? 
22. Is turnover problem in this organization? 
23. Are the awards and compensation systems in place enough to motivate 
you in performing your job?  What are the rewards and compensations? 
24. How would you define success? 
25. What are the reasons for the command’s success/failure? 
26. How would you describe the culture of the organization? 
27. How has leadership contributed to the culture of the command?   
28. How are you rewarded for your success? 
Miscellaneous 
29. If you were CO for a day, what would you change in this organization? 
30. Why are other districts better/worse than you?  Why? 
31. What would you say are the most significant processes that occur here? 




APPENDIX C.  SAMPLE GOALING LETTER 99-00 
From: Commanding Officer, Navy Recruiting District San Diego 
To: TEAM SD 
 
Subj: GOALING LETTER, FEB 2000 
 
1. HAT’S OFF TO THE FINEST TEAM IN THE NATION!  Your fantastic effort 
in January got the ship underway a day early.  When all was said and done, you achieved 
106 percent of NCO, number one in the nation!  You wrote an impressive 242 net 
contracts.  You hit 104 percent A-CELL,182 percent PUMG, 111 percent CRITS, 100 
percent NUKE and a remarkable 185 percent WF mission. Currently, 29 stations are at 
100 percent FY goal and 9 stations are above 85 percent. All zones are at 100 percent!  
Remember…our true goal this year is every station, every zone. 
2. Once again, you made shipping goal for the nation last month.  Not only did you 
ensure The district made our original goal of 177, you easily delivered on an extra 19 
requested by AREA.  Your tireless dedication to writing workforce contracts resulted in 
over-shipping for the month of February (by 40 to be exact). The DEP Slopes for March, 
April and May are steep; but as always, I trust you will all meet the challenge head on.  
 
3. The new contract goal this month is 238.  Continue to start strong and do it right 
by making the early gates.  As shown in the last couple of months, you avoid the 
frenzied, high-volume Mission Days (and Nights) by making 25 percent and 50 percent 
gates.  I must also emphasize that we need male and upper female contracts. As you may 
know, The district have almost no female lower seats for the remainder of the fiscal year.  
Lower females will be processed for physicals only and may be brought back at the end 
of the month if the seats are available.   
 
4. I’d like to bring up three important points regarding DEP leadership: 
a. First, I applaud your effort to identify attrites early.  Doing so has given 
you a clear picture of your true DEP posture.   
b. Second, an outstanding tool is now available to you to maintain the morale 
and enthusiasm of your deppers.  The Fleet Mentoring program is up and 
running but needs your energy to make it effective.  If you have a depper 
who would like to know more about his/her rating, please contact the EPO 
ASAP.  There may be a mentor who can “show the ropes” to your depper.   
c. Finally, treat your deppers with dignity and respect.  If you believe you 
have an RTO that needs to speak with me, please let the CR know 
immediately.  I am willing to speak to an RTO if you believe that depper 
needs some re-affirmation of his/her commitment. 
 
5. Through NALTS, local LEADS and RTC referrals, LEADS was responsible for 
45 percent of New Contract Objective for January.  Our Leads Team is #2 in the 
nation and is about to overtake the lead.  You are within standards both with 
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national and local leads.  Make no mistake, there is a direct correlation between 
LEADS success and district success.  Keep using those Leads! 
 
6. You are truly the best recruiters in the nation.  You have proven your skills 
beyond refute.  You have displayed your grit beyond belief.  You’ve 
demonstrated a tenacity and enthusiasm that all districts should emulate.  Not so 
long ago…last January to be exact, the district had to write 50 contracts on the 
last day.  This month, you ended up with almost 50 DDD’s!  And because we are 
forward thinking and because we believe in quality of life, I will do my best to 
roll up some goal from June into May so that you can better enjoy the summer 
months.  Keep on keepin’ on Team SD.  You’re rolling way past District of the 
Year Standards and living up to your billing as the “Best of the Best!” 
      
     CO 
 








APPENDIX D.  (EXCERPT FROM) SAMPLE EPO PASSDOWN LOG 
99-00 
EPO PASSDOWN LOG, 14 DEC 2000 
 
I’m gonna try to make this short because I’ve heard some complaints about the 
lengthiness of these passdown logs.  In fact, a certain Senior Chief said “it’s hard to read 
because it’s too long…” When I told this Chief Woods, his response was…”The real 
reason it’s hard for Senior Chief to read because he doesn’t know how to 
read…somebody has to read it to him.”  Now…I’m not trying to make fun of anybody’s 
learning deficiencies or anything like that, I’m just repeating what Chief Woods said to 
me on 28SEP at 1432 PM on my cellphone while I was driving to MEPS.  Anyway, let 
me continue with the final PDL of FY99: 
The CO said it best: “Losers quit when they’re tired, winners quit when they 
have won.”   
 
The stats say it 2nd best:  
• #1 in NCO attainment. 
• #1 in Accessions to bootcamp. 
• All Zones made FY goal! 
• 33 of 41 stations made FY goal. 
• LVWEST, REDLANDS, COLLEGE GROVE, SANTEE, 
BULLHEAD CITY and ORANGE made up their FY deficits in 
September and made FY Goal.  They battled until they won. 
• Zone 2 made a spectacular comeback! And not only locked out early, 
but made up an 8 contract deficit to make FY goal! 
• Every zone made all wickets except for one that missed Nuke, although 
they had enough to write, but PRIDE and CNRC would not let us…so I 
consider them making it.  That’s…ALL WICKETS!  Think about it, 
that’s amazing! 
• Zone 3 wrote over 858 gross contracts…damn! 
• LVEast, Chula Vista, El Cajon, El Centro, Victorville, and National 
City never missed monthly goal. 
• Zone 6 and Zone 4 made FY goal, the first time in a long time they have 
done that. 
• Zone 5 made all months, except for one month where they missed by a 
gnat’s you know what, well. 
• PO McCormick wrote 9 NCO’s.  PO King wrote 9 NCO’s.  PO Briones 
wrote 7 NCO’s. PO Gresens wrote 7 NCO’s.  PO Culpepper wrote 5 
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NCO’s.  PO Ferrari wrote 6 NCO’s.  PO Ramos wrote 5 NCO’s.  PO 
Lorenzo wrote 5 NCO’s.  HT2 Johnson wrote 5 NCO’s.  Damn… 
I’m proud of each and every one of you, and please, please forgive me if I miss 
you, but these are some things I will remember about this FY: 
• How the CR and I came back from goaling conference last year with a, as 
she says it “pretty dern high goal” but we both knew that you all could 
make it.  And as she said “they sho did, huh.” 
• How we rolled up over 70 DDD’s and then someone came up with the 
bright idea of not letting us keep them…but you wrote them nonetheless. 
• Visiting Zone 4 for the first time and seeing how fired up they all 
were…even though the conditions over there are sometimes unbearable.  
But they still looked sharp in their uniforms, even though they were 
uncomfortable. 
• Meeting PO Hansen and him telling me “ Can you say…I’m gonna blow 
up this year EPO”  and he did.  And he plays a good game of golf too. 
• The then XO (CDR Wynne) looking me in the eye at the end of last FY, 
saying…”We know your guys were good last year…the best…But this 
year, We want you to help me instill in them the idea of  
• TEAM.  That we want to be winners only for each other and for the 
TEAM.” 
• Petty Officer Suh and I screaming at the top of our lungs on the speaker 
phone talking about some crazy things, like his two hour commute from 
Chula Vista to Garden Grove every day. 
In fact I love you all and I’m looking forward to another great year.  There’s only 
one direction TEAM SD is going…and that’s UP.  We’ve got essentially the same goals 
this year.  You’ve had a whole year to figure out how to do it…you should put it in 
another gear.  I asked you to leave no doubt about who was the best and you did.  You 
put in the extra effort, stepped on the gas a little bit more, and came out on top.  You have 
proven time and time again that with a little sweat, a lot of talent and whole lot of heart, 
you can do anything.  You are the best!  You are the best!  You are the best! 
 
Feels Nice at the Top don’t it? 
Feels Great in the Winner’s Circle as well. 
 
I’ll say it again in case you forgot: 
 
“There ain’t no team like the one I got” 
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